| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: validate compress cache inode only when enabled
F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() uses NM_I(sbi)->max_nid as the synthetic inode
number for the compressed page cache inode. That inode only exists when
the compress_cache mount option is enabled.
When compress_cache is disabled, max_nid is outside the valid inode
range. A corrupted directory entry that points to ino == max_nid should
therefore be rejected by f2fs_check_nid_range(). However, is_meta_ino()
currently treats F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() as a meta inode unconditionally,
so f2fs_iget() bypasses do_read_inode() and its nid range check, and
instantiates a fake internal inode instead.
Gate the compressed cache inode case on COMPRESS_CACHE, matching
f2fs_init_compress_inode(). With compress_cache disabled, ino ==
max_nid now follows the normal inode path and is rejected as an
out-of-range nid. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: atomic: fix UAF issue on f2fs_inode_info.atomic_inode
- ioctl(F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT_RANGE) - shrink
- f2fs_gc
- gc_data_segment
- ra_data_block(cow_inode)
- mapping = F2FS_I(inode)->atomic_inode->i_mapping
: f2fs_is_cow_file(cow_inode) is true
- f2fs_evict_inode(atomic_inode)
- clear_inode_flag(fi->cow_inode, FI_COW_FILE)
- F2FS_I(fi->cow_inode)->atomic_inode = NULL
...
- truncate_inode_pages_final(atomic_inode)
- f2fs_grab_cache_folio(mapping)
: create folio in atomic_inode->mapping
- clear_inode(atomic_inode)
- BUG_ON(atomic_inode->i_data.nrpages)
We need to add a reference on fi->atomic_inode before using its mapping
field during garbage collection, otherwise, it will cause UAF issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: bound i_inline_xattr_size for non-inline-xattr inodes
When the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled, do_read_inode() loads
the on-disk i_inline_xattr_size unconditionally:
if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr(sbi))
fi->i_inline_xattr_size = le16_to_cpu(ri->i_inline_xattr_size);
but sanity_check_inode() only range-checks it when the inode also has the
FI_INLINE_XATTR flag set. An inode that carries an inline dentry or inline
data but not FI_INLINE_XATTR -- the normal layout for an inline
directory -- therefore keeps a fully attacker-controlled
i_inline_xattr_size from a crafted image.
get_inline_xattr_addrs() returns that value with no flag gating, so it
feeds the inode geometry:
MAX_INLINE_DATA() = 4 * (CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size - 1)
NR_INLINE_DENTRY() = MAX_INLINE_DATA() * BITS_PER_BYTE / (...)
addrs_per_page() = CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size
A large i_inline_xattr_size drives MAX_INLINE_DATA() and NR_INLINE_DENTRY()
negative, so make_dentry_ptr_inline() sets d->max (int) to a negative
value. The inline directory walk then compares an unsigned long bit_pos
against that negative d->max, which is promoted to a huge unsigned bound,
and reads far past the inline area:
while (bit_pos < d->max) /* fs/f2fs/dir.c */
... test_bit_le(bit_pos, d->bitmap) / d->dentry[bit_pos] ...
Mounting a crafted image and reading such a directory triggers an
out-of-bounds read in f2fs_fill_dentries(); the same underflow also
corrupts ADDRS_PER_INODE for regular files.
Validate i_inline_xattr_size against MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE whenever the
flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled -- i.e. whenever the value is
loaded from disk and consumed -- and keep the lower MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE
bound gated on inodes that actually carry an inline xattr, so legitimate
inodes with i_inline_xattr_size == 0 are still accepted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state
Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp
registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the
hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree()
in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside
attach_hdlc_protocol().
The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so
detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the
kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(),
is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the
->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A
ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the
kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory,
leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on
every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev)
before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync()
now runs on both free paths.
timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the
keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and
shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown.
Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is
attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so
that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and
ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list
structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so
struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first
timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol
without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync()
operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of
ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the
initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list
twice.
This bug was found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rpmsg: char: Fix use-after-free on probe error path
rpmsg_chrdev_probe() stores the newly allocated eptdev in the default
endpoint's priv pointer before calling rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(). If
rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() then fails, its error path frees eptdev while
the default endpoint may still dispatch callbacks with the stale priv
pointer.
Avoid publishing eptdev through the default endpoint until
rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() succeeds. Messages received before the priv
pointer is published should be ignored by rpmsg_ept_cb(). Flow-control
updates can hit rpmsg_ept_flow_cb() in the same window, so make both
callbacks return success when priv is NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl()
The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE
header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it
never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain
num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them.
CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the
sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header,
so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero
sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for
i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local
comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid()
result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls
the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID
base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read.
A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of
the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up
to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd
allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()
into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in
ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The
malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL
is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and
the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this
reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs.
Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the
identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and
smb_inherit_dacl(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
writeback: Fix use after free in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn()
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() has a loop like:
wb_get(new_wb);
while (1) {
list = llist_del_all(&new_wb->switch_wbs_ctxs);
/* Nothing to do? */
if (!list)
break;
... process the items ...
}
Now adding of items to the list looks like:
wb_queue_isw()
if (llist_add(&isw->list, &wb->switch_wbs_ctxs))
queue_work(isw_wq, &wb->switch_work);
Because inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() loops when processing isw items, it
can happen that wb->switch_work is pending while wb->switch_wbs_ctxs is
empty. This is a problem because in that case wb can get freed (no isw
items -> no wb reference) while the work is still pending causing
use-after-free issues.
We cannot just fix this by cancelling work when freeing wb because that
could still trigger problematic 0 -> 1 transitions on wb refcount due to
wb_get() in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn(). It could be all handled with
more careful code but that seems unnecessarily complex so let's avoid
that until it is proven that the looping actually brings practical
benefit. Just remove the loop from inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() instead.
That way when wb_queue_isw() queues work, we are guaranteed we have
added the first item to wb->switch_wbs_ctxs and nobody is going to
remove it (and drop the wb reference it holds) until the queued work
runs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: prevent potential infinite loop in bond_header_parse()
bond_header_parse() can loop if a stack of two bonding devices is setup,
because skb->dev always points to the hierarchy top.
Add new "const struct net_device *dev" parameter to
(struct header_ops)->parse() method to make sure the recursion
is bounded, and that the final leaf parse method is called. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: Delay put pmc->idev in mld_del_delrec()
pmc->idev is still used in ip6_mc_clear_src(), so as mld_clear_delrec()
does, the reference should be put after ip6_mc_clear_src() return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bus: mhi: host: Add alignment check for event ring read pointer
Though we do check the event ring read pointer by "is_valid_ring_ptr"
to make sure it is in the buffer range, but there is another risk the
pointer may be not aligned. Since we are expecting event ring elements
are 128 bits(struct mhi_ring_element) aligned, an unaligned read pointer
could lead to multiple issues like DoS or ring buffer memory corruption.
So add a alignment check for event ring read pointer. |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in elixir-ecto postgrex ('Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications' module) allows SQL Injection.
The channel argument passed to 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':listen/3 and 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':unlisten/3 is interpolated directly into LISTEN "..." / UNLISTEN "..." SQL statements without escaping the " character. An attacker who can influence the channel name can inject a " to break out of the quoted identifier and append arbitrary SQL. Because the notifications connection uses the PostgreSQL simple query protocol, multi-statement payloads are accepted, allowing DDL and DML commands to be chained (e.g. ; DROP TABLE ...; --). The same unsanitized interpolation also occurs in handle_connect/1 when replaying LISTEN commands after a reconnect.
This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/postgrex/notifications.ex and program routines 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':listen/3, 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':unlisten/3, 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':handle_connect/1.
This issue affects postgrex: from 0.16.0 before 0.22.2. |
| Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting. hackney does not percent-encode carriage return (\r) or line feed (\n) characters in the URL query component before constructing the HTTP/1.1 request target. Characters outside the grammar defined in RFC 3986 Section 3.4 must be percent-encoded, but hackney_url:make_url/3 passes the query binary directly without validation or escaping. An attacker who can control all or part of a URL passed to hackney can inject raw CRLF sequences into the query string, which are then sent as HTTP line breaks in the request target. This enables injection of arbitrary HTTP headers or splitting of the HTTP request.
This issue affects hackney: from 0.13.1 before 4.0.1. |
| Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification.
The OCSP response validation in public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 does not verify that a CA-designated responder certificate was cryptographically signed by the issuing CA. Instead, it only checks that the responder certificate's issuer name matches the CA's subject name and that the certificate has the OCSPSigning extended key usage. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSP responses can create a self-signed certificate with a matching issuer name and the OCSPSigning EKU, and use it to forge OCSP responses that mark revoked certificates as valid.
This affects SSL/TLS clients using OCSP stapling, which may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates, potentially transmitting sensitive data to compromised servers. Applications using the public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 API directly are also affected, with impact depending on usage context.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl and program routines pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 28.4.2 and OTP 27.3.4.10, corresponding to public_key from 1.16 before 1.20.3 and 1.17.1.2, and ssl from 11.2 before 11.5.4 and 11.2.12.7. |
| The Erlang/OTP ssl application does not validate that the PSK identity list and binder list carried in a TLS 1.3 ClientHello pre-shared key extension have equal length before passing them to the session ticket handler. In tls_handshake_1_3:handle_pre_shared_key/3, an OfferedPreSharedKeys record with a mismatched number of identities and binders is forwarded directly to tls_server_session_ticket:use/4, which crashes the session ticket handler process.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a single crafted ClientHello to a TLS 1.3 server with session tickets enabled (stateful or stateless mode) and permanently disrupt session ticket handling on that listener. New TLS 1.3 handshakes complete but subsequently crash when the server attempts to issue a session ticket, effectively making TLS 1.3 unusable on the affected listener until the ssl application is restarted. TLS 1.2 connections are not affected.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 22.2 before OTP 29.0.3, OTP 28.5.0.3 and OTP 27.3.4.14, corresponding to ssl from 9.5 before 11.7.3, 11.6.0.3 and 11.2.12.10. |
| Skipper contains an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-50197 in which oversized request bodies bypass Open Policy Agent (OPA) deny-on-presence Rego policies. When a request body exceeds the configured maxBodyBytes limit, Skipper forwards the full payload to the upstream service while OPA evaluates against an empty parsed_body, so policies that deny requests based on body content are not enforced and forbidden actions proceed. No fixed version is available; v0.27.26 adds documentation guidance only. |
| A vulnerability was determined in CodeAstro Online Classroom 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /OnlineClassroom/loginlinkadmin.php. Executing a manipulation of the argument aid can lead to sql injection. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. |
| The affected product is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow, which may allow an attacker to cause a memory corruption via a Read Request. |
| The affected product is vulnerable to a heap-based buffer overflow via a crafted MMS Initiate request. Remote code execution (RCE) has been demonstrated when ASLR is disabled; memory corruption or denial of service may occur in configurations where ASLR is enabled. |
| A NULL pointer dereference in the MMS Write Named Variable List handler, which may allow a network adjacent attacker to crash the server by sending a WriteRequest with an empty listOfData field. |
| The affected product is vulnerable to an Out-of-bounds read, which may allow an attacker to crash the parsing process and cause a denial of service. |
