| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: Reject descending VLAN tunnel ranges
A pair of descending VLAN and tunnel IDs can pass the tunnel range span
check. The VLAN subtraction produces a negative int, which is converted
to unsigned when compared with the u32 tunnel ID subtraction. It can
therefore equal the wrapped tunnel ID delta.
The range loop then performs no iterations. Since the batched
notification handling added a post-loop error check, this leaves err
uninitialized and makes the request's return value unpredictable.
Reject descending VLAN ranges before comparing the spans. Valid
ascending and single-entry ranges remain unchanged, while malformed
descending ranges consistently return -EINVAL.
This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by
manual source review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: bound SNL TLV parsing to the skb and add length checks
nfc_llcp_recv_snl() walked the SNL TLV list using a u16 offset/length
pair derived from skb->len, without bounding reads to the actual skb
data. Three problems followed:
- For a short frame (skb->len < LLCP_HEADER_SIZE), tlv_len underflowed.
- The per-TLV header (type, length) was read without checking that two
bytes remained.
- A declared TLV length could run past the end of the buffer, and an
SDREQ with length == 0 made "service_name_len = length - 1" underflow
(size_t), driving an out-of-bounds read in the following strncmp() /
nfc_llcp_sock_from_sn(). The SDRES case likewise read tlv[2]/tlv[3]
without a length check.
A nearby NFC device can reach this without authentication; LLCP link
activation happens automatically after NFC-DEP.
Walk the TLV list by pointer, bounded by skb_tail_pointer() over the
linear skb data, and validate each TLV declared length before use. Add
explicit length checks for SDREQ (>= 1) and SDRES (exactly 2).
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| FluidSynth is a software synthesizer based on the SoundFont 2 specifications. From 2.5.0 until 2.5.6, the native DLS parser validates articulation chunks using the unsigned expression cbsize + connblocks * 12 without first ensuring that the multiplication and addition fit in 32 bits. A crafted DLS file can supply a large connblocks value that wraps the expression and bypasses the chunk-size check, after which the parser performs approximately one billion 12-byte iterations beyond the chunk boundary. The excessive processing and invalid reads can cause denial of service. Builds with the CMake option enable-native-dls set to OFF do not expose the parser. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.6. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: Fix index_root heap OOB write in ntfs_ir_to_ib()
ntfs_ir_to_ib copies all entries from index_root into a freshly allocated
index_block_size-byte buffer without verifying that the entries fit in the
available space. The entries in index_root may be larger than the usable
entry space in the index block.
This can cause OOB writes past the end of the allocation.
The validator ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() checks that entries are
self-consistent within the IR value, but never cross-checks them against
index_block_size. There is no bounds check in ntfs_ir_to_ib() before the
memcpy.
Fixing this at the sink in ntfs_ir_to_ib() since
ntfs_index_root_inconsistent() validates the logical consistency of
index_root as a structure and a root with large entries is a structurally
valid root. The bug is a size conflict of ntfs_ir_to_ib().
Also, the validator is called once per inode load in
ntfs_read_locked_inode() while ntfs_ir_to_ib() is only called during a
reparent, a check there adds no overhead to the common path.
Moreover, even a future call path that bypasses the validator would still
be protected.
With NULL as first parameter of ntfs_error(), the volume error flag is
never set by this call, so the device name will be absent from the error
message. In any case, that the caller, ntfs_ir_reparent(), prints an error
message that includes the device name on NULL returns.
I think this is the best solution available without adding
'struct super_block *sb' as a parameter to ntfs_ir_to_ib().
This heap out-of-bounds write is triggered by a crafted filesystem image,
which is not in the kernel threat model, anyway, fixing memory errors would
be nice to keep things secure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: fix integer overflow in ftp helper port/address parsing
ip_vs_ftp_get_addrport() accumulates decimal digits into a __u16
(hport) and into unsigned char (p[]) without checking for overflow.
A crafted FTP PASV/EPSV response with an over-long port or address
octet wraps the value, so the helper configures the data connection
with a truncated port/address.
The netfilter conntrack FTP helper had the same defect, fixed in
commit 2b413fc689ba ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_ftp: avoid u16
overflows"). Apply the equivalent fix here: widen the port accumulator
to u32 and reject values above 65535, and reject address octets above
255. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: riscv-sbi-mpxy: validate RPMI notification lengths
The SBI return value controls how many bytes are copied from shared
memory into the RPMI notification buffer. It is not validated against
the negotiated shared-memory size before that copy. The event walker
also uses a reversed loop condition and can inspect a short event record.
Validate the complete notification length before copying it, iterate only
while a full event header remains, and stop when a declared event payload
extends beyond the copied notification data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: etm4x: fix underflow for usage of (nrseqstate - 1)
According to IHI006H Embedded Trace Macrocell Architecture
Specification[0], TRCSEQEVR<n> is implemented only when
TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b100, in which case n ranges from 0 to 2;
otherwise, TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b000.
IOW, the number of usage in the initialisation or setting
TRCSEQEVR<n> with drvdata->nrseqstate - 1 in the loop could make
underflow issue when TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b000.
Therefore, introduce nr_seq_ctrls field and untie it from nrseqstate.
As part of this introduce ETM_MAX_SEQ_TRANSITIONS macro and
apply nr_seq_ctrls and above macro to TRCSEQEVR<n> relevant fields setup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: bound smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE walks by DACL size
smb_check_perm_dacl() validates that the DACL fits inside the NT
security descriptor, but then bounds its two ACE walks by the
remaining NTSD length (acl_size) rather than the DACL's declared
size (pdacl_size).
When pdacl->size is smaller than the trailing NTSD buffer, bytes
after the declared DACL boundary - still inside the stored security
descriptor - are parsed as ACEs during access checks. A crafted
DACL can place an access-granting ACE beyond pdacl->size, and the
current code accepts it during SMB2_CREATE access validation, while
parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl() stop at pdacl_size.
Bound both ACE walks by pdacl_size to match the DACL boundary
semantics used elsewhere in the server.
Validation:
- semantic KUnit harness shows the post-boundary ACE is selected
before the fix and rejected (EACCES) after it
- linux master (7.2-rc6), x86_64 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject negative optlen in cgroup getsockopt hook
A cgroup getsockopt BPF program can shrink ctx->optlen after the
kernel getsockopt handler has run. The kernel-buffer variant, used by
TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, only rejects values larger than the original
length.
If BPF writes a negative optlen, that value is accepted and propagated
back to the TCP getsockopt code. It can then be passed to
copy_to_sockptr() as a size_t and trigger the hardened usercopy
bytes > INT_MAX warning.
Reject negative ctx.optlen in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_getsockopt_kern(),
matching the lower-bound validation already present in the sockptr-based
getsockopt hook. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix integer overflow of user QP buffer size
set_user_buf_size() computes the QP buffer size by left-shifting the
user-supplied rq.wqe_cnt and rq.wqe_shift values as signed integers.
A sufficiently large rq.wqe_cnt causes signed integer overflow, which
is undefined behavior, and yields a small or negative buf_size, causing
ib_umem_get() to map a buffer smaller than the hardware will actually
write into.
Replace the shifts and addition with check_shl_overflow() and
check_add_overflow(), rejecting invalid user inputs.
Moreover, guard the identical shift computing qp->sq.offset in
_create_user_qp() before set_user_buf_size() is reached. |
| FluidSynth is a software synthesizer based on the SoundFont 2 specifications. From 2.5.0 until 2.5.6, the native DLS loader assigns file-controlled wsmp.loop_start and wsmp.loop_length values to samples without calling fluid_sample_validate() or fluid_sample_sanitize_loop(). A crafted DLS file can place sample loop points beyond the sample buffer, causing out-of-bounds reads during audio rendering, undefined behavior, possible memory disclosure, and denial of service. Builds compiled with the CMake option enable-native-dls set to OFF do not expose the affected parser. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.6. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: validate topology volume range before allocation
SOF treats the topology mixer min and max values as non-negative indices
into its volume table. It stores them in signed fields, allocates max + 1
entries through an int argument, and later indexes the table with the
stored range.
An inverted range is invalid, while a maximum at or above INT_MAX cannot
be represented safely after the increment or in the signed fields.
Validate the complete range before storing it or allocating the table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: reject out-of-range evcn in mi_enum_attr()
In mi_enum_attr(), the start/end VCN validation for non-resident
attributes is:
if (svcn > evcn + 1) goto out;
When evcn is U64_MAX the "evcn + 1" expression wraps to 0 and any svcn
passes the check. For evcn values close to U64_MAX (but not equal to it)
the right-hand side is still a meaningless near-wrap upper bound, so a
malformed on-disk attribute with svcn == 0 and evcn near U64_MAX can pass
mi_enum_attr() unrejected.
VCN (virtual cluster number) is a cluster index, so any valid evcn is
bounded by the volume's total cluster count, which ntfs3 holds in
sbi->used.bitmap.nbits (set up in ntfs_init_from_boot() before any caller
of mi_enum_attr() runs). Reject evcn values that fall outside this range.
However, an empty non-resident attribute (no allocated clusters) is
legitimately encoded with svcn == 0 and evcn == -1 (U64_MAX), e.g. via
attr->nres.evcn = cpu_to_le64((u64)vcn - 1) with vcn == 0. That sentinel
must keep passing, so exclude evcn == U64_MAX from the range check. The
existing "svcn > evcn + 1" test still tolerates the sentinel ("0 > 0" is
false) and continues to require svcn == 0 for it, while the range check
rejects every other out-of-range evcn and thereby also defuses the
"evcn + 1" wraparound.
svcn does not need its own bound: once evcn < nbits, "svcn > evcn + 1"
implies svcn <= nbits.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: fixed evcn check] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse()
Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the
mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to
min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent
memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C
pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short
TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the
allocation.
The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the
buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match
that stride.
Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the
pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably
consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides.
Compile tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Require exactly one Stream ID for a vSID
tegra241_vintf_init_vsid() maps a guest vSID to a single physical Stream ID
taken from master->streams[0], and only warns when the device does not have
exactly one stream. A device with several streams gets only its first one
mapped, so a guest vSID invalidation cannot reach the others' ATC and IOTLB
entries; a device with none makes master->streams a ZERO_SIZE_PTR, read out
of bounds.
Reject the mapping with -EOPNOTSUPP if master->num_streams is not one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Squashfs: check block offset is not negative
If a negative offset is read off disk (for example the offset into the
decompressed fragment block), this will cause squashfs_copy_data() to
perform an out of bounds access.
Fix by checking if offset is negative, and returning 0. This matches
existing behaviour where an offset beyond the block returns 0 bytes
copied.
To trigger this out of bounds access requires a crafted Squashfs
filesystem and CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount it. Unprivileged users will not be
able to mount such a filesystem, but once mounted, an unprivileged user
can trigger the out of bounds access by reading the crafted file with the
negative offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received
isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without
ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed
in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the
data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS
(ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) -
out of the fixed-size descriptor:
isert_handle_iscsi_dataout():
sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc),
unsol_data_len);
isert_handle_scsi_cmd():
sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd->se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents,
isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len);
Because the declared length is never checked against wc->byte_len, an
initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually
sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of
the receive buffer.
Nothing upstream of isert closes this door:
- __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against
conn_ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter,
used here for the inbound check.
- iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets
ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength;
and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in
iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the value the initiator declares is
adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively
raises its own ceiling.
- isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive
descriptor (ISER_RX_SIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and
the descriptor size are unrelated.
The imm_data_len == data_len path is more than an over-read: it aliases
the receive descriptor via sg_set_buf() and passes it to the backend as
the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap
contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the
backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist
isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was
demonstrated.
Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has
declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that
permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment
length exceeds what was received. With KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0
Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25
Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work
Call Trace:
sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0
isert_recv_done+0xba6/0x2390
__ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390
ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150
isert_recv_done+0xba6 resolves to isert_handle_iscsi_dataout()
(ib_isert.c:1160), inlined through isert_rx_opcode().
Validate wc->byte_len against the framing in isert_recv_done() before the
PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short.
Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also
rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise
be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs
shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login
PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN")) but does not bound the declared
length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no
length check at all.
isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isert_get_data()
returns the iSER header plus ISER_HEADERS_LEN and makes no adjustment for
an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly
[ISER_HEADERS_LEN, ISER_HEADERS_LEN + dlength), and comparing that sum
against wc->byte_len bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS
term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything furth
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: prevent out-of-bounds read in super root block parsing
super-root inode metadata size is trusted before nilfs_read_inode_common().
Reject super-root inode sizes whose computed on-disk footprint exceeds the
filesystem block size. This prevents malformed filesystem images from
making nilfs_read_inode_common() read past the end of the super-root block.
[ryusuke: clarify the commit title] |
| FreeRDP before 3.31.0 contains a buffer over-read vulnerability in the rts_read_result function within the RPC gateway transport parser. Attackers can send a malicious BIND_ACK PDU with a truncated result entry to trigger an out-of-bounds read causing process abort. |
| A flaw has been found in OpenClaw ClawScan up to 0.1.6. This affects an unknown function of the file internal/runner/static_scanner.go of the component Static Scanner. This manipulation causes incomplete comparison with missing factors. It is possible to launch the attack on the local host. The exploit has been published and may be used. Upgrading to version 0.1.7 mitigates this issue. Patch name: 9f6a6fbb9f1137345566d0ab44c73893dfe112fa. The affected component should be upgraded. |
