| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: check dir entry fits before reading the hash trailer in ext4_search_dir()
For casefolded encrypted directories ext4 stores an 8-byte hash trailer
after the name (EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES()), at an offset derived from
de->name_len. On the sb_no_casefold_compat_fallback() path ext4_match()
reads that trailer, but ext4_search_dir()'s by-hand pre-check only tests
de->name + de->name_len <= dlimit, which proves the name fits, not the
rounded trailer. A crafted entry whose name ends at the block boundary
passes the check while EXT4_DIRENT_HASHES(de) lands past the block end,
so ext4_match() reads out of bounds on an ordinary lookup. KASAN reports
it as a use-after-free when the page after the directory block holds a
freed object:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_match (fs/ext4/namei.c:1435)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888010458000 by task exploit
Call Trace:
ext4_match (fs/ext4/namei.c:1435)
ext4_search_dir (fs/ext4/namei.c:1470)
__ext4_find_entry (fs/ext4/namei.c:1268 fs/ext4/namei.c:1632)
ext4_lookup (fs/ext4/namei.c:1703 fs/ext4/namei.c:1769)
...
filename_lookup (fs/namei.c:2842)
vfs_statx (fs/stat.c:353)
__do_sys_newfstatat (fs/stat.c:538)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Require, for hash-in-dirent directories, that the whole entry including
the rounded trailer fits before calling ext4_match(). This is the same
bound ext4_check_dir_entry() already enforces via ext4_dir_rec_len(), so
no well-formed entry is rejected. The other caller, ext4_find_dest_de(),
runs ext4_check_dir_entry() first and is unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning
ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the
synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers
clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()
currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no
storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT
write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report
a slab OOB write.
Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,
copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the
existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize
because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_skbmod: fix length calculations and avoid invalid header warnings
syzbot reported a warning in skb_network_header_len() triggered
by tcf_skbmod_act():
!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 skb_network_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 tcf_skbmod_act+0xfe8/0x1810 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55
There are a few issues in tcf_skbmod_act():
1. Calling skb_network_header_len() assumes skb->transport_header is set,
which is not guaranteed when tcf_skbmod_act() runs at TC ingress.
2. Unconditionally calling skb_mac_header_len() at the beginning of
tcf_skbmod_act() triggers a warning on L3 devices (e.g. TUN) where the
MAC header is unset, evaluating to an underflowed garbage length.
3. On TC ingress, skb->data points to the network header. Adding the MAC
header length to the IP header length causes skb_ensure_writable() to
request more bytes than the actual IP packet length, dropping valid
short packets (e.g. 28-byte UDP/IPv4 packets).
Fix these by:
- Using skb_network_offset(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr/ipv6hdr) for
SKBMOD_F_ECN so that the required length is correctly calculated on
both ingress (offset == 0) and egress (offset == mac_len).
- Setting max_edit_len to ETH_HLEN for Ethernet header modifications
after validating ARPHRD_ETHER. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Cap MSI-X vectors to the device MSI-X table size
mana_gd_query_max_resources() sizes gc->num_msix_usable from resp.max_msix
and the CPU count, but never from the device MSI-X table. On a 1792 vCPU
M-series VM that yields 1793 while the table has 1024 entries, and
mana_gd_setup_remaining_irqs() then walks indices 1..1792, running off the
end of the region mapped by msix_map_region():
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff8e347f8b99800c
RIP: 0010:msix_prepare_msi_desc+0x7a/0x90
RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ff4330cb164ea780 RCX: ff8e347f8b998000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__msi_domain_alloc_irqs+0x13a/0x440
msi_domain_alloc_irq_at+0x149/0x1b0
mana_gd_setup+0x351/0x890
mana_gd_probe+0x274/0x390
</TASK>
RAX is index 1024 * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE, one entry past the table.
msi_insert_desc() does range check the index, but only against the MSI
domain hwsize, which matches the table only for devices on an MSI parent
domain. With a global PCI/MSI domain hwsize is MSI_XA_DOMAIN_SIZE, so
nothing bounds the request.
Cap num_msix_usable with pci_msix_vec_count(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix password encoding bounds check
The password PSWD_ENCODINGS parser reads password_obj[elem + pos_values]
while copying the supported password encodings from the ACPI package.
The outer loop only guarantees that elem is within password_obj_count.
The encoding count is bounded by MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE, but that does not
guarantee that the ACPI package contains enough entries for all
elem + pos_values accesses.
A malformed package can therefore declare a non-zero encoding count
without providing enough string objects, causing the parser to read past
the ACPI package array and pass an out-of-bounds string pointer and
length to hp_convert_hexstr_to_str().
Add the same computed-index bounds check used by the other offset-based
package parsing loops before reading password_obj[elem + pos_values]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()
ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC
login response with
user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz;
user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (user->passkey)
memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz);
resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is
only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login
response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy()
reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not
bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack
hash[] buffer before allocating and copying.
[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611
[ 2030.242296]
[ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
[ 2030.242763] Call Trace:
[ 2030.242769] <TASK>
[ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0
[ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200
[ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70
[ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150
[ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0
[ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70
[ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120
[ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00
[ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0
[ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140
[ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0
[ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300
[ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0
[ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280
[ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490
[ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300
[ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110
[ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20
[ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470
[ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910
[ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0
[ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 2030.243564] </TASK>
[ 2030.243570]
[ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279:
[ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
[ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0
[ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750
[ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340
[ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0
[ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0
[ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
[ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930
[ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00
[ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140
[ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470
[ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100
[ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460
[ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 2030.305594]
[ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640
[ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 2030.309595] The buggy address
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-integrity: fix buffer overflow with keyed discard
Since commit 68c5c42567bc ("dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard
filler with a keyed sector marker"), integrity_metadata computes a
checksum for every discarded block into the "checksums" buffer.
integrity_sector_checksum always writes the whole digest. So if the tag
size is smaller than the digest size, the checksum of the last block
that fits into the buffer is written past the end of it. For example,
with hmac(sha256) and tag size 16, a 4MiB discard writes 16 bytes past
the kmalloc'ed page.
Fix this by subtracting extra_space from the buffer size when computing
max_blocks, like we do for writes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup
sfq_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) (unsigned). A
device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU
2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, so slot->allot = INT_MIN
and INT_MIN + INT_MIN toggles between INT_MIN and 0 forever, spinning
sfq_dequeue() under the qdisc lock.
Clamp the quantum to [256, 1 << 20] so the refill loop terminates. The
lower bound also covers q->quantum == 0 (psched_mtu() returning 0),
which spins sfq_dequeue() identically. sfq_change() already rejects a
negative quantum, so only the init path was exposed.
Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy
device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq_pie: clamp default quantum to avoid signed overflow
fq_pie_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without
clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0
accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which
overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_pie_qdisc_dequeue(),
causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_pie_policy which
is already bounded to [1, 1 << 20]; clamp the default to [256, 1 << 20].
256 matches fq_codel's floor and is a sane minimum for a DRR quantum.
Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy
device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum
fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 *
psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy
with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return
0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit
arithmetic, so q->quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill
loop adds 0 to f->credit (which stays <= 0) and goto begin loops
forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup.
Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 << 20] before multiplying so the product
cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 << 20, matching the bound already
enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change().
Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a
dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptp: netc: fix period truncation and potential divide-by-zero in PEROUT
The max_period bound in net_timer_enable_perout() was computed as:
max_period = (u64)NETC_TMR_DEFAULT_FIPER + integral_period;
which exceeds U32_MAX when integral_period > 0 (e.g. 0x100000002 for
the default 333333333 Hz clock). A period_ns that passes this check but
exceeds U32_MAX is then silently truncated when stored into the u32
struct netc_pp::period field.
A truncated value of zero can reach netc_timer_set_perout_alarm(), where
the local u32 period variable would also be 0, causing a divide-by-zero
in roundup_u64(delta, period) whenever the stime < min_time branch is
taken (which always happens for a start time of {0, 0}).
Additionally, netc_timer_enable_periodic_pulse() and
netc_timer_enable_fiper() both compute:
fiper = pp->period - integral_period;
A zero pp->period results in an unsigned wraparound to 0xFFFFFFFD,
mis-programming the FIPER hardware register.
Fix all three issues by capping max_period at NETC_TMR_DEFAULT_FIPER
(0xFFFFFFFF). This ensures that any period_ns passing the range check
fits in a u32 without truncation, so the stored value is always valid
and non-zero. The accepted range is reduced by integral_period ns
(typically only a few nanoseconds), which is negligible in practice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames
act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses
skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only
correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not
match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN
while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull()
use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight.
IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites
h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and calls eth_type_trans() on decode - so
instead of trying to make the offsets work for arbitrary link types,
simply drop packets that do not carry an Ethernet header.
Checking skb->dev->type alone is not enough. We have to cater for a
corner case where mirred can redirect an skb from a non-Ethernet device
to an Ethernet one, and skb->dev then says nothing about the framing the
skb actually has: an skb redirected from ppp0 reaches the target's ingress
hook with mac_len 0 and no Ethernet header at all. So at ingress also
require mac_len to be ETH_HLEN. On egress mac_len is not maintained, so
the device type is all we have; a bogus redirect there yields a malformed
frame rather than an out-of-bounds push, and it would be malformed with or
without IFE.
That corner case is not theoretical - redirecting from ppp0 into a veth
that has an ife encode action on its ingress hook panics without this
patch:
skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:98 put:14 head:ffff88800e410000
data:ffff88800e40fff5 tail:0x57 end:0x640 dev:veth3
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
Call Trace:
skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:224 net/core/skbuff.c:2657)
tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:829 net/sched/act_ife.c:874)
tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463)
netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6463 net/core/dev.c:6522)
tcf_mirred_to_dev (net/sched/act_mirred.c:248 net/sched/act_mirred.c:328)
tcf_mirred_act (net/sched/act_mirred.c:489)
tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463)
process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6728)
With Ethernet framing guaranteed, use ETH_HLEN instead of
hard_header_len. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: qlcnic: validate unified ROM sections before loading
The unified ROM parser reads directory, product, and data-descriptor fields
from the firmware file. Existing validation forms table and data ends with
unchecked additions and multiplications. Malformed values can wrap before
they are compared with the firmware size. The parser also dereferences
typed pointers at firmware-controlled offsets.
Valid descriptor extents alone are insufficient for the consumers. The
loader reads a fixed-size bootloader regardless of its declared size, the
version parser assumes a 17-byte tail, and a partial final firmware word is
read as a full u64. A truncated image can therefore make the driver read
beyond the firmware allocation during validation or loading.
Replace the pointer-returning parser with bounded range helpers. Validate
table entry sizes, descriptor indices, section ranges, the fixed
bootloader load length, and the version tail before exposing any section.
Read all file fields with unaligned little-endian accessors and assemble a
partial final word from only the bytes that remain. Apply the same range
checks to the legacy image before reading its fixed fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hinic3: Fix skb linearization mismatch and drop skb when skb_checksum_help() failed
Previously, hinic3_send_one_skb() cached the skb fragment count before
calling hinic3_tx_offload(). If hinic3_tx_csum() falls back to
skb_checksum_help() for unsupported tunnel packets, the skb may be
linearized. Continuing to build the TX descriptor with the stale
fragment count leads to a descriptor mismatch, which can trigger
out-of-bounds DMA reads or IOMMU faults.
Furthermore, the old code ignored the return value of skb_checksum_help(),
transmitting corrupted packets with incomplete checksums upon failure.
Fix this by:
1. Moving the hinic3_tx_offload() call before calculating 'num_sge' to
ensure the correct fragment count is used if the SKB is linearized.
2. Propagating skb_checksum_help() errors and returning
HINIC3_TX_OFFLOAD_INVALID to properly drop the skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read
Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read".
OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes.
A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local
system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is
reported.
Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing.
Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and
orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode
validation boundary.
This patch (of 2):
[BUG]
A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an
i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range.
ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking
up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves
the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers
assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing. |
| c-ares is an asynchronous resolver library. Prior to 1.34.7, ares_dns_parse() trusts the attacker-controlled ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, and ARCOUNT fields before confirming that the DNS response contains enough bytes for the claimed records. Because process_answer() invokes parsing before transaction ID and question validation, a malicious DNS response can cause ares_dns_record_rr_prealloc() and ares_array_set_size() to reserve disproportionate heap memory for a tiny message. Repeated responses create large allocation and release cycles that can degrade or deny name resolution, without causing memory corruption or information disclosure. This issue is fixed in version 1.34.7. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Validate the FW dump header length
nxp_process_fw_dump() pulls the ACL header off the frame and then reads
seq_num and buf_len from a struct nxp_fw_dump_hdr placed at skb->data,
without checking that the ACL payload is long enough to contain it.
h4_recv_buf() collects HCI_ACL_HDR_SIZE bytes of header followed by the
number of payload bytes named in that header, so skb->len is 4 + dlen
with dlen supplied by the controller and possibly smaller than the 8
byte dump header, or zero. A short frame with connection handle 0xfff
therefore reads both fields from beyond the received data.
Beyond the read itself, buf_len is what terminates a dump: a value of
zero makes the driver call hci_devcd_complete() and reset the
controller, so a truncated frame can end a dump early.
Use skb_pull_data() to validate and pull the FW dump header before
accessing its fields. Warn and reject the chunk if the header is
truncated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path
btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size
of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is:
err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data,
round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE));
Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255
bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO
bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to
carry, that read can also extend past the end of the buffer.
Compute the padded length up front, ensure the SKB has tailroom for it,
and zero-fill the padding with skb_put_zero(). skb->len then covers the
padding, so sdio_writesb() no longer needs to round up. byte_tx keeps
counting the header and the payload only, and the error path restores the
SKB so that the caller can requeue it.
Writing behind skb->tail is only safe because the driver owns the buffer,
which "Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Take exclusive ownership of the SKB before
TX" ensures. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: sensorhub: Fix memory overread in ring handler
`max_response` and `sensor_num` are read from different EC commands:
- `max_response` is from cros_ec_get_proto_info().
ec_dev->max_response = info->max_response_packet_size -
sizeof(struct ec_host_response);
- `sensor_num` is from cros_ec_get_sensor_count().
sensor_num = cros_ec_get_sensor_count(ec);
With a malfunctioning EC firmware, it is possible that the `msg->insize`
(i.e., `fifo_info_length` in the context) could be clamped in
cros_ec_cmd_xfer() because `msg->insize` is greater than `max_response`.
int fifo_info_length =
sizeof(struct ec_response_motion_sense_fifo_info) +
sizeof(u16) * sensorhub->sensor_num;
This means the number of read bytes could be less than expected. As a
result, the subsequent memcpy() in cros_ec_sensorhub_ring_handler()
overreads the `resp->fifo_info` buffer.
Check the return value of cros_ec_cmd_xfer_status() and abort if the
number of bytes read does not match the expected length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4.2: fix LAYOUTSTATS send buffer exhaustion
encode_layoutstats_maxsz budgets XDR_QUADLEN(PNFS_LAYOUTSTATS_MAXSIZE),
i.e. 256 bytes, for the layoutupdate4 body written by the layout driver.
The flexfiles record can exceed that.
ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate() emits, per data server, a netaddr4,
an nfs_fh4, two ff_io_latency4, an nfstime4 and a bool. A data server
whose filehandle is NFS_MAXFHSIZE bytes long already accounts for 132 of
those bytes, and the two ff_io_latency4 at 64 bytes each, the nfstime4
and the bool add a further 144, so the body passes 256 bytes before the
netaddr4 is encoded at all. encode_layoutstats() additionally writes
the deviceid4 and the layoutupdate4 lou_type word, neither of which the
macro accounts for.
The filehandle and the address are both chosen by the server, through
LAYOUTGET and GETDEVICEINFO, so it can drive the encoder past the
end of the send buffer. xdr_reserve_space() returns NULL once that
happens, and the two ff_layout_encode_io_latency() calls run with
dss_info->mirror->lock held, so a NULL return there leaves the lock
permanently held.
Raise PNFS_LAYOUTSTATS_MAXSIZE to 384 so that the record fits inside the
reservation. |
