| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: qcom-pmic: cancel reset_work on stop
pdphy_stop() disables IRQs but leaves reset_work pending. If the IRQ
handler schedules it just before disable_irq(), the work runs after
remove() frees the struct via devm.
Call cancel_work_sync() after disabling IRQs to close the window.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: usbtv: keep device alive while ALSA card exists
The ALSA PCM callbacks store the driver state in pcm->private_data. An
open PCM file can outlive USB disconnect because usbtv_audio_free() uses
snd_card_free_when_closed(). The disconnect path can then drop the V4L2
device reference and free struct usbtv before ALSA releases the substream,
so a later close dereferences freed memory in snd_usbtv_pcm_close().
Take a V4L2 device reference for the ALSA card and drop it from the card
private_free callback. This keeps struct usbtv valid until ALSA has closed
the remaining files and freed the card. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path
__hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the
same registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and
freeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it. Serialize the
remove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one
path releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev
under the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path
already cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is
dropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes
ops->hdev == NULL under the lock.
Background: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one
device reference (hid_get_device()). Two paths can release it:
- device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device()
-> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list
under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program;
- BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls
st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for
its own registration.
The coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs
"if (!hdev) return" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two
paths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs
prog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as
non-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the
destroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same
reference. The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement
is individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the
device is simply freed while the transport is still inside
hid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory.
The fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on
both sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock. With
the lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no
READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal.
Unlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of
hid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path
itself still holds this registration's reference (released only by
its own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy
traversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal
re-check return early without any put. At most one of the two
paths releases each registration reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Have show_event_filters/triggers files take trace array ref
The newly added files show_event_filters and show_event_triggers that show
all filters or triggers that are set within the trace array do not take a
reference for the trace array it is showing. Without taking a reference,
the trace_array may be freed via "rmdir" while a task is reading one of
theses files. Those files iterate all the events within an instance
(trace_array) and nothing prevents that instance from being freed while
its data is being read. This causes a use-after-free crash.
Have the open of both those files take the trace_array reference via the
trace_array_get() that prevents the trace_array from being freed while the
files are opened. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio-ap: fix stale pqap_hook pointer on error in vfio_ap_mdev_set_kvm()
In vfio_ap_mdev_set_kvm(), kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook is set to
&matrix_mdev->pqap_hook before the update locks are acquired and the
mdev list is checked for a conflicting assignment. If another mdev is
already attached to the same KVM instance, the function returns -EPERM
without restoring the hook pointer, leaving kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook
pointing at the failing matrix_mdev instead of the mdev that legitimately
owns the KVM.
Since matrix_mdev->kvm is never set on this error path,
vfio_ap_mdev_unset_kvm() will not clean up the hook when matrix_mdev
is later closed. If matrix_mdev is subsequently freed, any PQAP
instruction executed by the guest will dereference the stale pointer
through pqap_hook_rwsem, resulting in a use-after-free.
Since kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook is only set in the vfio_ap_mdev_set_kvm()
function and is cleared in the vfio_ap_mdev_unset_kvm() function, a check
for 'kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook != NULL' is all that is needed to determine
whether it belongs to another mdev. This will alleviate the need to iterate
the matrix_dev->mdev_list list to see if the kvm object is assigned to
another mdev.This was introduced in v3 to alleviate the need to take the
mdevs_lock while iterating the list; however, this did not prevent a
potential race condition.
The pqap_hook_rwsem(write) is now performed inside
get_update_locks_for_kvm(), which is updated to acquire
pqap_hook_rwsem(write) between kvm->lock and mdevs_lock. This ordering
is consistent with the PQAP intercept path, which acquires pqap_hook_rwsem
in read mode while srcu is held under vcpu->mutex, establishing the
dependency: kvm->lock -> vcpu->mutex -> srcu -> pqap_hook_rwsem(read).
The pqap_hook_rwsem is now released inside the
release_update_locks_for_kvm(), which is updated to release
pqap_hook_rwsem(write) between mdevs_lock and kvm->lock.
Additionally, kvm_put_kvm() in vfio_ap_mdev_unset_kvm() is moved
after release_update_locks_for_kvm(). Previously it was called while
kvm->lock was held; if it were ever the last reference, kvm_destroy_vm()
would run under kvm->lock, which would deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: Synchronize timeout work during SQ teardown
nvmet_auth_sq_free() cancels auth_expired_work with
cancel_delayed_work(). If the work has already started, cancellation does
not wait for the callback. Transport teardown can consequently free or
reuse the queue containing struct nvmet_sq while
nvmet_auth_expired_work() still accesses that SQ.
Add a teardown-specific helper that synchronously drains the delayed work
before freeing authentication state, and use it from nvmet_sq_destroy().
Keep the non-synchronous helper for in-band authentication state cleanup,
where the SQ owner remains alive. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: cec: disable delayed work before freeing an interrupted transmit
cec_transmit_msg_fh() drops adap->lock to wait for a blocking transmit in
wait_for_completion_killable(). If that wait is interrupted by a signal,
cancel_delayed_work_sync() can run before the CEC kthread arms the reply
timeout via schedule_delayed_work(&data->work) in cec_transmit_done_ts().
The work is then armed after the cancel, and the data is freed with its
delayed_work still pending:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ... hint: cec_wait_timeout
Use disable_delayed_work_sync(): it cancels the work and disables it, so
the later schedule_delayed_work() becomes a no-op and the work cannot be
re-armed. The data is freed right after, so it need not be re-enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: lock mutex in ceph_mds_check_access()
MDS session OPEN handling replaces mdsc->s_cap_auths under
mdsc->mutex, freeing the previous array and its strings.
ceph_mds_check_access() traverses this array without holding the
mutex. A concurrent session reopen can therefore free the array while
it is being inspected, resulting in a use-after-free like this:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 003aaad64b2c8bb9
[...]
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 56 UID: 2953037534 PID: 1253231 Comm: php-cgi8.4 Not tainted 6.18.45-i2-ampere #1146 NONE
[..]
pc : ceph_mds_check_access+0xd4/0x550
lr : ceph_mds_check_access+0xc8/0x550
[...]
Call trace:
ceph_mds_check_access+0xd4/0x550 (P)
ceph_atomic_open+0x138/0xbe8
path_openat+0xa24/0xfa8
do_filp_open+0x94/0x158
do_sys_openat2+0x88/0xf8 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: vgic-v3: take an LPI reference in vgic_v3_save_pending_tables
vgic_v3_save_pending_tables() iterates dist->lpi_xa using xa_for_each()
and dereferences the returned struct vgic_irq in the loop body without
holding a reference on the LPI.
The xarray iterator only provides temporary RCU coverage while looking up
the current entry. That is not sufficient for this loop body, which reads
fields from struct vgic_irq and performs guest memory accesses before the
iteration completes.
A concurrent path can trigger this race: the irqfd cached injection path
(vgic_its_inject_cached_translation) obtains a transient LPI reference
via vgic_its_check_cache() without holding kvm->lock, vcpu->mutex,
config_lock, or its_lock. If guest ITS DISCARD then drops the cache and
ITE references under its_lock, the transient inject reference may become
the final one. When vgic_put_irq() drops it, the LPI is erased from
lpi_xa and freed via kfree_rcu(). Meanwhile, vgic_v3_save_pending_tables()
may still hold a stale pointer obtained from the xarray iterator and
dereference it after the RCU grace period completes.
Fix this by re-fetching each iterated LPI via vgic_get_irq(), which takes
a stable reference, and dropping it with vgic_put_irq() on all paths.
This matches the pattern already used by other lpi_xa iterators in the
vgic ITS code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ti: vpe: quiesce overflow recovery before freeing streams
The VIP overflow recovery worker is armed from the hardirq handler when a
FIFO overflow is detected, and the list-complete path looks the stream up
through the VPDMA list private pointer. Both keep touching stream, port
and device state; the recovery worker also resets the parser and VPDMA,
repopulates the descriptor list, and re-enables the per-list IRQs.
vip_stop_streaming() masks and clears the per-list IRQs, but it neither
synchronizes the hardirq handler nor disables recovery_work. An overflow
IRQ that has already queued recovery_work, or a list-complete IRQ in
flight when the stream is torn down, can therefore still dereference the
stream after its resources are released: the descriptor list is freed by
vip_release_stream() on file release, and the stream itself by
free_stream() on unbind/remove.
Drain the recovery worker and the IRQ handler at both teardown points
through a shared vip_quiesce_stream() helper, before any stream-owned
resource is released. disable_work_sync() cancels pending recovery_work,
drains a running instance, and raises its disable depth, so a subsequent
schedule_work() issued by a racing IRQ handler is rejected at the
workqueue scheduler: recovery_work cannot be requeued after
disable_work_sync() takes effect. The worker may still re-enable the
per-list IRQs before disable_work_sync() returns; disable_irqs() then
masks those sources and synchronize_irq() waits for any in-flight handler
that still dereferences stream state. In vip_stop_streaming() the helper
runs before the parser is stopped, since a worker drained by
disable_work_sync() may re-enable the parser before exiting and would
otherwise undo the stop. recovery_work is created disabled and enabled in
vip_start_streaming() before IRQs, pairing the enable with the teardown
disable across the streaming lifecycle.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool and confirmed
by manual code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: saa7164: fix cleanup on resource allocation failure
saa7164_dev_setup() adds the device to the global saa7164_devlist before
requesting the PCI BAR memory regions.
If get_resources() fails, saa7164_dev_setup() decrements the device count
and returns an error, but leaves the device on saa7164_devlist. The probe
error path then frees the device, leaving a dangling entry on the global
list.
Reuse the existing MMIO mapping error path to remove the device from
saa7164_devlist and decrement the device count before returning.
Also release BAR0 if it was successfully requested but the BAR2 request
fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rtl2832_sdr: release URBs and stream buffers on start_streaming() failure
rtl2832_sdr_start_streaming() calls rtl2832_sdr_alloc_stream_bufs(),
rtl2832_sdr_alloc_urbs() and rtl2832_sdr_submit_urbs() in sequence and
shares a single err: label that only unlocks the mutex and returns.
When alloc_urbs() succeeds but submit_urbs() fails, or when alloc_urbs()
itself returns -ENOMEM after alloc_stream_bufs() has already succeeded,
the URBs and/or the coherent DMA stream buffers stay allocated while
streaming reports failure to vb2. Two latent defects follow on the next
VIDIOC_STREAMON:
1) rtl2832_sdr_alloc_stream_bufs() unconditionally resets dev->buf_num
to 0 and overwrites dev->buf_list[]/dev->dma_addr[], permanently
leaking the coherent DMA memory allocated by the previous attempt.
2) rtl2832_sdr_alloc_urbs() never resets dev->urbs_initialized and only
increments it. After a second successful pass urbs_initialized can
exceed MAX_BULK_BUFS, so the subsequent rtl2832_sdr_free_urbs() walks
from urbs_initialized - 1 down to 0 and reads past the end of
dev->urb_list[], passing garbage pointers to usb_free_urb().
Mirror the teardown that stop_streaming() already performs: on the error
path call rtl2832_sdr_free_urbs() and rtl2832_sdr_free_stream_bufs()
before unlocking. Both helpers are idempotent (free_urbs kills and zeros
urbs_initialized; free_stream_bufs is gated on URB_BUF and clears the
buf_num counter), so partial-failure paths and the no-allocation paths
remain safe.
Issue identified by automated review of the INV-003 series at
https://sashiko.dev/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
samples/damon/wsse: handle damon_start() failure
Patch series "samples/damon: handle damon_{start,stop}() failures".
All DAMON sample modules are not correctly handling failures from
damon_start(). Among those, mtier also has an additional problem for
handling of damon_stop() failures. wsse and prcl also have a problem in
their damon_call() failure handling. As a result, memory leaks, next
DAMON operation disruptions, and use-after-free can happen. Fix those.
Note that only the damon_start() failure caused issues can reliably be
reproduced. Reproducing those issues require the admin permission,
though.
This patch (of 6):
damon_sample_wsse_start() callers assume it will clean up resources when
it fails. And the function does the cleanup for context buildup failures.
However, it is not doing the cleanup for damon_start() failure. As a
result, when damon_start() fails, it leaks the memory for DAMON context.
Free the context in case of the failure to fix the issues.
Note that the issue can reliably be reproduced because the module calls
damon_start() in the exclusive mode. For example,
$ sudo damo start
$ echo $$ | sudo tee /sys/module/damon_sample_wsse/parameters/target_pid
$ echo Y | sudo tee /sys/module/damon_sample_wsse/parameters/enabled
$ sudo cat /proc/allocinfo | grep damon_new_ctx
Because the first command is running another DAMON instance, the third
command fails the damon_start() call because the new DAMON instance cannot
exclusively run. And without this fix, by repeating the third and the
fourth commands above, we can show the memory consumption is only
increasing due to the leaks. It requires the sudo permission though.
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
samples/damon/mtier: handle damon_stop() failure
damon_sample_mtier_stop() assumes its damon_stop() call will always
successfully stops the two DAMON contexts. Hence it deallocates the two
DAMON contexts after the damon_stop() call. However, if a given context
is already stopped, damon_stop() fails and returns an error while letting
the DAMON contexts that have not yet stopped keep running. This kind of
unexpected early DAMON context stops could happen due to memory allocation
failures in kdamond_fn(). Because damon_sample_mtier_stop() just
deallocates all DAMON contexts with damon_target and damon_region objects
that are linked to the contexts, the execution of the unstopped DAMON
context (kdamond) ends up using the memory that freed (use-after-free).
Fix the issue by separating the damon_stop() to be invoked per context.
Note that DAMON_SYSFS also allows multiple DAMON contexts execution. But,
it calls damon_stop() for each context one by one. Hence this issue is
only in mtier.
For the long term, it would be better to refactor damon_stop() to always
ensure stopping all contexts regardless of the failures in the middle.
Make this fix in the current way, though, to keep it simple and easy to
backport. I will do the refactoring later.
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: storage: realtek_cr: fix use-after-free on disconnect
realtek_cr_destructor() calls timer_delete() before the chip containing
the timer is freed. The timer callback may still be running and can
rearm itself, resulting in a use-after-free.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() to wait for the callback and prevent further
rearming. Do this unconditionally because ss_en may be changed after
the timer is armed.
Move timer_setup() into init_realtek_cr() so the timer is initialized
before any failure path can invoke the destructor.
Found by static analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped
Wire up a gmem_invalidate_range() call for SNP VMs, and use it to force
vCPUs to reload/recheck their guest-provided VMSA if the backing gmem
page is being invalidated, e.g. is being PUNCH_HOLE'd. Use the same core
logic to handle invalidations as VMX does for the APIC-access page, as the
two concepts are nearly identical: shove the physical address of a page
into the vCPU's control structure:
1. Snapshot the invalidation sequence counter
2. Grab the pfn (from guest_memfd in this case)
3. Acquire mmu_lock for read
4. Re-request reload if retry is needed, otherwise commit the change.
Note, the re-request action in #4 is necessary as KVM's retry logic is
fuzzy, i.e. can get false positives. If the guest_memfd page has been
dropped, at some point a subsequent reload will fail to get a PFN from
guest_memfd, and KVM will fail KVM_RUN. If the retry was due to a false
positive, KVM will retry until there are no relevant MMU notifier events
(and will retry in the "outer" loop, i.e. will drop locks and resched as
needed).
Note #2! Take care to invalidate the VMSA when a relevant memslot is
DELETED or MOVED, as invalidations in response to PUNCH_HOLE are predicated
on memslot bindings (KVM doesn't know what GFN range(s) to invalidate
without a binding). And more importantly, the VMSA mapping requires a
memslot, i.e. must be invalidated if its memslots disappears, regardless of
the state of the underlying guest_memfd inode.
Failure to invalidate the vCPU's control.vmsa_pa (which is checked by
pre_sev_run()) can prevent KVM from properly freeing the page as firmware
will reject the RMPUPDATE to reclaim the page with FAIL_INUSE if the vCPU
is actively running, i.e. if VMSA page is in-use. That in turn leads to an
RMP #PF on the next use, as the page will still be assigned to the SNP VM.
SEV-SNP: RMPUPDATE failed for PFN 78d198, pg_level: 1, ret: 3
SEV-SNP: PFN 0x78d198, RMP entry: [0xfff0000000144001 - 0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
rmpupdate+0x12c/0x140
rmp_make_shared+0x3b/0x60
sev_gmem_invalidate+0xe0/0x170 [kvm_amd]
delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0
kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm]
vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x496c7e
</TASK>
------------[ cut here ]------------
SEV: Failed to update RMP entry for PFN 0x78d198 error -14
WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:5160 at sev_gmem_invalidate+0x126/0x170 [kvm_amd], CPU#3: sev_snp_vmsa_pu/31345
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 31345 Comm: sev_snp_vmsa_pu Tainted: G U O
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
RIP: 0010:sev_gmem_invalidate+0x12b/0x170 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
delete_from_page_cache_batch+0x1d8/0x220
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x120/0x3d0
kvm_gmem_fallocate+0x19a/0x270 [kvm]
vfs_fallocate+0x1bc/0x1f0
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x48/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x496c7e
</TASK>
irq event stamp: 20689
hardirqs last enabled at (20699): [<ffffffff8e76092c>] __console_unlock+0x5c/0x60
hardirqs last disabled at (20708): [<ffffffff8e760911>] __console_unlock+0x41/0x60
softirqs last enabled at (20722): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140
softirqs last disabled at (20717): [<ffffffff8e6cd74e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x7e/0x140
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff99
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: core: fix debugfs UAF on adapter removal
i2c_del_adapter() frees the adapter's debugfs directory before it
unregisters the adapter device, but the new_device sysfs attribute
stays writable until device_del(). A write racing with removal still
reaches i2c_device_probe(), which passes the freed adap->debugfs to
debugfs_create_dir() as the new client's parent:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lookup_noperm_common+0x407/0x430
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88803ef87810 by task syz.0.61/6090
lookup_noperm_common+0x407/0x430
simple_start_creating+0x9c/0x110
debugfs_start_creating+0xdb/0x1a0
debugfs_create_dir+0x24/0x350
i2c_device_probe+0x814/0xbf0
It's technically possible to create a client after i2c_deregister_clients
has run. That client will never be unregistered and make
wait_for_completion hang.
Close the window by removing the new_device attribute at the start of
i2c_del_adapter(). device_remove_file() will drain any clients left. |
| Use-after-free in the Audio/Video: Web Codecs component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 156, Firefox ESR 140.16, Firefox ESR 153.3, Thunderbird 156, Thunderbird 140.16, and Thunderbird 153.3. |
| NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.26.1, has a use-after-free vulnerability when compiled for DNS-over-QUIC support with '--with-libngtcp2'. Each DoQ stream owns an output buffer that holds the DNS response. ngtcp2's retransmission buffer keeps a shallow pointer into the output buffer for as long as a STREAM frame may be resent. On a client RESET_STREAM, the output buffer is freed but ngtcp2 still holds the matching retransmission entries. The next PTO timeout makes ngtcp2 re-encode the STREAM frame and copy from the freed buffer. A malicious actor that can query Unbound over DoQ and that withholds ACKs, sends RESET_STREAM, and waits for PTO, reaches this use-after-free with no privilege. This leads to retransmissions against freed memory and eventually an abnormal server exit under a 20-query spray. |
| NLnet Labs Unbound 1.12.0 up to and including 1.26.0 has a use-after-free vulnerability when compiled for DNS-over-HTTPs support with '--with-libnghttp2'. During failure code paths (i.e., RPZ drop query, jostle due to heavy traffic), a dropped DoH stream brings down the whole DoH session and does not account properly for other DoH streams in the same session. This leads to use-after-free in those code paths. If the prerequisites are satisfied (possible RPZ drop or heavy client traffic), a malicious actor can trigger the vulnerability with a single DoH connection and the appropriate traffic. Impact is limited as the reads are not user controlled and the use-after-free leads to early returns. However, a hardened allocator can catch the use-after-free and controllably terminate the process resulting to denial of service. |
