| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: access chan->conn safely in get/setsockopt
Since commit b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
l2cap_chan::conn has held reference and remains non-NULL also after the
corresponding hci_conn is deleted. In this state accessing various
fields eg. hci_conn::hdev is invalid, which leads to KASAN crash in
l2cap_sock_setsockopt() access of conn->hcon->hdev.
Check l2cap_chan::conn.hcon corresponds to an alive hci_conn before
trying to use it in l2cap_sock.c. Hold l2cap_chan_lock() in
getsockopt/setsockopt to ensure it stays alive, and to avoid data races
in l2cap_chan fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix password encoding bounds check
The password PSWD_ENCODINGS parser reads password_obj[elem + pos_values]
while copying the supported password encodings from the ACPI package.
The outer loop only guarantees that elem is within password_obj_count.
The encoding count is bounded by MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE, but that does not
guarantee that the ACPI package contains enough entries for all
elem + pos_values accesses.
A malformed package can therefore declare a non-zero encoding count
without providing enough string objects, causing the parser to read past
the ACPI package array and pass an out-of-bounds string pointer and
length to hp_convert_hexstr_to_str().
Add the same computed-index bounds check used by the other offset-based
package parsing loops before reading password_obj[elem + pos_values]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()
ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC
login response with
user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz;
user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (user->passkey)
memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz);
resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is
only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login
response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy()
reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not
bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack
hash[] buffer before allocating and copying.
[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611
[ 2030.242296]
[ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
[ 2030.242763] Call Trace:
[ 2030.242769] <TASK>
[ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0
[ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200
[ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70
[ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150
[ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0
[ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70
[ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120
[ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00
[ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0
[ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140
[ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0
[ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300
[ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0
[ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280
[ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490
[ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300
[ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110
[ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20
[ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470
[ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910
[ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0
[ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 2030.243564] </TASK>
[ 2030.243570]
[ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279:
[ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
[ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0
[ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750
[ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340
[ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0
[ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0
[ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
[ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930
[ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00
[ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140
[ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470
[ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100
[ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460
[ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 2030.305594]
[ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640
[ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 2030.309595] The buggy address
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Do not skip lock checks for single-byte ranges
check_lock_range() uses inclusive ranges. Its callers pass the end
offset as start + length - 1, so start == end represents a valid
single-byte range rather than an empty range.
The start == end shortcut therefore skips mandatory byte-range lock
checks for one-byte reads, writes, copychunk operations and one-byte
truncate ranges. A conflicting lock covering that byte is not checked
and the operation is allowed to proceed.
Remove the shortcut. The truncate size == inode->i_size case is already
handled by only calling check_lock_range() when the new size differs
from the current file size. |
| adm-zip is a JavaScript library for creating and extracting ZIP archives in Node.js. Prior to 0.6.1, getData() in zipEntry.js trusts an entry's central-directory uncompressed size and allocates output memory before validating that value against the actual compressed data and decompression result. A small crafted ZIP can declare a multi-gigabyte uncompressed size, causing Buffer.alloc and decompression handling to commit excessive resident memory before CRC validation reports an error. Applications that read entries from untrusted archives can therefore be terminated by the operating system or suffer service-wide memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-integrity: fix buffer overflow with keyed discard
Since commit 68c5c42567bc ("dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard
filler with a keyed sector marker"), integrity_metadata computes a
checksum for every discarded block into the "checksums" buffer.
integrity_sector_checksum always writes the whole digest. So if the tag
size is smaller than the digest size, the checksum of the last block
that fits into the buffer is written past the end of it. For example,
with hmac(sha256) and tag size 16, a 4MiB discard writes 16 bytes past
the kmalloc'ed page.
Fix this by subtracting extra_space from the buffer size when computing
max_blocks, like we do for writes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
slip: remove slip_hangup() to fix use-after-free in slip_receive_buf()
Jaeyoung Chung and Eulgyu Kim reported a slab-use-after-free read
in slip_receive_buf() when racing against tty hangup.
tty_ldisc_hangup() calls ld->ops->hangup() while holding only
a read lock on tty->ldisc_sem (via tty_ldisc_ref()).
Because slip_hangup() simply called slip_close(), it ran concurrently
with reader functions such as slip_receive_buf().
slip_close() unregisters and frees the net device and its private
struct slip, causing concurrent reader threads in slip_receive_buf()
to dereference freed memory.
Line discipline close() is already guaranteed to be called under
the write lock of tty->ldisc_sem during hangup processing
(in tty_ldisc_reinit() or tty_ldisc_kill()).
Remove slip_hangup() so teardown is serialized cleanly by slip_close(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix race l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs. put_chan
For L2CAP sockets without owning sk->sk_socket, reading
l2cap_pi(sk)->chan may race against concurrent l2cap_sock_kill() ->
l2cap_sock_put_chan(). This excludes simultaneous proto_ops callbacks,
but access in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has unsafe lockless read.
[Task 1] [Task 2 (hdev->workqueue)]
l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_disconn_cfm
l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen l2cap_conn_del
bt_accept_dequeue l2cap_chan_del
lock_sock(sk) l2cap_sock_teardown_cb
bt_accept_unlink
bt_sk(sk)->parent = NULL
release_sock(sk) ----------------> lock_sock(sk)
parent = /* NULL */
lock_sock(sk) <--------------------- release_sock(sk)
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)
l2cap_sock_close_cb
l2cap_sock_kill(sk)
l2cap_sock_put_chan
chan = READ l2cap_pi(sk)->chan l2cap_pi(sk)->chan = NULL
l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero l2cap_put_chan(chan)
kref_get_unless_zero(&chan->ref)
Task 1 may observe NULL which causes null-ptr-deref.
Fix the race by taking lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_kill() to
synchronize with l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(). hold_unless_zero() is not
needed here, l2cap_pi(sk)->chan owns reference if it is non-NULL.
Clarify code comments vs. locking. |
| SysReptor is a fully customizable pentest reporting platform. Prior to 2026.58, installations that enable password reset by email while configuring ALLOWED_HOSTS with a wildcard accept an attacker-controlled Host header when generating a password reset link. An unauthenticated attacker can request a reset email whose link points to an attacker-controlled system, and a victim who follows that link can disclose the reset token, allowing the attacker to reset the victim's password and take over the account. Exploitation also requires a configured email gateway and an email address for the victim, while some reverse proxy configurations may reject the hostile Host header. This issue is fixed in version 2026.58. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: validate banner payload length
When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field
is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a
`payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This
violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in
`populate_in_iter()`:
------------[ cut here ]------------
!iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter)
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x6634/0x6810
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3159, CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ceph_con_workfn+0x1f5/0x14a0 net/ceph/messenger.c:1575
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405
worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK>
According to the msgr2 protocol specification, the banner payload is
expected to contain at least two 64-bit integers (`server_feat` and
`server_req_feat`). Therefore, `payload_len` must be at least 16 bytes.
Fix this by adding a check in `process_banner_prefix()` to reject a
`payload_len` smaller than 16 bytes. This prevents the 0-length read and
correctly aborts the connection with a protocol error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4/pnfs: key the data server cache on the NFS version
nfs4_pnfs_ds_add() keys the per-net data server cache on the multipath
address set alone, and struct nfs4_pnfs_ds records no version. That
suffices for the files layout driver, which always connects with version
4, but flexfiles takes its version tuple from GETDEVICEINFO per device,
and one address can legitimately serve both NFSv3 and NFSv4.
Two deviceids on one address with different ds_versions[0].version
therefore share a single nfs4_pnfs_ds, and whichever mirror connects
first pins ds_clp to its own version. The other one is handed that
client anyway, so it selects rpc_call_ops for a version the connection
does not speak, and the mismatched sequence-slot handling dereferences
NULL.
Add the version to the cache key so the two cannot alias, giving each
version its own nfs4_pnfs_ds and connection while both mirrors stay
usable. Only the major version is compared, since that is what selects
rpc_call_ops and rpc_ops; v4.0 and v4.1 keep sharing a client. The files
layout driver passes the 4 it already hardcodes at connect time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate DIO orphan slot during inode read
[BUG]
A corrupted append-DIO dinode (high byte at offset 0xa1
corrupted from 0 to 1) can carry an i_dio_orphaned_slot
outside the mounted filesystem slot range and trigger a
use-after-free error:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() uses i_dio_orphaned_slot to index the
slot-local system inode cache. The dinode validator does not check
this active slot, so an out-of-range value produces an invalid cache
entry pointer that is dereferenced as an inode pointer.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_dio_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before DIO orphan recovery can consume it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Compare iterator types during state pruning
An iterator stack slot can be MEM_RCU or PTR_UNTRUSTED. These states
must not be equal, or the verifier can prune an unsafe path.
Compare the pointer type for STACK_ITER slots. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/bpf: Replace ly instruction with llgf
cpu_nr is a 32 bit value and BPF_REG_0 is a 64 bit register, when ly loads
the cpu_nr into BPF_REG_0 it does not zero the upper bits, but llgf does. |
| PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in C. In 2.17 and earlier, the OpenSSL and GnuTLS backends in pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_ossl.c and pjlib/src/pj/ssl_sock_gtls.c copy DNS SubjectAltName values with string functions that recalculate their length and truncate an embedded NUL byte. With server verification enabled through --tls-verify-server for the PJSIP TLS/SIPS transport, a certificate containing a DNS SubjectAltName formed from the target hostname prefix followed by an embedded NUL and an attacker-controlled suffix can therefore be accepted for the prefix hostname. An attacker who possesses such a certificate from a trusted issuer and can intercept the connection can impersonate the target server, complete the SIP session, and receive REGISTER credentials. The mbedTLS backend is not affected because it preserves the explicit string length. No fixed version is available as of this review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: fix off-by-one page overflow in ntfs_decompress()
The per-token range check in ntfs_decompress() uses
if (cb >= cb_sb_end || dp_addr > dp_sb_end)
break;
so dp_addr == dp_sb_end falls through to the symbol copy
`*dp_addr++ = *cb++`, writing one byte past the destination page. Since
NTFS_SB_SIZE == PAGE_SIZE the destination is a single page, so the byte
lands in the adjacent page, and *dest_ofs is left one past the sub-block
end (the later `*dest_ofs &= ~PAGE_MASK` then yields 1, not 0, so the page
is never finalized and later sub-blocks keep writing further past it). A
corrupted compressed $DATA attribute thus produces a bounded run of
out-of-bounds writes when the file is read.
Break as soon as dp_addr reaches dp_sb_end; a full sub-block still
completes, as its final copy advances dp_addr to exactly dp_sb_end. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hinic3: Fix skb linearization mismatch and drop skb when skb_checksum_help() failed
Previously, hinic3_send_one_skb() cached the skb fragment count before
calling hinic3_tx_offload(). If hinic3_tx_csum() falls back to
skb_checksum_help() for unsupported tunnel packets, the skb may be
linearized. Continuing to build the TX descriptor with the stale
fragment count leads to a descriptor mismatch, which can trigger
out-of-bounds DMA reads or IOMMU faults.
Furthermore, the old code ignored the return value of skb_checksum_help(),
transmitting corrupted packets with incomplete checksums upon failure.
Fix this by:
1. Moving the hinic3_tx_offload() call before calculating 'num_sge' to
ensure the correct fragment count is used if the SKB is linearized.
2. Propagating skb_checksum_help() errors and returning
HINIC3_TX_OFFLOAD_INVALID to properly drop the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read
Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read".
OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes.
A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local
system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is
reported.
Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing.
Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and
orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode
validation boundary.
This patch (of 2):
[BUG]
A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an
i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range.
ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking
up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves
the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers
assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix UAF in bpf_trampoline_multi_attach_free on update failure
When bpf_trampoline_update() fails before modify_fentry_multi()/
unregister_fentry_multi() is called, cur_image is unchanged
(cur_image == old_image) and ftrace still calls into it. Freeing
old_image in that case causes a UAF.
Only free old_image when it differs from cur_image. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length
nxp_process_fw_dump() pulls the ACL header off the frame and then reads
seq_num and buf_len from a struct nxp_fw_dump_hdr placed at skb->data,
without checking that the ACL payload is long enough to contain it.
h4_recv_buf() collects HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE bytes of header followed by the
number of payload bytes named in that header, so skb->len is 4 + dlen
with dlen supplied by the controller and possibly smaller than the 8
byte dump header, or zero. A short frame with connection handle 0xfff
therefore reads both fields from beyond the received data.
Beyond the read itself, buf_len is what terminates a dump: a value of
zero makes the driver call hci_devcd_complete() and reset the
controller, so a truncated frame can end a dump early.
Use skb_pull_data() to validate and pull the FW dump header before
accessing its fields. Warn and reject the chunk if the header is
truncated. |
