| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: ice: don't dereference pointers from TP_printk()
After forwarding net-next during the v7.3 merge window we started
seeing:
TRACE EVENT ERROR: Event ice_tx_dim_work has double dereference in TP_printk: REC->q_vector->tx.tx_ring->q_index
WARNING: kernel/trace/trace_events.c:420 at test_double_dereference.cold+0x39/0x4b
this is due to extra checks added in tracing subsystem in
commit b5cc230af5e5 ("tracing: Warn when an event dereferences a pointer in TP_printk()").
Printing happens long after the event was recorded, by which point
the pointers may be invalid (the ring or the dim instance).
Copy the eight scalars into the event instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate packet_len before skb_put_data
btintel_pcie_submit_rx_work() reads packet_len from rfh_hdr without
checking if it exceeds the RX buffer size. An oversized packet_len
can lead to an out-of-bounds read in skb_put_data().
Validate packet_len to ensure it is non-zero and does not exceed
BTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(*rfh_hdr), logging an error when
invalid.
This issue was reported by Claude Mythos. It can be simulated either by
using customized firmware configured to return an invalid packet_len or
by modifying rfh_hdr->packet_len in the driver before calling
btintel_pcie_submit_rx_work(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: put the "mdio" child node reference on success
macb_mii_init() holds the reference returned by of_get_child_by_name()
for macb_mdiobus_register() and drops it only on the error paths, so
every successful probe leaks a node reference. On a CM5, overlay
removal after four bind cycles reports
OF: ERROR: memory leak, expected refcount 1 instead of 5
Drop the reference after registration, where __mdiobus_register() has
already taken its own for the lifetime of the bus. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Move representor vnic reporter to eswitch devlink port
The representor vnic devlink health reporter is created and destroyed
along the representor netdev (un)load path, which is not serialized by
the devlink instance lock. Destroying the reporter from there triggers
a devl_assert_locked() splat on driver unbind:
WARNING: net/devlink/core.c:259 at devl_assert_locked+0x54/0x70, CPU#2: bash/3758
Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_core ...
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3758 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 6.19.0+ #1 PREEMPT
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), ...
RIP: 0010:devl_assert_locked+0x54/0x70
Call Trace:
<TASK>
devl_health_reporter_destroy+0x3a/0x1b0
mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x12d/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_unregister_vport_reps+0x1b8/0x220 [mlx5_core]
? __esw_offloads_unload_rep+0x190/0x190 [mlx5_core]
? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc3/0xf0
device_release_driver_internal+0x3b2/0x560
unbind_store+0xce/0xf0
Move the reporter's lifecycle to the eswitch devlink port (un)register
paths, which are already serialized by the devlink instance lock, and
store the handle on mlx5_devlink_port. Use the port's mlx5_vport as the
reporter priv since the diagnose callback only needs a device handle and
a vport number, and mlx5_vport carries both and is initialized before
any representor driver probes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Allow list_del during perf_event_overflow()
A PMU might use perf_sched_cb_inc() and perf_sched_cb_dec()
interface to get the PMU call back function pmu::sched_task
invoked at schedule in and schedule out. This is achieved
by walking along the list anchored by sched_cb_list.
The following scenario might lead to a list corruption.
perf_pmu_sched_task()
for_each_list_entry(..., &sched_cb_list)
+--> __perf_pmu_sched_task()
+--> event->pmu->sched_task())
+--> PMU_push_sample()
+--> perf_event_overflow()
+--> __perf_event_overflow()
+--> pmu->stop()
+--> perf_sched_cb_dec()
remove entry from sched_cb_list
while list node in use.
This happens when ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, xxx) has been
invoked and perf_event::event_limit hits zero.
Prevent the list corruption and convert for_each_list_entry()
to for_each_list_entry_safe(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/eeh: Fix recursive locking on devices without EEH sensitive driver
The commit 1010b4c012b0 ("powerpc/eeh: Make EEH driver device hotplug
safe") refactored the EEH code such that the pci_rescan_remove_lock is
held at the beginning of eeh_handle_normal_event() and the
eeh_reset_device() is called with that lock being held. Looks like the
commit missed to remove the existing lock/unlock inside eeh_rmv_device()
which is no longer necessary. This is causing the eehd to hang on the
lock which it actually holds when that code path is taken.
[<0>] 0xc00000011c78f870
[<0>] __switch_to+0xfc/0x1a0
[<0>] pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x30/0x44
[<0>] eeh_rmv_device+0x290/0x2e0
[<0>] eeh_pe_dev_traverse+0x80/0x130
[<0>] eeh_reset_device+0xcc/0x23c
[<0>] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x830/0xa80
[<0>] eeh_event_handler+0xf8/0x190
[<0>] kthread+0x194/0x1b0
[<0>] start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18
The issue is seen for cases where the errors are detected on the PHB
directly AND|OR for devices where the driver error_detected() returns
PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET, and driver being not EEH sensitive(i.e no
error handlers like slot_reset(), resume() etc defined). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/alternatives: Exclude text poking against change_page_attr()
From time to time, the following BUG can be observed
in the x86 alternatives patching code [0]:
> kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2576!
> Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 355 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.1.3-1-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed 8c1795b03ec64f997e57a8ad38b1161e3b98da64
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
> RIP: 0010:__text_poke+0x2aa/0x450
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> smp_text_poke_batch_finish+0x2a7/0x320
> __static_call_transform+0xb7/0x220
> arch_static_call_transform+0x5b/0xb0
> __static_call_init+0xe9/0x270
> static_call_module_notify+0x11f/0x150
> notifier_call_chain+0x61/0xe0
> blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x63/0xc0
> load_module+0x1c92/0x20c0
> init_module_from_file+0xd8/0x140
> idempotent_init_module+0x100/0x2f0
> __x64_sys_finit_module+0x71/0xe0
> do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x610
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
which matches the following BUG_ON() in alternative.c:
/*
* If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not
* implemented.
*/
BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1]));
This can happen if vmalloc_to_page() fails, for any reason. Such can happen
if text poking races with CPA, which can possibly result in the collapsing
of page tables (or breaking of PMD hugepages). It is not a problem for most
users of vmalloc_to_page() (they solely own the vmalloc'd range) but, when
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX=y, various modules own a single execmem vmalloc
range, and can call set_memory_*() in parallel on it. This can happen to
race against __text_poke and cause havoc in vmalloc_to_page().
Fix it by excluding against CPA using the init_mm mmap read lock.
[ dhansen: Fix up SoB ordering. The actual code flow here was:
Pedro=>Lorenzo=>Mike=>Me which is reflected in the SoB chain
now. I *believe* Mike simply picked up Lorenzo's update to
Pedro's post from the Link ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmr: account multicast table and route memory
A netadmin in a user+net namespace can create many IPv4 and IPv6
multicast routing tables with MRT_TABLE and MRT6_TABLE. Each unseen
id allocates an mr_table via the shared mr_table_alloc(), links it
into the per-net list, and leaves it until netns teardown. Those
objects were not charged to memcg, so the host unreclaimable slab
grows with the table count.
Account mr_table allocations with GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT and mark the
IPv4/IPv6 MFC caches SLAB_ACCOUNT. This matches the established
handling of IP addresses, routes and alternate interface names.
Unresolved MFC entries are still allocated from softIRQ with
GFP_ATOMIC and are not charged. They expire after 10 seconds and are
bounded by the socket receive queue; see commit 0079ad8e8dc3
("ipmr: remove hard code cache_resolve_queue_len limit"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usbusx2y: fix in04_last array size mismatch with in04_buf
The in04_last array in struct usx2ydev is declared as char[24], but
in04_buf is allocated as sizeof(struct us428_ctls) which is 21 bytes.
In i_usx2y_in04_int(), when ctl_snapshot_last == -2 (initialization
path):
memcpy(usx2y->in04_last, usx2y->in04_buf, sizeof(usx2y->in04_last));
This copies 24 bytes from a 21-byte slab allocation, reading 3 bytes
past the end of the source object.
Introduce a USX2Y_IN04_SIZE constant defined as sizeof(struct
us428_ctls) and use it consistently for the in04_last array, the
in04_buf allocation, the URB transfer length, and the comparison loop,
replacing the bare 24 and 21 literals throughout. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: skip the VMID 0 flush for VRAM
Clear-on-release only runs on VRAM, which amdgpu_ttm_map_buffer() reaches
via its direct MC address without programming a GART window, yet the wipe
still forces a VMID 0 flush. On GFX11 (e.g. Navi33) that spurious SDMA
flush can wedge the engine; only flush when a GART window is actually used.
v2: Let amdgpu_ttm_map_buffer() return whether the VMID 0 flush is needed,
and drive the clear and copy paths from that. (Christian)
v3: Make the vm_needs_flush output parameter mandatory instead of
allowing NULL. (Christian)
(cherry picked from commit a306e406e570b74318ff7d80e5b07b540ca1d3a9) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ufs: create the root dentry after loading cylinder metadata
ufs_fill_super() installed sb->s_root before it loaded the cylinder
group structures for a writable mount:
sb->s_root = d_make_root(inode);
...
if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
if (!ufs_read_cylinder_structures(sb))
goto failed;
When ufs_read_cylinder_structures() failed, the error path freed the
in-core superblock information and set sb->s_fs_info to NULL while
sb->s_root stayed installed. get_tree_bdev() then reached
deactivate_locked_super(), and because s_root was present,
generic_shutdown_super() called sync_filesystem() and the put_super
operation. Both dereference UFS_SB(sb), which is now NULL, so a mount
that fails only while reading the cylinder groups oopses during
teardown. A crafted image whose first cylinder group cannot be read
reaches this path.
Load the cylinder group metadata first and create the root dentry last,
so the superblock is published to the VFS only once it is fully set up.
ufs_setup_cstotal() and ufs_read_cylinder_structures() take only the
super_block and do not use the root inode, so the reordering is safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tick/broadcast: Plug clockevents replacement race
朱恺乾 reported and decoded the following race condition when a broadcast
device is replaced:
CPUA CPUB
__tick_broadcast_oneshot_control()
bc = tick_broadcast_device.evtdev;
tick_install_broadcast_device(dev)
clockevents_exchange_device(cur, dev)
shutdown(cur);
detach(cur);
cur->handler = noop;
tick_broadcast_device.evtdev = dev;
tick_broadcast_set_event(bc, next_event); <- FAIL: arms a detached device.
If the original broadcast device has a restricted interrupt affinity mask
and the last CPU in that mask goes offline then the BUG() in
tick_cleanup_dead_cpu() triggers because the clockevent device is not in
detached state.
The reason for this is that tick_install_broadcast_device() is not
serialized vs. tick broadcast operations.
The obvious cure is to serialize tick_install_broadcast_device() with
tick_broadcast_lock against a concurrent tick broadcast operation.
That requires to split clockevents_exchange_device() into two parts, one
which does the exchange, shutdown and detach operation and the other which
drops the module reference count. This is required because the module
reference cannot be dropped while holding tick_broadcast_lock.
Let clockevents_exchange_device() do both operations as before, but let the
broadcast device code take the two step approach and do the device
exchange under tick_broadcast_lock and drop the module reference count
after releasing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Free histogram var refs regardless of how often they are referenced
Using the same variable three or more times in one hist trigger leaks the
variable reference and its strings when the trigger is removed.
commit 656fe2ba85e8 ("tracing: Use hist trigger's var_ref array to destroy
var_refs") made a trigger's var_refs[] array the only owner of a var ref:
destroy_hist_field() returns early for HIST_FIELD_FL_VAR_REF, so the field
expressions never destroy one. One entry, freed once, no count needed.
commit 8bcebc77e85f ("tracing: Fix histogram code when expression has same
var as value") then made repeated references share one object and added a
count of them. Only the increment side exists, since those expressions
still return early and never drop a reference, so __destroy_hist_field()
sees how many references were created rather than how many are left. It
frees when the decremented count is 0 or 1, so two references work and
three or more leak.
Sharing kept one array entry per object, and create_var_ref() searches and
appends within a single trigger, so nothing outside it holds the object.
Removing a trigger whose variables are still referenced is already refused
by check_var_refs() with -EBUSY. Drop the count and free unconditionally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
Writing a hist trigger whose value or variable carries a modifier that is
not allowed there leaks the fields that were built for it.
__create_val_field() takes the field from parse_expr() and stores it in
hist_data->fields[] only after the modifier checks have run:
hist_field = parse_expr(hist_data, file, field_str, flags, var_name,
&n_subexprs);
...
if (hist_field->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_VAR) {
if (hist_field->flags & (...))
goto err;
} else {
if (hist_field->flags & (...))
goto err;
}
hist_data->fields[val_idx] = hist_field;
Both checks jump past that store, and the err label returns without
freeing anything. The error unwinds to create_hist_data(), which calls
destroy_hist_data() -> destroy_hist_fields(), and that reaches a field
only by walking fields[]. A field that never got there is unreachable.
commit e0213434fe3e ("tracing: Do not let histogram values have some
modifiers") set ret to -EINVAL and fell through to the store, which left
the field owned by fields[] and freed along with the rest of hist_data.
Splitting the check into a value case and a variable case replaced that
fall-through with a goto that skips it.
With CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK, 200 writes of
# echo 'hist:keys=prev_pid:vals=next_pid.log2' > \
events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
each correctly rejected with -EINVAL, leave 332 unreferenced objects
(63744 bytes) reported at create_hist_field(); 200 install and remove
cycles of a valid trigger leave none. A '.log2' field is two
allocations, since create_hist_field() puts the plain field in
operands[0] of the log2 field, and both are reported.
Use destroy_hist_field() rather than __destroy_hist_field() so that
operands[0] is freed as well. It returns early for HIST_FIELD_FL_VAR_REF,
which is what an operand owned by hist_data->var_refs[] needs; the
rejected field itself is never a var ref, because a var ref never carries
a modifier flag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
print_entries() uses n_entries both as the number of sort entries and as
its own return value, so the -ENOMEM it stores when the stats allocation
fails overwrites the count that the cleanup still needs:
n_entries = tracing_map_sort_entries(map, ...);
if (n_entries < 0)
return n_entries;
...
if (!stats) {
n_entries = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
...
out:
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries(sort_entries, n_entries);
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries() takes an unsigned int and loops up to
it, so -ENOMEM arrives as 4294967284. It walks an array of at most
map->max_elts pointers and calls destroy_sort_entry(), which dereferences
and frees, on whatever lies past the end.
Reading the hist file of a trigger with a .percent value, with that
allocation forced to fail:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90000045000 by task init/1
tracing_map_destroy_sort_entries+0xa0/0xb0
hist_show+0x6f7/0x1df0
seq_read_iter+0x2b8/0x1190
vfs_read+0x176/0xa40
The buggy address belongs to a 4-page vmalloc region starting at
ffffc90000041000 allocated at tracing_map_sort_entries+0x5c/0xd50
A few pages further the fault is fatal. The registers at the oops confirm
the bound: the loop's end pointer less the array start, over the pointer
size, is 4294967284.
Return the error in a separate variable and leave n_entries holding the
count, the way tracing_map_sort_entries() does on its own error path.
The stats block is only entered for a value carrying .percent or .graph,
which __create_val_field() has rejected since v6.3, so this cannot be
reached in mainline as it stands. It becomes reachable again with
"tracing: hist: let values keep the percent and graph modifiers", so it
should be applied first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
event_hist_trigger_named_init() puts the trigger on the global
named_triggers list and only then takes the reference on the trigger it
shares its histogram with:
data->ref++;
save_named_trigger(data->named_data->name, data);
ret = event_hist_trigger_init(data->named_data);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(data->cmd_ops);
data->cmd_ops = &trigger_hist_cmd;
}
return ret;
event_hist_trigger_init() fails when alloc_hist_pad() cannot allocate, and
nothing takes the trigger back off the list on the way out.
event_hist_trigger_parse() frees it, and the next lookup by name reads the
freed object:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888009346860 by task init/1
find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
hist_register_trigger+0xc1/0xa00
event_hist_trigger_parse+0x3146/0x6af0
event_trigger_write+0xce/0x160
Freed by task 67:
kfree+0x154/0x420
trigger_kthread_fn+0xfd/0x160
Do the reference first and publish once it has succeeded, so that nothing
which can fail runs after the trigger becomes findable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
Commit 6f86bdeab633 ("tracing: Fix bad hist from corrupting named_triggers
list") described how a trigger that is registered but not on file->triggers
ends up freed while still on the global named_triggers list, and moved the
registration down so that hist_trigger_enable() follows it immediately. One
path still gets there. hist_trigger_enable() adds the trigger and takes it
straight back out when the event cannot be enabled:
list_add_tail_rcu(&data->list, &file->triggers);
update_cond_flag(file);
if (trace_event_trigger_enable_disable(file, 1) < 0) {
list_del_rcu(&data->list);
update_cond_flag(file);
ret--;
}
so the list walk in hist_unregister_trigger() matches nothing, test stays
NULL, and the ->free() that would call del_named_trigger() is skipped.
out_unreg falls through to out_free, which frees the trigger anyway:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880091d3160 by task init/1
find_named_trigger+0xac/0xc0
hist_register_trigger+0xc1/0xa00
event_hist_trigger_parse+0x3146/0x6af0
event_trigger_write+0xce/0x160
Freed by task 69:
kfree+0x154/0x420
trigger_kthread_fn+0xfd/0x160
Leave the trigger where hist_unregister_trigger() can find it and let that
undo the registration, which is the only code that knows all of what
cmd_ops->init() took: the named list entry, the hist_pad reference, the
reference on the trigger a named histogram is shared with, and the copied
cmd_ops. It also pairs the failed trace_event_trigger_enable_disable(),
whose sm_ref and buffered event reference are otherwise left behind.
Since ->free() releases trigger_data and, for a trigger that does not share
its histogram, hist_data with it, out_unreg can no longer fall through to
out_free. For a trigger that does share, hist_register_trigger() has
already destroyed the caller's hist_data, so the fall-through was reading
freed memory there as well.
Move the enable_timestamps check in hist_unregister_trigger() above the
->free() call for the same reason: hist_data does not outlive it once the
trigger being removed is the one that owns it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Validate full buffer range in ivpu_to_cpu_addr
Add a size parameter to ivpu_to_cpu_addr() and validate that the
whole [vpu_addr, vpu_addr + size) range stays within the BO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Validate firmware log buffer metadata
The tracing log headers parsed by fw_log_print_buffer() reside in
DMA-shared BOs that the NPU firmware can write to.
fw_log_from_bo() validated log->header_size and log->size, but
fw_log_print_buffer() re-read those same fields from shared memory
afterwards, allowing a TOCTOU where firmware changes them between the
check and the use, and making the host dereference out-of-bounds
addresses while printing logs.
Snapshot the validated values once with READ_ONCE() and pass them down
explicitly in a new struct ivpu_fw_log_desc instead of re-reading them
from the shared struct. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Limit firmware log name prints to field size
The name in struct vpu_tracing_buffer_header is a fixed-size array
populated by the NPU firmware. It is expected to be NUL-terminated,
but nothing on the host side enforces this, so printing it with an
unbounded string conversion would read past the field if the
terminator is ever missing and expose adjacent bytes of the shared
tracing BO through dmesg and the debugfs FW log output.
Print at most as many characters as the name field holds, so the output
never runs past it even if the string is not NUL-terminated. |
