| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Affected versions of MISP validate the user-configurable homepage by checking only whether the supplied path begins with /. That check is insufficient because protocol-relative URLs such as //attacker.example also begin with / but resolve to an external origin in browsers.
The vulnerable homepage value can be stored as a user setting and later used by the post-login routing logic. The commit explicitly identifies //attacker.example as a payload that passed validation and was emitted to the Location header after login.
The fix introduces a shared InternalRedirectValidator that rejects URLs containing a host, scheme, userinfo, unsafe leading // or /\, malformed URLs, and control characters. It also revalidates homepage settings on read so legacy or internally written unsafe values cannot bypass the new storage-time validation.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45 |
| Affected versions of MISP do not enforce parent-event visibility when serving cryptographic keys through CryptographicKeysController::view().
The vulnerable handler queried CryptographicKey directly using the supplied key ID and selected sensitive fields such as:
*
type
*
key_data
*
fingerprint
but did not fetch or authorize the associated parent event first.
The upstream commit explicitly states that cryptographicKeys/view could return a protected event’s signing key to any authenticated user.
The fix adds parent_id and parent_type to the lookup and then enforces authorization through the associated event using fetchSimpleEvent($user, parent_id). If the parent is not an Event, access is limited to site administrators.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45 |
| Affected versions of MISP inconsistently enforced email-address visibility in DashboardsController::listTemplates().
The query always fetched User.email, while redaction happened only inside the non-REST rendering branch. As a result, the same authenticated user who saw redacted data in the normal HTML interface could request the REST/JSON representation and receive template owners’ email addresses without the intended privilege check.
The fix moves the decision to a centralized User::canSeeEmails() authorization helper. Email addresses are now fetched only when the requester is a site administrator or the instance explicitly enables Security.disclose_user_emails. The same helper is also reused by other dashboard widgets to keep email-disclosure policy consistent.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45 |
| Affected versions of MISP contain insufficient validation of server-side outbound HTTP destinations in feed retrieval and TAXII discovery functionality.
In feed processing, redirects were followed without validating the redirect scheme or destination. The original request headers were reused across redirect hops, meaning authentication headers or API credentials configured for a feed could be forwarded to a different host. Redirects could also target internal network resources, resulting in SSRF. The fix adds redirect validation, blocks internal destinations for cross-host redirects, strips configured feed credentials before following redirects to another host, and pins validated DNS results to prevent re-resolution after validation.
The TAXII discovery endpoint had a related incomplete SSRF defense. It used gethostbyname() and compared the result against only a few literal addresses. This missed cases including IPv6 loopback (::1), numeric host encodings such as 0x7f000001, and potentially multiple DNS records. The fix moves TAXII discovery to the shared URL egress validator.
Together, these commits harden MISP's outbound URL handling against alternate-address representations, DNS-related bypasses, unsafe redirects, internal-host access, and cross-host credential forwarding.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45 |
| Affected versions of MISP insufficiently validate URLs used by dashboard widgets, particularly the Button widget.
The widget's URL is stored configuration controlled by a user. The previous renderer considered a URL safe if it appeared relative or if its parsed hostname matched the configured MISP hostname. That logic failed to reject dangerous schemes and URL forms that browsers normalize differently from PHP's URL parsing.
As a result, values such as javascript: URLs or backslash-based authority forms could reach the generated anchor's href and execute script or navigate to an attacker-controlled origin when another user interacted with the widget. The upstream commit describes the issue as:
“javascript: and backslash URLs reached the href (stored XSS)”.
The fix routes widget URLs through a shared DashboardURLValidator, rejects dangerous schemes, raw backslashes, control characters, and unauthorized absolute origins, and validates the URL both in the widget handler and renderer.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45 |
| Affected versions of MISP contain inconsistent authorization checks across dashboard widgets that display organisation information.
Several organisation-related widgets did not honor Security.hide_organisation_index_from_users. As a result, authenticated users without the perm_sharing_group permission could enumerate organisations even though the normal organisation index was intentionally hidden from them.
The affected widgets included paths that:
*
returned organisation names and identifiers;
*
could expose additional organisation database fields through JSON export because unrestricted find('all') queries fetched full rows;
*
accepted limit=0 or negative values in a way that could effectively remove the result limit and return the entire organisation table.
A related organisation-contributor leaderboard also ignored the same visibility setting. Its handler counted Event.orgc_id across the entire event table and mapped those IDs to organisation names, revealing every organisation with events regardless of whether the caller could see any of those events. The fix withdraws this widget entirely for users who lack organisation-index visibility.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45 |
| Affected versions of MISP allow authenticated users to retrieve object-reference records by UUID through EventGraphTool::get_reference_data() without first checking whether the requester is authorized to view the object the reference belongs to.
The vulnerable code queried ObjectReference.uuid directly and returned the matching row whenever it existed. Because no parent-object ACL was applied, a user who knew or obtained a reference UUID could retrieve information associated with an object outside their normal access scope. The commit explicitly states that any object reference could be returned by UUID without authorizing its parent object.
The fix retrieves the referenced object's object_id and calls fetchObjectSimple() with the current user. If the user cannot access that parent object, MISP now returns NotFoundException instead of exposing the reference.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45 |
| Affected versions of MISP contain improper authorization checks in the freetext feed preview functionality. The preview performed correlation lookups against attributes from events without applying the requesting user's ACL, allowing restricted event correlations and associated event information to be exposed to users who could not otherwise access those events. The vulnerable queries were scoped only by attribute values and deletion status rather than MISP's event, organization, sharing-group, attribute, and object-level access controls.
The same preview functionality also returned cross-feed correlation information without properly restricting the feed list to feeds visible to the caller. This exposed metadata for feeds that were not marked lookup_visible; one affected response additionally included the configured feed URL even though that value was not required by the feature.
The fixes apply the caller's ACL to attribute correlation searches, remove feed URLs from correlation results, restrict cross-feed results according to feed visibility, and correct host-organization ID comparison so the authorization rules are applied consistently.
Version affected: ≤2.5.45 |
| MISP's UiBeta theme collection view (app/View/Themed/UiBeta/Collections/view.ctp) performed a secondary query of member events by UUID without applying the caller's access control list (ACL). The CollectionsController::view() action correctly resolved collection element UUIDs through Event::fetchSimpleEvents($user, ...), which enforces per-user event ACL. However, the view template independently re-queried the same UUIDs using only an Event.uuid IN (...) condition, omitting the createEventConditions() authorization filter. Because collection element UUIDs are stored without server-side authorization against the referenced event (CollectionElementsController::add() accepts whatever UUID the collection owner posts), an authenticated user with view access to a collection could retrieve full details of events they are not permitted to read. The exposed data included event identifiers, info, dates, timestamps, creator organization, all event tags, and galaxy clusters (the latter attached via a cluster-scoped rather than event-scoped ACL check). This constitutes an authorization bypass at the presentation layer, allowing horizontal privilege escalation across event boundaries within the MISP instance. |
| MISP contains a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the sharing group quick-edit functionality. The addOrg, removeOrg, addServer, and removeServer actions share the __initialiseSGQuickEdit() helper, where the HTTP method validation intended to restrict these operations to POST requests was commented out.
As a result, these state-changing actions could be invoked using GET requests. An attacker could craft a URL targeting one of the affected actions and cause an authenticated MISP user with sufficient privileges to request it, for example through a malicious link or embedded web resource.
Successful exploitation could modify the membership of a MISP sharing group without the victim intentionally performing the operation. Depending on the action performed, an attacker could add or remove organisations or servers from a sharing group, potentially granting unintended access to information distributed through that sharing group or disrupting legitimate information sharing.
The patch restores HTTP method enforcement centrally in __initialiseSGQuickEdit() by calling allowMethod(['post']), ensuring that all four affected quick-edit operations require POST requests and are therefore subject to the application's normal protections for state-changing requests. |
| An incorrect authorization vulnerability in MISP allowed authenticated users to delete attributes from events despite lacking the required perm_modify or perm_modify_org permissions.
The affected attribute deletion paths relied on organization membership checks performed by MispAttribute::deleteAttribute() but did not consistently enforce MISP's event modification authorization rules. Consequently, a user belonging to the organization associated with an event could potentially delete individual attributes or perform bulk attribute deletion even when their assigned role was not authorized to modify the event.
This created an inconsistency between attribute editing and deletion: editing an attribute correctly used MISP's ACL::canModifyEvent() authorization logic, whereas the affected deletion operations could bypass these permission checks.
An authenticated attacker with access to an affected MISP instance and membership in the organization owning an event could exploit this flaw to remove attributes from that event, potentially causing unauthorized modification or loss of threat intelligence data.
The patch introduces a common authorization check for all affected deletion paths. Before deletion, MISP now resolves the associated events and verifies that the current user is authorized to modify each event using the same authorization mechanism used by normal event and attribute modification operations. |
| An authorization flaw in MISP allowed an authenticated user to submit a sharing_group_id without verifying that the user was authorized to use the referenced Sharing Group.
In several attribute and Galaxy Cluster creation and editing workflows, validation of the submitted Sharing Group was performed only when the request explicitly set the distribution field to 4 ("Sharing Group"). An attacker could therefore craft a request containing a sharing_group_id while omitting the distribution parameter, or otherwise avoiding the distribution == 4 condition, causing the Sharing Group authorization check to be skipped.
This could allow a user with permission to create or modify the affected MISP objects to associate data with a Sharing Group that they are not authorized to use. Depending on the affected object's existing distribution settings and subsequent processing, this could bypass intended information-sharing boundaries and result in unauthorized placement or distribution of data to members of another Sharing Group.
The issue affected attribute attachment and editing operations as well as Galaxy Cluster creation and editing. The fix ensures that authorization is performed whenever a non-empty sharing_group_id is submitted, independently of the distribution parameter. It also centralizes the authorization decision in SharingGroup::canUse() and explicitly rejects empty Sharing Group identifiers rather than allowing them to be interpreted as an unrestricted query. |
| A cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability exists in MISP due to form-security and CSRF protections being disabled based on whether an incoming request was identified as a REST request.
MISP's REST detection can be influenced by request properties such as the URL suffix or the HTTP Accept header. Because Accept: application/json can be supplied by a cross-origin page without requiring a CORS preflight, an attacker could cause a request originating from another website to be treated as REST traffic. MISP would consequently disable its normal form-security and CSRF validation even though the request was authenticated using the victim's existing browser session.
An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit this behavior by convincing an authenticated MISP user to visit or interact with a malicious web page. The attacker's page could then issue crafted requests to susceptible state-changing MISP endpoints using the victim's privileges. Depending on the permissions of the victim and the targeted endpoint, this could allow unauthorized modification, creation, publication, or removal of data and other state changes.
The vulnerability originates from granting the form-security exemption based on _isRest() rather than on the authentication mechanism used by the request. The patch changes this behavior so that CSRF and form-security exemptions are granted only when the request actually carries a MISP API key. Session-authenticated REST-style requests remain subject to CSRF protection.
The fix also introduces support for transmitting CSRF tokens through the X-CSRF-Token header for legitimate same-origin AJAX requests. Such a header cannot normally be attached by a cross-origin page without triggering a CORS preflight, preventing it from being used to reproduce the original attack. |
| A path traversal vulnerability existed in the handling of MISP object template names during STIX 2 import and MISP-to-STIX 2 export.
MISP object names are passed to PyMISP's object-template resolution mechanism, which constructs a filesystem path by joining the configured MISP object-template directory, the object name, and definition.json. An object name originating from untrusted STIX or MISP content was not sufficiently restricted before being used in this filesystem path.
An attacker able to supply a crafted object name containing path separators or traversal sequences such as ../ could therefore cause template resolution to escape the expected template directory and attempt to load a definition.json file from another location accessible to the process.
During STIX 2 import, an attacker-controlled x_misp_name from a custom STIX object could directly reach this template-resolution mechanism.
The issue could also become persistent. A malicious object name stored in a MISP event could later be processed again during STIX 2 export. Consequently, content originally introduced in one security context could trigger filesystem access later when the event is exported by a process operating with different or greater privileges.
If a suitable definition.json file exists outside the intended template directory, its contents may be interpreted as a MISP object template and fields from that file copied into the converted object. This can result in unintended disclosure of locally accessible data represented by the template file and modification of the resulting object's metadata or semantics.
The patches introduce strict validation of object-template names. Valid names are restricted to a single path component containing letters, digits, hyphens, or underscores. Names that do not meet these requirements are replaced with the generic unknown-template name before reaching PyMISP template resolution. The original rejected name is preserved in the object's comment and a warning is generated, preventing traversal while retaining the source information. |
| A vulnerability in misp-stix could allow a crafted STIX document to influence security-sensitive MISP attribute metadata during import.
The STIX import logic automatically selected between the internal MISP parser and the external STIX parser based on metadata contained in the STIX document itself. For STIX2, the presence of MISP-specific tool labels could cause a document to be classified as originating from MISP; similarly, STIX1 relied on the document title. These classification indicators are fully controlled by the STIX producer and therefore cannot constitute a trusted indication of the document's origin. The accompanying fix explicitly notes that the parser choice was previously based solely on labels or header titles that any producer could write, and introduces an explicit classification parameter allowing callers to override this detection.
When STIX2 content was handled as an internal MISP export, attributes contained in an x-misp-object were converted by copying the complete x_misp_attributes dictionary and passing it directly to misp_object.add_attribute(). Consequently, a crafted STIX bundle could supply fields that were not part of the expected STIX-to-MISP round-trip format, including security-sensitive properties such as distribution, sharing_group_id, tags, or other MISP attribute fields.
An attacker able to provide a STIX document for import could therefore spoof the markers used to identify MISP-generated content and inject additional attribute properties. This could alter the distribution, sharing restrictions, classification, or semantic metadata of imported attributes, potentially causing information to be shared contrary to the importing organization's policy or influencing downstream processing and automation based on attacker-controlled tags or metadata.
The vulnerability results from dynamically assigning externally supplied object properties without restricting them to an expected set of attributes, matching CWE-915. MITRE specifically describes this weakness as accepting externally influenced fields without controlling which object attributes may be modified and recommends an allow-list, which is the approach implemented by the patch. The parser-selection issue additionally corresponds to CWE-807, because an untrusted value was used to make a security-relevant trust/classification decision.
The attack is also consistent with CAPEC-153 (Input Data Manipulation), in which an attacker controls the structure or flags of supplied data so that the target selects a different processing path or interprets the content differently than intended. |
| A denial-of-service vulnerability was identified in misp-stix when processing attacker-controlled STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents.
The STIX import code used sys.exit() to handle several parsing and loading failures. Because SystemExit inherits from BaseException rather than Exception, these failures bypassed the exception handlers used by callers of the library. As a result, a malformed STIX document could terminate a long-running importer process instead of returning a recoverable parsing error.
Additionally, no limit was imposed on the size of STIX documents before parsing. A submitted document was therefore read and materialised in memory before its validity or type was evaluated. Depending on the document and parsing path, processing could consume approximately two to seven times the input size in memory, allowing a sufficiently large STIX document to cause excessive memory and CPU consumption and potentially terminate or severely degrade the importing service.
An attacker able to provide STIX content to a MISP-STIX import workflow could exploit either condition to affect availability. A malformed document could cause abnormal process termination through an uncaught SystemExit, while a large document could exhaust resources during deserialisation and conversion.
The fixes replace process-terminating sys.exit() calls with catchable exceptions such as STIXLoadingError and MissingSTIXContentError, and extend exception handling around the complete STIX detection and conversion process. The importer also now enforces an input-size limit before parsing. The default maximum is 100 MB, can be adjusted by callers, and can explicitly be disabled when required. STIX 1 inputs are additionally checked for the expected root element before the complete XML tree is constructed.
ImpactSuccessful exploitation can cause:
* termination of a long-running MISP-STIX importer;
* excessive memory allocation;
* excessive CPU consumption;
* degradation or temporary unavailability of services relying on the converter;
* interruption of batch or automated STIX ingestion workflows. |
| A parser state isolation vulnerability in misp-stix could cause data from a previously processed STIX document to be retained and incorporated into the MISP event generated from a subsequent document when the same parser instance is reused.
Several STIX 1 and STIX 2 parser components maintained per-document state that was not completely cleared between conversions. In the STIX 2 parser, galaxy and galaxy-cluster information, including custom galaxy clusters, could survive a parser reset and subsequently be associated with objects from another bundle.
The STIX 1 parsers were affected by the same underlying state-management issue. Depending on the parser type, retained information could include galaxies, references, passive DNS bookkeeping, package titles, dates, and timestamps. As a result, parsing a second STIX package with an already-used parser could produce a MISP event containing information that was present only in the previously processed package. For example, a generated event could inherit passive DNS records from an earlier document, reference unrelated galaxy information, combine titles from different packages, or use timestamps originating from another conversion.
The issue primarily affects applications using the misp-stix API directly and reusing parser instances across independent STIX documents. Normal conversion entry points that instantiate a new parser for each file are not affected by this particular reuse scenario.
An attacker able to influence documents processed by such a long-lived parser could potentially cause information from one conversion to contaminate a subsequent MISP event. This can affect the integrity of generated threat intelligence, resulting in incorrect associations, misleading contextual information, or unrelated indicators being attributed to an event. In environments where consecutive documents have different access controls or distribution scopes, the retained state could additionally result in limited disclosure of information from a previously processed document.
Successful exploitation depends on the consuming application reusing the same parser instance and on the ordering of processed documents, which increases attack complexity. No direct availability impact or code execution is involved. |
| MISP installation scripts generated an Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration containing an incorrectly formatted HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:
Redirect permanent / https://misp.example
Apache’s Redirect directive appends any portion of the requested path that follows the matched prefix to the configured destination URL. Because the destination did not end with /, attacker-controlled path content was appended directly to the hostname rather than to its URL path.
For example, a request resembling:
http://misp.example/@attacker.example/
could result in a redirect resembling:
https://misp.example@attacker.example/
Under standard URL parsing, misp.example is interpreted as user information and attacker.example as the destination host. An unauthenticated remote attacker could therefore construct a URL hosted under the legitimate MISP domain that redirects users to an attacker-controlled website.
The vulnerability could be used for phishing, credential collection, or potentially disclosing sensitive query-string information preserved during the redirect. Exploitation requires a user to follow the crafted HTTP URL.
The fix adds the missing trailing slash to the redirect destination, ensuring that appended request data remains part of the path on the configured MISP host.
Existing installationsExisting MISP installations should review their Apache HTTP virtual-host configuration and ensure that the HTTPS redirect destination ends with a trailing slash:
Redirect permanent / https://misp.example/
After updating the configuration, validate it with apachectl configtest and reload or restart Apache for the change to take effect |
| A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) protection bypass existed in the html_to_markdown expansion module of misp-modules.
The module attempts to prevent requests to loopback, private, link-local, and other restricted IP address ranges. However, IP addresses were compared against the blocked ranges without first normalising IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.
An authenticated attacker able to invoke the module could supply an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address, such as:
http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/
http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/
Alternatively, the attacker could use a hostname that resolves to an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address. These addresses were treated as IPv6 addresses and therefore did not match the corresponding blocked IPv4 ranges.
Successful exploitation could cause the misp-modules server to connect to services available through its loopback interface, internal network, or link-local network. This could expose internal web services, administrative interfaces, or cloud instance metadata, with retrieved content potentially returned to the attacker as converted Markdown.
The vulnerability has been addressed by normalising IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses to their underlying IPv4 representation before applying the blocked-range checks. URLs without a valid hostname are now also rejected. |
| An improper authorization check in MISP’s attribute creation endpoint allowed an authenticated user with permission to add attributes to submit a sharing_group_id without triggering the corresponding sharing group authorization check, as long as the attribute distribution value was not explicitly set to 4 — “sharing group”.
As a result, a user could reference or associate an attribute with a sharing group they were not authorized to use. This could lead to an access-control bypass affecting the integrity of attribute sharing metadata and potentially expose or misuse restricted sharing group relationships.
The patch changes the authorization logic so that the sharing group permission check is performed whenever a non-empty sharing_group_id is provided, regardless of the selected distribution value. |
