| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: guard against division by zero in iwl_dbg_tlv_alloc_fragments
Make sure we don't end-up with a num_frags = 0 situation.
For that, check that the required size is not 0 and put a checker on
num_frags as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: fix OOB read via signed offset in rsc_table_for_each_entry()
table->offset[i] is a u32 from firmware, but was stored into a signed
int. A crafted offset like 0xFFFFFFF0 becomes -16, placing hdr 16 bytes
before the table buffer. The subsequent avail check was bypassed
because the negative int was promoted to a large size_t in the
expression "table_sz - offset - sizeof(*hdr)", yielding a large positive
avail and letting the out-of-bounds hdr->type read proceed undetected.
Store the offset as u32 and validate it with unsigned comparisons before
any pointer arithmetic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence
Multiple issues have been found within the hid-asus driver:
- unchecked size in asus_raw_event()
- unclean teardown of asus_probe on failure
- possible use-after-free in asus_probe
- multiple workqueue used for jobs where one was enough
- sleeping calls in atomic context
- packets of incorrect size being sent to the keyboard controller
Join the two workqueues into one reusing the stopping mechanism
of the brightness workqueue, use the joined workqueue to also
move the asus_wmi_send_event() sleeping call away from atomic
context and add a size check in asus_raw_event(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: qgroup: fix a wrong length calculation in qgroup_free_reserved_data()
In that function, we round down the start position and round up the
ending position.
But during the calculation of @len, we use "round_up(start + len,
sectorsize)", which is the rounded up end position, not the rounded up
length.
Which results a much larger length, and later we are still using
"start + len", which is completely incorrect.
Fix it by declaring a local @aligned_start and @aligned_len and use them
instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check
verify_tags() validates the tagset table unpacked from a policy blob.
For each set it reads a count and checks that advancing the index by
that count stays inside sets.table[]:
u32 cnt = tags->sets.table[i];
if (i+cnt >= tags->sets.size) {
i, cnt and sets.size are all u32, so i+cnt is evaluated modulo 2^32.
sets.table[] is filled by unpack_tagsets() with aa_unpack_u32(), so
every entry is a raw unbounded 32-bit word taken from the policy blob,
and verify_tags() is the function that is supposed to validate it. A
count close to U32_MAX makes the sum wrap to a small value, the guard
passes, and the inner loop then walks sets.table[++i] past the end of
the kcalloc(size, sizeof(u32)) allocation.
Note that sets.size is bounded by 65535, because unpack_tagsets() reads
it with aa_unpack_array() as a u16, so the wrap cannot be reached by
growing the table; it is reached purely through the attacker-supplied
count.
With sets.size = 2 and sets.table = { 0, 0xffffffff }:
i = 0: cnt = 0, guard 0 + 0 >= 2 is false, inner loop does not run
i = 1: cnt = 0xffffffff, guard (1 + 0xffffffff) mod 2^32 == 0 >= 2 is
false, so the guard is bypassed and the inner loop reads
sets.table[2] -- one element past a two element allocation
The walk continues until an out-of-bounds value happens to be >=
hdrs.size or the access faults, so a crafted policy yields an
out-of-bounds read on the policy load path
(aa_replace_profiles -> aa_unpack -> unpack_policydb -> unpack_tags ->
verify_tags). unpack_tags() runs before the perms and DFA tables are
unpacked, so no other table needs to be well formed to reach it.
Policy load is gated by aa_may_manage_policy(), which checks
CAP_MAC_ADMIN relative to the subject's own user namespace rather than
the init user namespace, so with the default
unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy=1 the path is reachable from an
unprivileged task in a matched-level nested namespace, not only by a
globally privileged one.
Perform the addition in u64 so that it cannot wrap, restoring the
intended i + cnt < sets.size guarantee. |
| Imager versions before 1.036 for Perl exit the process reading a TGA with a colour map length of 32768 or more in tga_palette_read.
The reader unpacks the two-byte colour map length into a signed short, so a length of 32768 or more becomes negative. tga_palette_read() casts that value to size_t and asks mymalloc() for a size near SIZE_MAX. The allocation fails and Imager's allocator calls exit(3).
Reading an attacker-supplied file through Imager->read() triggers an uncatchable exit. |
| Imager versions before 1.036 for Perl disclose uninitialised heap memory reading a paletted image with pixel indexes past its colour map in i_gpix_p and i_glin_p.
The palette is allocated uninitialised, and only the entries a reader adds count as populated. The TGA reader stores pixel indexes without checking them against the colour map. i_gpix_p() rejects only an index greater than the count, so an index equal to it reads the first unpopulated entry, and getpixel() returns it.
i_glin_p() skips any index at or beyond the count without writing that pixel to the caller's buffer. The palette-to-RGB conversion reads each row through an uninitialised buffer, so those pixels of the converted image hold prior heap contents.
Reading an attacker-supplied image through Imager->read() and then fetching its pixels or converting it to RGB discloses process heap memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue
gred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the
current backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit:
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (gred default VQ)
gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= q->limit (gred configured VQ)
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (bfifo)
sch->qstats.backlog + skb->len <= q->limit (plug)
sch->qstats.backlog and q->backlog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb->len
are unsigned int, so all sums are computed in 32 bits and wrap at 2^32.
Once the true backlog exceeds 4 GiB the wrapped sum becomes small and
admission keeps succeeding, so the queue grows without bound and the kernel
can be driven to OOM.
Promote the sums to u64 so admission stops once the true backlog exceeds
the limit. The limit is u32, so the bounded queue stays below 2^32 and
the stored u32 backlog never wraps.
The bug can only be reproduced as root (albeit with ridiculous setup):
attach a gred (or bfifo/plug) qdisc with a limit near 4 GiB,
leaving the default VQ unconfigured (for gred), and drive >4 GiB of
queued traffic (e.g. via a size table / stab to inflate qdisc_pkt_len,
or sustained high-rate traffic). The u32 backlog+len sum wraps at 2^32,
admission keeps succeeding, and the queue grows unboundedly to OOM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/amd/hsmp: Reject negative power cap writes in hwmon
hsmp_hwmon_write() takes the user-supplied hwmon value as a signed long
and assigns "val / MICROWATT_PER_MILLIWATT" to msg.args[0], which is a
__u32. MICROWATT_PER_MILLIWATT is an unsigned long, so a negative write
to power1_cap (e.g. "echo -1 > power1_cap") is first converted to a huge
unsigned value by the division and then stored into the u32 argument.
As a result a nonsensical, multi-gigawatt socket power limit is sent to
the SMU via HSMP_SET_SOCKET_POWER_LIMIT instead of the write being
rejected.
Reject negative values with -EINVAL before the conversion.
Tested with HSMP enabled:
CAP=$(dirname $(grep -l amd_hsmp_hwmon \
/sys/class/hwmon/hwmon*/name | head -1))/power1_cap
# negative write
echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
# valid positive write must still work
echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
Before:
# echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0 <- accepted; bogus limit sent to SMU
# echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0
After:
# echo -1000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
ret=1 <- rejected with -EINVAL
# echo 400000000 > $CAP ; echo "ret=$?"
ret=0 <- valid write still works |
| A vulnerability in the DNS over TCP implementation of Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause the TCP DNS response handler to unexpectedly restart, causing the device to reload.
This vulnerability is due to a logic error when parsing a DNS query and tracking the size of the incoming buffers. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by formatting a crafted reply to a DNS query sent from the targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the device to reload, causing a denial of service (DoS) condition.
Note: The attacker must be able to respond to DNS queries from the device, either by controlling the DNS service or through a machine-in-the-middle attack. |
| IBM MQ could allow an authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code due to an integer overflow in MQINQ request processing. |
| rabbitmq-c is a C-language AMQP client library for RabbitMQ. Prior to 0.16.0, a malicious AMQP server can send an undersized HEADER or METHOD frame during client login and cause unsigned size_t underflow in amqp_handle_input() in librabbitmq/amqp_connection.c. The parser subtracts HEADER_SIZE, fixed per-frame fields, and FOOTER_SIZE from state->target_size without first checking the minimum frame length. The wrapped encoded.len value is passed through amqp_decode_properties() to amqp_decode_table_internal(), where it defeats bounds checks and causes an out-of-bounds read and process crash. An on-path attacker can also trigger the issue when AMQP traffic is not protected by TLS with certificate validation. The demonstrated impact is denial of service, with no reliable memory disclosure or code execution shown. This issue is fixed in version 0.16.0. |
| VLC media player versions 3.0.0 through 3.0.23 contain a memory-safety vulnerability reachable when processing crafted media. Exploitation requires user interaction and may result in application termination or code execution with the privileges of the VLC process. |
| A flaw was found in libxml2's xmlBuildQName function, where integer overflows in buffer size calculations can lead to a stack-based buffer overflow. This issue can result in memory corruption or a denial of service when processing crafted input. |
| virtio-win provides Windows paravirtualized drivers for QEMU and KVM. From mm210 until mm320, the Viosock driver permits a low-privilege local process to submit an IOCTL_SELECT request with attacker-controlled VIRTIO_VSOCK_SELECT.Fdss[*].fd_count values that overflow the 32-bit sum used by VIOSockSelect for bounds checking. The wrapped sum can pass the FD_SETSIZE check even though an individual descriptor count is much larger than the expected limit. VIOSockSelectCopyFds then iterates using the unchecked count and writes beyond the allocated pPkt->Fds array in the NonPagedPool kernel heap. Successful exploitation can corrupt kernel memory and enable privilege escalation in a Windows guest running the driver. This issue is fixed in mm320. |
| Integer Overflow or Wraparound in GitHub repository vim/vim prior to 9.0.1846. |
| Integer overflow or wraparound vulnerability in Samsung Opensource Escargot allows attackers with write access to the bytecode-cache directory to cause a heap-based buffer overflow and denial of service via a crafted cache file.
This issue affects Escargot: ac94df78493ee6fede286620d94f724e46b4d238. |
| Integer overflow in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 153.0.8010.47 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN
In drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c, isert_login_recv_done()
computes the login request payload length as wc->byte_len minus
ISER_HEADERS_LEN with no lower bound, and login_req_len is a signed int.
A remote iSER initiator can post a login Send work request carrying
fewer than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (76) bytes, so the subtraction underflows
and login_req_len becomes negative.
isert_rx_login_req() then reads that negative length back into a signed
int, takes size = min(rx_buflen, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS), and because the
min() is signed it keeps the negative value; the value is then passed as
the memcpy() length and sign-extended to a multi-gigabyte size_t. The
copy into the 8192-byte login->req_buf runs far out of bounds and
faults, crashing the target node. The login phase precedes iSCSI
authentication, so no credentials are required to reach this path.
Reject any login PDU shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN before the
subtraction, mirroring the existing early return on a failed work
completion, so login_req_len can never go negative. The upper bound was
already safe: a posted login buffer cannot deliver more than
ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so the difference stays at or below
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the existing min() clamps it; only the missing
lower bound needs to be added. |
| A missing lower-bound validation in the bson_new_from_buffer() function of libbson allows an integer underflow when processing BSON data with a zero-length prefix. The function reads a 32-bit document length from the input buffer but does not verify that the value is at least 5 (the minimum valid BSON document size) before using it in an array index calculation. When the length field is zero, the expression used to check the document's null terminator wraps to UINT32_MAX, causing a heap out-of-bounds read that crashes the process. An unauthorized party who can supply crafted BSON input to an application using this API can cause a denial of service. |
