| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage released under GNU Affero General Public License v3.0. The signature component of the authorization may be invalid, which would mean that as a client you can use any arbitrary secret to upload objects given the user already has prior WRITE permissions on the bucket. Prior knowledge of access-key, and bucket name this user might have access
to - and an access-key with a WRITE permissions is necessary. However with relevant information in place, uploading random objects to buckets is trivial and easy via curl. This issue is fixed in RELEASE.2025-04-03T14-56-28Z. |
| Improper signature verification in AMD CPU ROM microcode patch loader may allow an attacker with local administrator privilege to load malicious microcode, potentially resulting in loss of integrity of x86 instruction execution, loss of confidentiality and integrity of data in x86 CPU privileged context and compromise of SMM execution environment. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature issue exists in "FreeFrom - the nostr client" App versions prior to 1.3.5 for Android and iOS. The affected app cannot detect event data with invalid signatures. |
| There is a vulnerability in the Supermicro BMC firmware validation logic at Supermicro MBD-X13SEM-F . An attacker can update the system firmware with a specially crafted image. |
| There is a vulnerability in the BMC firmware image authentication design
at Supermicro MBD-X12DPG-OA6
. An attacker can modify the firmware to bypass BMC inspection and bypass the signature verification process |
| There is a vulnerability in the Supermicro BMC firmware validation logic at Supermicro MBD-X12STW . An attacker can update the system firmware with a specially crafted image. |
| A SAML library not dependent on any frameworks that runs in Node. In version 5.0.1, Node-SAML loads the assertion from the (unsigned) original response document. This is different than the parts that are verified when checking signature. This allows an attacker to modify authentication details within a valid SAML assertion. For example, in one attack it is possible to remove any character from the SAML assertion username. To conduct the attack an attacker would need a validly signed document from the identity provider (IdP). This is fixed in version 5.1.0. |
| There is a vulnerability in the Supermicro BMC firmware validation logic at Supermicro MBD-X12STW-F . An attacker can update the system firmware with a specially crafted image. |
| ALTCHA is privacy-first software for captcha and bot protection. A cryptographic semantic binding flaw in ALTCHA libraries allows challenge payload splicing, which may enable replay attacks. The HMAC signature does not unambiguously bind challenge parameters to the nonce, allowing an attacker to reinterpret a valid proof-of-work submission with a modified expiration value. This may allow previously solved challenges to be reused beyond their intended lifetime, depending on server-side replay handling and deployment assumptions. The vulnerability primarily impacts abuse-prevention mechanisms such as rate limiting and bot mitigation. It does not directly affect data confidentiality or integrity. This issue has been addressed by enforcing explicit semantic separation between challenge parameters and the nonce during HMAC computation. Users are advised to upgrade to patched versions, which include version 1.0.0 of the altcha Golang package, version 1.0.0 of the altcha Rubygem, version 1.0.0 of the altcha pip package, version 1.0.0 of the altcha Erlang package, version 1.4.1 of the altcha-lib npm package, version 1.3.1 of the altcha-org/altcha Composer package, and version 1.3.0 of the org.altcha:altcha Maven package. As a mitigation, implementations may append a delimiter to the end of the `salt` value prior to HMAC computation (for example, `<salt>?expires=<time>&`). This prevents ambiguity between parameters and the nonce and is backward-compatible with existing implementations, as the delimiter is treated as a standard URL parameter separator. |
| xml-crypto is an XML digital signature and encryption library for Node.js. An attacker may be able to exploit a vulnerability in versions prior to 6.0.1, 3.2.1, and 2.1.6 to bypass authentication or authorization mechanisms in systems that rely on xml-crypto for verifying signed XML documents. The vulnerability allows an attacker to modify a valid signed XML message in a way that still passes signature verification checks. For example, it could be used to alter critical identity or access control attributes, enabling an attacker to escalate privileges or impersonate another user. Users of versions 6.0.0 and prior should upgrade to version 6.0.1 to receive a fix. Those who are still using v2.x or v3.x should upgrade to patched versions 2.1.6 or 3.2.1, respectively. |
| An improper verification of cryptographic signature in Zscaler's SAML authentication mechanism on the server-side allowed an authentication abuse. |
| A vulnerability has been identified in Mendix SAML (Mendix 10.12 compatible) (All versions < V4.0.3), Mendix SAML (Mendix 10.21 compatible) (All versions < V4.1.2), Mendix SAML (Mendix 9.24 compatible) (All versions < V3.6.21). Affected versions of the module insufficiently enforce signature validation and binding checks. This could allow unauthenticated remote attackers to hijack an account in specific SSO configurations. |
| cjwt is a C JSON Web Token (JWT) Implementation. Algorithm confusion occurs when a system improperly verifies the type of signature used, allowing attackers to exploit the lack of distinction between signing methods. If the system doesn't differentiate between an HMAC signed token and an RS/EC/PS signed token during verification, it becomes vulnerable to this kind of attack. For instance, an attacker could craft a token with the alg field set to "HS256" while the server expects an asymmetric algorithm like "RS256". The server might mistakenly use the wrong verification method, such as using a public key as the HMAC secret, leading to unauthorised access. For RSA, the key can be computed from a few signatures. For Elliptic Curve (EC), two potential keys can be recovered from one signature. This can be used to bypass the signature mechanism if an application relies on asymmetrically signed tokens. This issue has been addressed in version 2.3.0 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| Ever Gauzy v0.281.9 contains a JWT authentication vulnerability that allows attackers to exploit weak HMAC secret key implementation. Attackers can leverage the exposed JWT token to authenticate and gain unauthorized access with administrative permissions. |
| Applications that use spring-boot-loader or spring-boot-loader-classic and contain custom code that performs signature verification of nested jar files may be vulnerable to signature forgery where content that appears to have been signed by one signer has, in fact, been signed by another. |
| Improper authentication in the API authentication middleware of HCL DevOps Loop allows authentication tokens to be accepted without proper validation of their expiration and cryptographic signature. As a result, an attacker could potentially use expired or tampered tokens to gain unauthorized access to sensitive resources and perform actions with elevated privileges. |
| Formbricks is an open source qualtrics alternative. Prior to version 4.0.1, Formbricks is missing JWT signature verification. This vulnerability stems from a token validation routine that only decodes JWTs (jwt.decode) without verifying their signatures. Both the email verification token login path and the password reset server action use the same validator, which does not check the token’s signature, expiration, issuer, or audience. If an attacker learns the victim’s actual user.id, they can craft an arbitrary JWT with an alg: "none" header and use it to authenticate and reset the victim’s password. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.1. |
| tiny-secp256k1 is a tiny secp256k1 native/JS wrapper. Prior to version 1.1.7, a malicious JSON-stringifyable message can be made passing on verify(), when global Buffer is the buffer package. This affects only environments where require('buffer') is the NPM buffer package. Buffer.isBuffer check can be bypassed, resulting in strange objects being accepted as a message, and those messages could trick verify() into returning false-positive true values. This issue has been patched in version 1.1.7. |
| aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. In decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (which is the correct ciphertext) is exposed even if the tag is incorrect. This is because in decrypt_inplace in asconcore.rs, tag verification causes an error to be returned with the plaintext contents still in buffer. The vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.3. |
| OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. |
