| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Ash field_policies are documented to protect against filter-based information disclosure: when a field the actor may not see is referenced in a filter, it is replaced with an expression that evaluates to nil, so a filter cannot be used as a yes/no oracle to read a value the actor cannot see.
This nilling was applied to attributes but not to calculations or aggregates. A user-supplied filter reference to a calculation or aggregate carries an Ash.Query.Calculation / Ash.Query.Aggregate struct, which the authorizer's reference replacement did not match (it only matched the Ash.Resource.* structs), so the filter ran against the real value.
As a result, an actor whose field policies forbid a calculation or aggregate can still filter by it (for example filter(secret_calc == "x") or filter(comment_count == n)) and learn the value from whether rows match — an oracle that recovers field-policy-protected values one probe at a time. Filtering is commonly exposed to lower-privileged actors (for example via AshGraphql or AshJsonApi filter arguments), which is exactly the surface field policies are meant to protect.
The fix routes filter references to calculations and aggregates through the same field-policy nilling as attributes.
This issue affects ash: from 2.11.0-rc.0 before 3.33.4. |
| AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool's existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3. |
| AshLua exposes Ash read actions to Lua scripts run through an eval action. A read call accepts an operation (list, min, max, first, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.
Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A script could therefore read a field the calling actor's field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate instead of as a field. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The prior hardening only enforced the exposed-field allow-list (field visibility), which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.
The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource's field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.
This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.2. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to store a value of arbitrary size in an attribute whose length constraint should bound it.
Ash measures string length with Elixir's String.length/1, which counts Unicode graphemes, in the max_length and min_length constraints of Ash.Type.String (apply_constraints/2 in lib/ash/type/string.ex), in Ash.Resource.Validation.StringLength, and in the string_length expression function. A grapheme carries an unbounded number of combining marks, so a base character followed by a million combining acute accents is one grapheme and megabytes of data, and satisfies max_length: 2. Where the data layer imposes no independent limit (ETS, Mnesia, or a Postgres text column) the whole value is persisted, so an attacker can write an entire request body into an attribute declared with a small maximum and grow storage without bound.
The counting unit also disagrees with the storage layer, which counts codepoints rather than graphemes, so a value accepted by the constraint can still be rejected or truncated by the column. A Postgres varchar(n) column bounds the value itself and is not exposed.
This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.33.0. |
| Improper Authentication vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server allows an unauthenticated attacker to register OAuth clients even when Dynamic Client Registration is gated by an initial access token.
resolve_secret/3 in AshAuthentication.Oauth2Server (reached through __resolve_secret__!) treated any return other than {:ok, _} or :error from a configured {module, function, args} or 2-arity-function secret provider as a valid secret, wrapping nil, false, or "" as {:ok, value}. When the initial_access_token resolves to such an empty value, POST /oauth/register compares the presented bearer token against it and the comparison passes with no token supplied, so registration is open although it was configured closed. The same fail-open affected other resolved secrets such as signing_secret.
This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.1.0 before 0.3.1. |
| Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server allows an attacker who controls a client metadata URL and its DNS to make the server connect to internal or loopback addresses.
public_ip?/1 in AshAuthentication.Oauth2Server.CIMD.ReqFetcher enforces the outbound policy for CIMD metadata fetches. It classified several address forms as publicly routable that are not: IPv4-compatible ::/96 (for example ::127.0.0.1), SIIT IPv4-translated ::ffff:0:0:0/96, and deprecated site-local fec0::/10. A returned AAAA record in one of these ranges passed the policy, so a fetch pinned to that address reached space the policy was meant to block.
This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.3.0 before 0.3.1. |
| Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server allows an unauthenticated attacker to inject arbitrary authentication parameters into the WWW-Authenticate challenge header.
BearerPlug and RequireScopePlug built the Bearer resource_metadata="..." challenge by interpolating a resource_metadata URL derived from the request tenant directly into the quoted value. In a multi-tenant application that sets the Ash tenant from request-controlled data (a subdomain, the Host, a path segment, or a header), a tenant containing a " closes the quoted value and appends attacker-chosen auth-params, including a second resource_metadata URL pointing at an attacker-controlled authorization server that spec-following clients follow. Carriage returns and line feeds are rejected by Plug, so this is parameter injection within one header, not response splitting.
This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.1.3 before 0.3.1. |
| Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server allows a shared HTTP cache to serve one tenant's OAuth discovery metadata to another tenant's clients.
The RFC 8414 and RFC 9728 metadata endpoints in AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Oauth2Server.ProtocolRouter return tenant-specific values (issuer, authorization_endpoint, token_endpoint, jwks_uri) when a tenant is set, but sent them with Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600 and no Vary. When the tenant is derived from something other than the URL (a header or the Host) and a shared cache sits in front, the cache key is the URL alone, so a stored response for one tenant is served to another for up to an hour. Affected clients may then send authorization codes and secrets to the wrong tenant's token endpoint and validate tokens against the wrong keys.
This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.1.3 before 0.3.1. |
| Improper Protection of Alternate Path vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server exposes the state-changing OAuth endpoints under an unintended URL prefix, bypassing controls scoped to the canonical prefix.
oauth2_server_protocol_routes/1 in AshAuthentication.Phoenix.Oauth2Server.Router forwards the same ProtocolRouter at both the /oauth prefix and the /.well-known prefix. Phoenix forward strips the matched prefix before dispatch, so the full route table answers under both mounts, and POST /register, POST /token, and POST /revoke are reachable as /.well-known/register, /.well-known/token, and /.well-known/revoke. Edge controls such as WAF rules, rate limits, or authentication exemptions written against the /oauth paths, or that allow-list /.well-known as unauthenticated, do not apply to the alias.
This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.1.0 before 0.3.1. |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ash-project ash_authentication_oauth2_server allows an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust database storage and memory.
The /authorize endpoint is unauthenticated by design. With Client ID Metadata Documents enabled, resolve_client/3 in AshAuthentication.Oauth2Server.CIMD fetches the document for each new URL-shaped client_id and upserts a client row, with no cap on the number of rows, no expiry or garbage collection, and no length bound on the fetched fields; the document was also placed in CIMD.Cache before validation, so even rejected documents held cache memory until their TTL. An attacker serving valid documents at many distinct URLs creates one permanent client row per URL, each able to carry multi-megabyte strings, growing storage and memory without bound.
This issue affects ash_authentication_oauth2_server: from 0.3.0 before 0.3.1. |
| Improper Protection of Alternate Path vulnerability in ash-project ash_lua allows a user-supplied Lua script to read attributes that are not on the exposed-field allow-list.
AshLua exposes Ash resources to Lua scripts, gated by a manifest declaring which fields are exposed. The read action's operation aggregate path in AshLua.Runtime took the field name straight from the Lua call and resolved it with only String.to_existing_atom and Ash.Query.Aggregate.new!, neither of which consults the exposed-field allow-list the normal fields path enforces. A script can therefore read the value of any attribute of any record the actor may read, including private sensitive?: true columns, via resource.read({ operation = {"list", "hashed_password"} }); min and max give a value oracle. Anyone able to submit or influence a Lua script can reach this.
This issue affects ash_lua: from 0.1.0 before 0.2.1. |
| Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding vulnerability in ash-project ash_double_entry allows an attacker to submit several distinct string spellings of the same identifier.
AshDoubleEntry.ULID renders a 128-bit ULID as 26 Crockford base-32 characters, but the first character encodes only 3 bits, so canonical values are 0 to 7. decode/1 in lib/ulid.ex masks the first character to its low 3 bits and valid?/1 accepts all 32 characters in that position, so 0..., 8..., G... and R... decode to the identical 16-byte value and resolve to the same row. When the type is exposed as a public ID over an HTTP or API boundary, an attacker-supplied ID can be spelled differently from the record it actually reads or writes, desynchronizing or bypassing string-level checks such as idempotency and deduplication keys, deny-lists, audit correlation, or signatures computed over the submitted ID.
This issue affects ash_double_entry: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.19. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input vulnerability in ash-project ash lets an attacker confuse the stored type tag of an Ash.Type.Union value that uses storage: :map_with_tag, bypassing that member's validation and any tag-based authorization.
For a union with storage: :map_with_tag, each member is identified in storage by a configured tag and tag_value. Ash.Type.Union.dump_to_native/2 (lib/ash/type/union.ex) did not force the configured tag when writing the value, so a tag carried in the submitted value was persisted verbatim. An attacker can therefore store a value whose data belongs to one member but whose tag names a different member. On read the value is re-selected by its tag and treated as the incompatible member (a type confusion), bypassing the real member's constraints and any logic or policy that branches on the union tag. The fix drops any incoming tag and forces the configured tag value on dump.
This issue affects ash: from 2.14.18 before 3.32.2. |
| Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows an unauthenticated attacker to receive unredacted internal error data by provoking an error shape the configured error handler does not match.
apply_error_handler/3 in lib/ash_typescript/rpc/errors.ex is the only hook an application has for redacting or suppressing errors before they reach the client, with a nil return dropping the error entirely. Its rescue clause logs a warning and then returns the original, pre-handler error map. Error handlers are conventionally written as pattern-matching functions over expected error shapes, so an unmatched shape raises FunctionClauseError and the raw transformed error, including any secrets carried in vars, is emitted instead. An intent to suppress an error becomes an intent to publish it. The rescue catches exceptions only, so a handler that throws or exits still propagates.
This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.8.0 before 0.18.0. |
| Improper Access Control vulnerability in ash-project ash lets a create action overwrite an existing record when the ETS or Mnesia data layer is used, because neither enforced primary-key uniqueness on insert.
Unlike a SQL data layer, whose unique primary-key constraint rejects a duplicate, the ETS and Mnesia data layers implemented create as a keyed insert that replaces any existing entry with the same primary key (lib/ash/data_layer/ets/ets.ex, lib/ash/data_layer/mnesia/mnesia.ex). An actor who can set the primary key on a create (for example a user-supplied string or integer key) can submit a create whose key matches an existing record and silently overwrite it, destroying and replacing another entity's data without going through the update action or its policies. The fix rejects a create whose primary key already exists with an already-taken error, and only allows duplicates for keyless resources.
This issue affects ash: from 0.4.0 before 3.32.2. |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an actor to update records forbidden by resource policies through the atomic path of Ash.update_many/4.
Ash.update_many/4 runs as a single atomic statement (a data-layer update_many, for example a SQL MERGE) whenever an atomic strategy is used and the data layer supports it. Ash.Actions.Update.UpdateMany (lib/ash/actions/update/update_many.ex) took that path even under authorize?: true without applying the resource's policies, so the statement updated every row matched by primary key regardless of the policy filter that authorization would impose. An actor could therefore update records the policies forbid, such as rows belonging to another actor or tenant. The fix restricts the atomic path to data layers supporting changeset filters when authorizing, authorizes each changeset, and merges the resulting policy filter into each changeset so the statement only touches authorized rows.
This issue affects ash: from 3.29.0 before 3.32.2. |
| Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in ash-project ash_cloak allows an attacker who can influence the bytes of an encrypted column to crash the BEAM node, by triggering unbounded atom creation or a decompression bomb during decryption.
AshCloak.Calculations.Decrypt decodes the decrypted binary with Ash.Helpers.non_executable_binary_to_term/1 without the :safe option, so atoms in the payload are interned during the decode and never garbage collected, and the term format's compressed form is inflated transparently. vault.decrypt!() is the only barrier and stops tampering only for an authenticated cipher. Cloak also ships the unauthenticated AES.CTR, whose ciphertext an attacker who knows their own plaintext can XOR into any same-length payload without the key, so an ordinary read of the forged column reaches the decoder. A few hundred kilobytes of distinct atoms exhausts the atom table, or a small compressed payload inflates to gigabytes.
This issue affects ash_cloak: from 0.1.0 before 0.4.0. |
| Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in ash-project ash returns records that a runtime read policy denies to any actor.
When a resource has an access_type :runtime read policy (a check evaluated per record rather than compiled to a filter), Ash.Policy.Authorizer decides each record in check_result/1 (lib/ash/policy/authorizer/authorizer.ex) by discarding impossible policy scenarios and inspecting what remains. When every scenario for a record was impossible, meaning no policy can authorize it and it must be forbidden, the empty-scenario branch instead kept the record ({[record | data], authorizer, any_forbidden?}) and returned it as authorized. As a result, records the runtime read policy denies are returned to any actor. The fix forbids a record whose scenarios are all impossible.
This issue affects ash: from 3.4.44 before 3.32.2. |
| Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in ash-project ash_phoenix lets an attacker who controls filter form parameters filter across relationships the resource author marked non-public, turning the returned rows into a boolean oracle over private related data.
AshPhoenix.FilterForm resolved every relationship hop in the user-supplied path with Ash.Resource.Info.related/2, which traverses private relationships, and only checked the terminal field for publicity. parse_path_and_field/2 also rewrote a field naming a relationship into an extra path segment, so field=some_private_rel was accepted too. Both path and field come straight from form params, and the resulting ref went to Ash.Query.do_filter/2 without the public-only enforcement of Ash.Filter.parse_input/2. The fix resolves each hop with Ash.Resource.Info.public_relationship/2, rejecting the first non-public hop, and requires the terminal field to be public.
This issue affects ash_phoenix: from 0.6.0-rc.1 before 2.3.25. |
| Improper Input Validation vulnerability in ash-project ash_typescript allows a remote attacker to submit argument values outside a declared allowlist or bound on typed-controller routes.
AshTypescript.TypedController.RequestHandler in lib/ash_typescript/typed_controller/request_handler.ex calls Ash.Type.cast_input/3 and treats an {:ok, cast} result as fully validated. In Ash these are separate steps: cast_input/3 only coerces the term, while every constraint declared on the argument is applied by Ash.Type.apply_constraints/3, which this path never calls. Constraints such as one_of, max_length, min and max, and match are therefore inert, so a value outside a declared allowlist is accepted and passed to the route handler. Codegen renders the same constraints into the generated TypeScript types, so an allowlist appears enforced to a TypeScript caller while any other HTTP client ignores it. Empty-string to nil normalization also lives in apply_constraints, so the allow_nil?: false check accepts "" for a required argument.
Where a constraint gates a role, a status, or a sort direction, this becomes a privilege or state-machine bypass.
This issue affects ash_typescript: from 0.15.0 before 0.18.0. |
