| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: drop_monitor: fix info leak in NET_DM_ATTR_PAYLOAD
net_dm_packet_report_fill() and net_dm_hw_packet_report_fill() open code
the NET_DM_ATTR_PAYLOAD attribute to avoid zeroing the packet payload
before overwriting it with skb_copy_bits().
skb_put() reserves nla_total_size(payload_len), i.e. the header plus the
NLA_ALIGN() padding, but only payload_len bytes are copied in. When
payload_len is not a multiple of 4 the 1-3 padding bytes are never
initialized and are leaked to user space inside the netlink message.
KMSAN confirms the leak for the software path when the packet payload
length is not 4-byte aligned:
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter
_copy_to_iter
__skb_datagram_iter
skb_copy_datagram_iter
netlink_recvmsg
sock_recvmsg
__sys_recvfrom
Uninit was created at:
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof
__alloc_skb
net_dm_packet_work
Bytes 173-175 of 176 are uninitialized
Use __nla_reserve(), which sets up the attribute header and zeroes the
padding, instead of open coding the attribute construction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drop_monitor: fix size calculations for 64-bit attributes
net_dm_packet_report_fill() and net_dm_hw_packet_report_fill() use
nla_put_u64_64bit() to append 64-bit attributes (NET_DM_ATTR_PC and
NET_DM_ATTR_TIMESTAMP).
On 32-bit architectures without CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
nla_put_u64_64bit() may append a 4-byte NET_DM_ATTR_PAD attribute for
64-bit alignment.
However, net_dm_packet_report_size() and net_dm_hw_packet_report_size()
used nla_total_size(sizeof(u64)) instead of nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(u64)),
budgeting 12 bytes instead of up to 16 bytes.
This under-estimation of SKB size can lead to an skb_over_panic() when
__nla_reserve() or skb_put() is subsequently called.
Fix this by using nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(u64)) in both size calculations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drop_monitor: perform u64_stats updates under IRQ-disabled section
In net_dm_packet_trace_kfree_skb_hit() and net_dm_hw_trap_packet_probe(),
u64_stats_update_begin() / u64_stats_inc() / u64_stats_update_end() were
called after spin_unlock_irqrestore(&...drop_queue.lock, flags), when local
IRQs had already been re-enabled.
Tracepoint probes can execute in IRQ or softirq context. On 32-bit
architectures, u64_stats_update_begin() disables preemption but not interrupts,
relying on seqcount writes. If a nested interrupt occurs on the same CPU during
the 64-bit stats update, the reentrant seqcount update can corrupt the
seqcount state or stats value.
Fix this by performing the 64-bit per-CPU stats update before releasing
drop_queue.lock via spin_unlock_irqrestore(), ensuring local interrupts remain
disabled during the u64_stats update. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
Each recvmsg() call must process either
- only contiguous DATA records (any number of them)
- one non-DATA record
If the next record has different type than what has already been
processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record
has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where
we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record
to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.
Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible,
since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer,
and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext
skb for access to metadata like length).
Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing
loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and
then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case
we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's
zero length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bridge: make ebt_snat ARP rewrite writable
The ebtables SNAT target keeps the Ethernet source address rewrite
behind skb_ensure_writable(skb, 0). This is intentional: at the bridge
ebtables hooks the Ethernet header is addressed through
skb_mac_header()/eth_hdr(), while skb->data points at the Ethernet
payload. Asking skb_ensure_writable() for ETH_HLEN bytes would check
the payload, not the Ethernet header, and would reintroduce the small
packet regression fixed by commit 63137bc5882a.
However, the optional ARP sender hardware address rewrite is different.
It writes through skb_store_bits() at an offset relative to skb->data:
skb_store_bits(skb, sizeof(struct arphdr), info->mac, ETH_ALEN)
skb_header_pointer() only safely reads the ARP header; it does not make
the later sender hardware address range writable. If that range is
still held in a nonlinear skb fragment backed by a splice-imported file
page, skb_store_bits() maps the frag page and copies the new MAC address
directly into it.
Ensure the ARP SHA range is writable before reading the ARP header and
before calling skb_store_bits(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix recursive ww_mutex acquire in amdgpu_devcoredump_format
When dumping IB contents from a hung job, amdgpu_devcoredump_format()
acquired the VM root PD's reservation via amdgpu_vm_lock_by_pasid() and
then, for each IB, called amdgpu_bo_reserve() on the BO backing the IB.
Both reservations are reservation_ww_class_mutex objects and neither
used a ww_acquire_ctx, which trips lockdep:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
--------------------------------------------
kworker/u128:0 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88838b16e1f0 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4},
at: amdgpu_devcoredump_format+0x1594/0x23f0 [amdgpu]
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8882f82681f0 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4},
at: amdgpu_devcoredump_format+0x1594/0x23f0 [amdgpu]
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
Workqueue: events_unbound amdgpu_devcoredump_deferred_work [amdgpu]
Call Trace:
__ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0
ww_mutex_lock
amdgpu_bo_reserve
amdgpu_devcoredump_format+0x1594 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_devcoredump_deferred_work+0xea [amdgpu]
The two reservations are on different BOs in the captured trace, so the
splat is a lockdep-correctness warning, not an observed deadlock. It
becomes a real self-deadlock whenever the IB BO shares its dma_resv with
the root PD (the always-valid case, see amdgpu_vm_is_bo_always_valid()):
amdgpu_bo_reserve(abo) re-acquires the same ww_mutex without a ticket
and blocks forever. With amdgpu.gpu_recovery=0 the timeout handler
refires every ~2 s and each invocation produces this splat, drowning the
kernel ring buffer.
Now that amdgpu_vm_lock_by_pasid() takes a drm_exec context, move the IB
dumping into a separate helper that locks the root PD and every IB BO
together in a single drm_exec ticket. DRM_EXEC_IGNORE_DUPLICATES handles
IB BOs that share a dma_resv (e.g. always-valid BOs, or two IBs backed
by the same BO). Every lock is now a top-level acquire under one
ww_acquire_ctx, so the recursive ww_mutex condition is gone, and the
per-IB amdgpu_bo_reserve()/amdgpu_bo_unref() dance -- including a BO
refcount leak on the amdgpu_bo_reserve() failure path -- is removed.
(cherry picked from commit d6bf4242731219ee08ce54c365631e395486651e) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/iucv: filter frames in afiucv_hs_rcv() by ingress device
afiucv_hs_rcv() selects a socket from iucv_sk_list by matching four 8-byte
name fields in the transport header alone. No check is made against the
net_device the frame arrived on.
This can cause a frame arriving on any netdev to be delivered to an AF_IUCV
socket. Three problems follow.
First, a frame arriving over HiperSockets can be delivered to a socket
bound to the classic z/VM IUCV transport, which has iucv->hs_dev == NULL.
iucv_sock_bind() takes the classic path whenever the requested userid
matches iucv_userid, even on a guest that also has a HiperSockets device
carrying the same identifier. The child socket created by
afiucv_hs_callback_syn() for such a match inherits hs_dev = NULL and
transport = AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER, so the first send() on it returns -ENODEV.
The socket delivered to accept() is unusable.
Second, a frame arriving on one netdev can be delivered to a socket bound
to a different IQD device. Which can lead to
- Accept-queue exhaustion (DoS)
- Attacker-controlled peer identity in the child socket
- Data injection into existing sockets
- Fabric noise on the IQD fabric, where bogus replies are sent
- killing established connections
Third, all AF_IUCV sockets live in init_net, as iucv_sock_alloc() calls
sk_alloc(&init_net, ...). But even frames arriving on netdev devices in a
namespace can be delivered to an IUCV socket. So a process in an
unprivileged user and network namespace holding only the CAP_NET_RAW
capability valid within that namespace can send a raw ETH_P_AF_IUCV frame
on its own lo device and have it matched against init_net sockets.
Fix all three by skipping any socket whose hs_dev does not match the
ingress device. A classic z/VM IUCV socket has hs_dev == NULL; the ingress
dev is never NULL, so classic sockets are skipped automatically. An unbound
HIPER socket also has hs_dev == NULL and is skipped. A bound HIPER socket
is only reachable from the exact IQD device it was bound to. Because hs_dev
is always a device in init_net (iucv_sock_bind() scans
for_each_netdev_rcu(&init_net, ...) exclusively), a frame whose ingress
device belongs to another namespace never matches any socket.
Note that AF_IUCV over HiperSockets provides no per-connection
authentication: no sequence numbers, no TLS, no nonce. The four name fields
identifying a connection are exchanged in plaintext on the shared
HiperSockets segment (VCHID). Any host on the same HiperSockets segment
could spoof any frame type against an existing connection. That is a
protocol-level property unchanged by this patch. The fix reduces the attack
surface to peers present on the same HiperSockets segment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: ipmb: validate write message length
ipmb_write() read message fields before validating the length byte.
A zero or short write can read uninitialized stack bytes.
A length smaller than the SMBus header underflows the block write length.
Require a non-empty buffer and the minimum IPMB request length.
Also require the length byte plus payload before parsing the message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-io: report non-retryable errors separatedly
The error codes BLK_STS_NOTSUPP and BLK_STS_INVAL should not cause leg
failure on dm-raid1. This patch changes the interface to dm-io, so that
it reports two error bitmaps - error_bits and unsup_bits. The unsup_bit
bitmap tracks BLK_STS_NOTSUPP or BLK_STS_INVAL errors, the error_bits
bitmap tracks all the other errors.
dm-raid1 is changed so that it won't fail a leg if it receives an error
in the unsup_bits bitmap.
This patch (with 62dc37a819a5) fixes misbehavior if the user uses
unaligned bio vectors on dm-raid1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SCO: hold sk properly in sco_conn_ready
sk deref in sco_conn_ready must be done either under conn->lock, or
holding a refcount, to avoid concurrent close. conn->sk and parent sk is
currently accessed without either, and without checking parent->sk_state:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
sco_sock_release
sco_conn_ready
sk = conn->sk
lock_sock(sk)
conn->sk = NULL
lock_sock(sk)
release_sock(sk)
sco_sock_kill(sk)
UAF on sk deref
and similarly for access to sco_get_sock_listen() return value.
Fix possible UAF by holding sk refcount in sco_conn_ready() and making
sco_get_sock_listen() increase refcount. Also recheck after lock_sock
that the socket is still valid. Adjust conn->sk locking so it's
protected also by lock_sock() of the associated socket if any. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fec: only stop PTP if it was initialized
fec_ptp_init() is only called when fep->bufdesc_ex is available.
However, fec_probe() unconditionally calls fec_ptp_stop() on the
failed_init path, and fec_drv_remove() unconditionally calls
fec_ptp_stop() during device removal.
Check fep->bufdesc_ex before calling fec_ptp_stop() in both paths
to avoid stopping PTP when it was not initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN
New sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last
l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and
state set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the
dangling parent reference.
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown,
due to chan->state accessed without consistent locking:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect
l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global_chan_by_psm
l2cap_chan_lock(pchan)
l2cap_chan_close
l2cap_sock_teardown_cb
pchan->state = BT_CLOSED
l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) ------> l2cap_chan_lock(pchan)
l2cap_new_connection
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb
l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) <-------- l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan)
l2cap_sock_kill(parent) /* bt_sk(sk)->parent dangling */
Fix by adding check for sk_state == BT_LISTEN after acquiring sk lock in
l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(). Add lock_sock() around sk_state writes
where missing, to avoid data races.
Although the data races on pchan->state should be fixed too, this
defensive sk_state check probably makes sense in any case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Fix resize of the RX ring
When a AF_XDP socket is attached, the virtnet_rx_resize
should resize the rq->xsk_buffs XSK buffer array. Otherwise,
when the size grows, the virtnet_rx_resume() causes a write
past the end of the array. This is easily reproducable with
ethtool -G ens3 rx 32
./xdpsock -i eth0 -q 0 -r -z &
ethtool -G eth0 rx 256 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: avoid divide by zero in rt6_multipath_rebalance
rt6_multipath_rebalance() calculates the total eligible nexthop weight
in one pass and programs upper bounds in a second pass. Since
RTM_NEWROUTE is RTNL-free, a concurrent
ignore_routes_with_linkdown update can make the first pass return zero
while the second sees an eligible nexthop, causing
rt6_upper_bound_set() to divide by zero.
UBSAN: division-overflow in net/ipv6/route.c:4845:17
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
rt6_upper_bound_set() net/ipv6/route.c:4845
rt6_multipath_rebalance()
fib6_add_rt2node()
ip6_route_multipath_add()
inet6_rtm_newroute()
Skip upper-bound calculation when the first pass reports a zero total.
This respects the lock-free performance considerations here and solves
insecure scenarios. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4.1: zero referring call lists before decoding
decode_cb_sequence_args() allocates csa_rclists with kmalloc_objs(), so
each referring_call_list starts uninitialized. decode_rc_list() assigns
rcl_refcalls only when rcl_nrefcalls is nonzero. A valid list with zero
referring calls therefore leaves the pointer uninitialized, and
nfs4_callback_sequence() later passes stale slab contents to kfree().
Allocate csa_rclists with kzalloc_objs() so every rcl_refcalls member is
NULL from the beginning, including valid empty referring call lists. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in read_log_rec_buf()
read_log_rec_buf() copies a log record into a caller buffer starting at
u32 off = lsn_to_page_off(log, lsn) + log->record_header_len;
log->record_header_len (and log->data_off, used for the following pages)
comes verbatim from the on-disk restart area and is only checked for
8-byte alignment in is_rst_area_valid(), so off can exceed
log->page_size. "tail = log->page_size - off" then underflows and
memcpy() reads past the page_size-sized buffer returned by
read_log_page(), spilling adjacent slab memory into the replay buffer.
This is reachable by mounting a crafted NTFS image:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_log_rec_buf+0x216/0x580
Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800a877ff8 by task exploit/127
read_log_rec_buf fs/ntfs3/fslog.c:2299
log_replay fs/ntfs3/fslog.c:4216
ntfs_loadlog_and_replay fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:324
ntfs_fill_super fs/ntfs3/super.c:1392
get_tree_bdev_flags fs/super.c:1694
__x64_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4360
The buggy address is located 4088 bytes to the right of
the 4096-byte region [ffff88800a876000, ffff88800a877000)
Reject an in-page offset outside the current page before the copy.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: replaced the >= sign with >] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: check rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() return value in rpcb_register_inet4/6
rpcb_register_inet4() and rpcb_register_inet6() store the result of
rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() into map->r_addr without checking it for NULL.
rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() returns NULL when its final kstrdup() fails, and
the unchecked NULL is then carried into the synchronous RPCBPROC_SET
encode path: rpcb_register_call() -> rpc_call_sync() ->
rpcb_enc_getaddr() -> encode_rpcb_string(), whose first statement is
strlen(string), dereferencing NULL and oopsing the kernel.
The crash reproduces under failslab on v6.12; with KASAN the NULL
dereference surfaces as a fault on the shadow of address zero:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
RIP: 0010:strlen (lib/string.c:409)
Call Trace:
encode_rpcb_string (net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c:890)
rpcb_enc_getaddr (net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c:910)
rpcauth_wrap_req_encode (net/sunrpc/auth.c:745)
call_encode (net/sunrpc/clnt.c:1966)
__rpc_execute (net/sunrpc/sched.c:952)
rpc_run_task (net/sunrpc/clnt.c:1243)
rpc_call_sync (net/sunrpc/clnt.c:1272)
rpcb_v4_register (net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c:500)
svc_generic_rpcbind_set
nfsd_rpcbind_set
svc_register
svc_setup_socket
svc_addsock
write_ports
nfsctl_transaction_write
vfs_write
The crash is reachable when an in-kernel RPC service (nfsd, lockd,
nfs-callback) registers with the local rpcbind under enough memory
pressure for the small GFP_KERNEL kstrdup() in rpc_sockaddr2uaddr() to
fail. The asynchronous getport path already handles this exact failure
mode by returning -ENOMEM; only the two register helpers omit the check.
Mirror that handling: bail out with -ENOMEM when rpc_sockaddr2uaddr()
returns NULL, before the address is fed into the encoder. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix out-of-bounds read in ext4_read_inline_dir()
ext4_read_inline_dir() can read a dirent header past the end of its inline
buffer, triggering a slab-out-of-bounds read during getdents64():
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ext4_check_dir_entry
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800f3dd23c by task exploit/148
...
__ext4_check_dir_entry
ext4_read_inline_dir
iterate_dir
The dirent payload lives in a buffer of exactly inline_size bytes:
dir_buf = kmalloc(inline_size, GFP_NOFS);
but iteration runs in a position space extra_offset bytes larger
(extra_size = extra_offset + inline_size) so the synthetic "." and ".."
land at their block-dir offsets. A dirent is formed at "dir_buf + pos -
extra_offset", yet the ext4_check_dir_entry() length argument uses the
larger extra_size. A position whose dirent header would extend past
extra_size is therefore accepted, and the rescan loop's rec_len probe and
ext4_check_dir_entry() dereference de->rec_len before the entry is rejected.
Reject a position whose minimum-size dirent header would not fit within
extra_size before forming de, in both the rescan and main loops, and pass
inline_size rather than extra_size to ext4_check_dir_entry() so the length
check matches the physical buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix tree connection use-after-free in smb2_tree_connect()
ksmbd_tree_conn_connect() publishes a new tree connection in
sess->tree_conns with a single reference and returns its pointer to
smb2_tree_connect(). The handler continues to initialize the object and
build the response after publication. A concurrent session logoff can
erase the connection and drop that reference, freeing the object while
the handler still uses it.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smb2_tree_connect+0xe3d/0xf90
smb2_tree_connect (fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:2872)
handle_ksmbd_work
process_one_work
worker_thread
kthread
After xa_store() succeeds, take a second reference before releasing
tree_conns_lock. The original reference belongs to the xarray entry and
the second belongs to the creating smb2_tree_connect() handler.
Keep the references balanced in every path:
- On normal exit or an error after publication, smb2_tree_connect()
drops its creator reference. Error cleanup also calls
ksmbd_tree_conn_disconnect(), which drops the xarray reference only if
it removes the exact entry.
- SMB2 TREE_DISCONNECT uses the same helper to remove the entry and drop
its xarray reference. The request's existing lookup reference remains
owned by the request and is released by the existing cleanup.
- Session LOGOFF removes each entry and drops its xarray reference. If
it wins the race, later cleanup sees that the entry is gone and does
not drop that reference again.
To enforce this ownership, claim the disconnected state and erase the
exact entry atomically under tree_conns_lock. This guarantees one drop
for the xarray reference and one drop by each in-flight user, regardless
of which teardown path wins. If logoff removes the entry before
initialization completes, fail the connect instead of marking the
detached object TREE_CONNECTED. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: skip double clone set expressions on element insert
Both the dynset and newsetelem path clone the existing set expressions
when setting set element expressions if no override expressions are
provided. This results in a double clone, once to clone the template set
expressions then another clone on the new element. Add a flag to
annotate if userspace provides a override expression (ie. expression of
the same type of the set but different configuration), otherwise borrow
the existing expression from the set. Add conditionals to release
expression iif they represent an override. Use this new override_exprs
flag to dump the dynset expression override to userspace.
This simplifies the existing logic and it also fixes a bug with the
connlimit expression which results in a module refcount imbalance
WARNING splat when resorting on the default set expressions. |
