| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Apache Airflow: the Core API logout endpoint revokes only a session token presented as the _token cookie. When a client logs out presenting its credential as an Authorization bearer header instead, the endpoint returns its normal logout response but revokes nothing, so the token remains valid until it expires. An attacker who already holds a copy of that token keeps the victim's access after the victim has logged out and believes the session ended; the default token lifetime is 24 hours and is configurable.
Affects API clients that authenticate with a bearer token rather than the browser session cookie. The attacker must already possess a copy of a valid token; obtaining one is outside the scope of this issue, and no privileges beyond the victim's own are gained.
Users of apache-airflow are recommended to upgrade to apache-airflow version 3.3.2 or later, which fixes the issue. |
| When a request to the Airflow core API carries both a session cookie and an explicit `Authorization: Bearer` token, Airflow resolves the caller from the cookie and ignores the bearer token, inverting the intended precedence of bearer over cookie. The request then executes -- and is recorded in the audit log -- as the cookie's principal rather than the identity the client explicitly presented.
Only Apache Airflow 3.3.0 and 3.3.1 are affected. Earlier releases do not contain the code path that caches the cookie-derived user, and are not vulnerable.
Exploiting this requires an attacker to first place a valid session cookie of their own into the victim's browser or client: for example by cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, through cross-site scripting in a separate application sharing a parent domain, or via a shared workstation. Deployments that host the Airflow UI on a domain shared with other applications are therefore the most exposed; a deployment on a dedicated domain with no co-hosted applications is not reachable this way. The consequence is principal confusion and misattributed audit records rather than a direct privilege escalation.
Users of 3.3.0 or 3.3.1 should upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.3.2 or later, which resolves the caller from the explicitly supplied credential whenever one is present. |
| Apache Airflow's `/assets/events` API returned asset events for every Dag in the deployment, with no filter restricting them to the Dags the caller is authorized to read. Any authenticated user holding asset-read access could therefore enumerate asset events — including the source Dag ID, task ID, run ID and event timestamps — for Dags they have no permission to see. Because the filter was also absent from the count query, `total_entries` and pagination disclosed the existence of hidden Dags even without inspecting individual rows. Deployments are affected whenever per-Dag access control is used to separate teams or tenants; no special configuration is required. Upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.2 or later. |
| The CompressionFilter class uses ZLib to deflate and inflate data sent and received. When we inflate incoming data, the filter does not control the resulting size, and create a buffer no matter what.
Some compressed data may have a compression ration greater than 1 thousand, leading to an exhaustion of the application memory, as we don't control the deflated size.
The fix adds such a control by allowing the application developer to provide a fixed size limit, which when reached throws an exception. It also allows the user to provide a compression ratio that should not be exceeded, protected the application from small inflated files that inflate in gigantic files, but with a grace limit for the resulting size (1Mb) to avoid false positive (like a very small file inflating with a high ratio, but resulting with a acceptable size, like a few thousands bytes)
For application using this feature, it is highly recommended to create the CompressionFilter and to pass the maximum limit as a forth constructor parameter, maxDecompressedSize:
public CompressionFilter(final boolean compressInbound, final boolean compressOutbound, final int compressionLevel, final int maxDecompressedSize)Optionally one can also provide a maxDecompressRatio fifth parameter, and a decompressRatioMinSize sixth parameter to allow small inflated files with a high compression ratio to still be accepted.
Here are the additional constructor:
public CompressionFilter(final boolean compressInbound, final boolean compressOutbound,
final int compressionLevel, final int maxDecompressedSize,
final long maxDecompressRatio, final long decompressRatioMinSize)
Also note that a fluent API has been added to spare the users the pain to call a constructor with that many parameters:
CompressionFilter compressionFilter = new CompressionFilter()
.setCompressionLevel(Zlib.COMPRESSION_MAX)
.setMaxDecompressedSize(1_000_000)
.setMaxDecompressRatio(100).
.setDecompressRatioMinSize(100_000);
Applications using Apache MINA are advised to upgrade and configure their CompressionFilter instance. |
| A specially crafted pair of WS-Policy documents can force Neethi's policy-intersection to do exponential amounts of work, pinning the CPU for a long time (denial of service).
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.4, which fixes this issue. |
| When Neethi fetches a remote policy reference, it only limits the time per read, not the whole transfer, so a server that trickles bytes slowly can keep the fetch alive indefinitely and tie up the calling thread (denial of service).
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.4, which fixes this issue. |
| The fix for CVE-2026-47065/ZDRES-232 ("resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy"), released on 2026-06-02 and announced as "Fully addressed" in MINA 2.2.8, 2.1.13 and 2.0.29, was committed to the
2.2.X branch only. The 2.0.X and 2.1.X maintenance branches never received the resolveProxyClass() override, so the 2.0.29 and 2.1.13 artifacts listed as fixed -- and every later release on those lines, up to and including the current 2.0.30 and 2.1.14 -- remain vulnerable to the exact allow-list bypass that CVE-2026-47065 was meant to close. |
| A small WS-Policy document using repeated policy references can force Neethi to re-expand the same references exponentially during normalization, consuming huge amounts of CPU and memory (denial of service).
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.4, which fixes this issue. |
| A specially crafted WS-Policy document can pack unlimited content inside a policy assertion, which Neethi copies into memory without counting it against its size limits, exhausting the heap (denial of service).
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.4, which fixes this issue. |
| A specially crafted WS-Policy document with deeply nested policy elements can bypass Neethi's nesting-depth limit and exhaust the thread stack, crashing the parser (denial of service).
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.4, which fixes this issue. |
| Apache NiFi Registry 0.4.0 through 2.11.0 are subject to path manipulation when storing extension bundle content using group, artifact, and version coordinates from uploaded NAR manifests. The default file persistence provider used coordinates as filesystem path components without rejected parent-directory names, and the path-containment check compared an unnormalized resolved path. An authenticated user authorized to write and delete bundles in a bucket can upload a NAR with a crafted manifest resulting in file system operations outside of the file persistence directory. Upgrading to Apache NiFi Registry 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which rejects parent-directory coordinates and requires a normalized path to remain a strict child of the storage root location. |
| Apache NiFi 2.11.0 supports migrating the contents of a version-controlled Process Group into a Connector using REST API methods that list eligible migration sources and submit migration requests. The framework authorized both methods against the target Connector alone, without evaluating access to the Process Groups involved. The absence of Process Group authorization allowed an authenticated user with read access to a Connector to enumerate the identifiers, names, and flow registry details of version-controlled Process Groups outside the scope of granted read policies. It also allowed a user with write access to a Connector to migrate a Process Group without write access to that Process Group, copying the flow definition, referenced assets, and component state into the Connector, and leaving the source Process Group disabled and renamed. Migration excludes sensitive property values and requires the source Process Group to be stopped with empty queues, which limits the scope of exposure. Apache NiFi installations that do not implement component-level authorization policies for Process Groups are not subject to this vulnerability, because the framework enforces Connector write permissions as the security boundary. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which filters migration sources to Process Groups the requesting user is authorized to read, and requires write access to the source Process Group when submitting a migration request. |
| Apache NiFi 1.5.0 through 2.11.0 provide REST API methods that replace the entire contents of a Process Group using a client-supplied flow definition, covering Process Group flow replacement together with versioned flow update and rebase operations. Framework authorization for these methods was limited to read and write privileges on the Process Group itself, unlike the corresponding asynchronous update request methods, which also authorize the components encapsulated in the Process Group along with referenced Controller Services, Parameter Contexts, and Parameter Providers. As a result of the missing authorization, an authenticated user with write access to a Process Group could supply a flow definition that modifies or removes components in descendant Process Groups protected by more restrictive access policies, and could bind components to Controller Services and Parameter Contexts without authorization for those referenced components. Existing verification checks limited the impact to stopped components, and the issue applies only to deployments that use component-level authorization policies, because the framework enforces write permissions as the security boundary. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which applies consistent reference resolution and component authorization across Process Group replacement and versioned flow update methods |
| Apache NiFi 2.11.0 disabled support for gzip-encoded HTTP requests for the application REST API and rejected requests that included the standard Content-Encoding header indicating gzip encoding. The framework enforcement filter did not check multiple instances of the Content-Encoding header and did not reject non-standard identifiers for gzip encoding, allowing a malicious client to send crafted requests that could consume excessive amounts of memory. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which disables decompression of gzip-encoded HTTP requests regardless of header number or encoding identifiers. |
| Apache NiFi 2.9.0 through 2.11.0 provide Connector configuration update and verification REST API methods that do not enforce authorization checking on Assets and Secrets referenced in proposed configuration. Updating or verifying a Connector configuration step can apply Asset and Secret references, but framework authorization was limited to write privileges on the Connector itself. As a result of the missing authorization, an authenticated user authorized to modify a Connector, but not authorized to read a referenced Parameter Provider, could apply Secret values backed by that Parameter Provider. The same methods also accepted Asset identifiers without verifying that the Asset belonged to the Connector being configured. Apache NiFi installations that do not implement different levels of authorization across Connectors and Parameter Providers are not subject to this vulnerability, because the framework enforces write permissions on the Connector as the security boundary. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which authorizes read access to referenced Parameter Providers and verifies Connector ownership of referenced Assets during configuration update and verification. |
| Apache Airflow Akeyless provider: the Akeyless secrets backend's team-scope guard can be bypassed with a user-controlled key. In a multi-team deployment, a Dag author scoped to one team can supply a Variable key containing a path separator that causes the backend to resolve a secret belonging to a different team, because the lookup path is concatenated from an unvalidated key after the team-scoped lookup misses. The Execution API Variables route accepts a path-shaped key, so this is reachable from ordinary Dag code.
Affects multi-team deployments using the Akeyless secrets backend. Single-team deployments are not affected, as there is no cross-team boundary to cross. This is the same class as CVE-2026-68870, CVE-2026-68871 and CVE-2026-68872 in the Azure Key Vault, Yandex Lockbox and Amazon secrets backends.
Users of apache-airflow-providers-akeyless are recommended to upgrade to version 0.3.1 or later, which fixes the issue. |
| Apache Airflow's asset queued-events DELETE endpoints checked the caller's Dag-axis permission with `READ` instead of `EDIT`. Any authenticated user who could read a Dag could therefore delete that Dag's queued asset events, silently suppressing asset-triggered scheduling for it — a state-changing action gated on a read-only permission. Deployments are affected whenever asset-triggered scheduling is in use and Dag read access is granted more widely than Dag edit access, which is the normal RBAC arrangement; no special configuration is required. Upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.2 or later. |
| Apache Karaf's XmlUtils cached XML parser/transformer factories in static ThreadLocal fields on long-lived container threads. Because a ThreadLocal value outlives the OSGi bundle that created it, repeated bundle or feature install, update, or refresh operations can leave successive bundle ClassLoader's pinned in memory and unreachable for garbage collection, leading to unbounded Metaspace growth and eventual denial of service of the Karaf instance. |
| Improper input validation in TopicRegion in Apache ActiveMQ, Apache ActiveMQ Broker, and Apache ActiveMQ All on all platforms.
An authenticated client can spoof clientId when removing a durable topic subscription.
This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker: before 5.19.11, from 6.0.0 before 6.3.2; Apache ActiveMQ All: before 5.19.11, from 6.0.0 before 6.3.2; Apache ActiveMQ: before 5.19.11, from 6.0.0 before 6.3.2.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 6.3.2 or 5.19.11 which fixes the issue. |
| When audit logging is enabled (zookeeper.audit.enable=true), an unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary fields into Apache ZooKeeper's audit log by sending a digest authentication request with tab characters (\t) embedded in the username. Because the audit log uses tab-separated key=value format, the injected tabs are parsed as legitimate field separators, allowing the attacker to spoof audit results (e.g., injecting result=success), forge operation types, and corrupt forensic evidence.
A log injection vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper allows a client that can call setACL to inject forged key-value fields into zookeeper_audit.log. When audit logging is enabled, the server serializes attacker-controlled digest ACL ids into the acl= audit field without escaping tab characters. Because audit events are emitted as tab-separated key=value records, a crafted ACL id can make one successful setAcl event appear to contain forged fields such as operation=delete and znode=/forged. This undermines the integrity of downstream audit parsing, alerting, and incident response.
This issue affects Apache ZooKeeper: from 3.9.0 through 3.9.5, from 3.8.0 through 3.8.6.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.6 or 3.8.7, which fixes the issue. |
