| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: lan743x: fix RX checksum use-after-free
lan743x_rx_process_buffer() adds each non-first receive buffer to the
head skb's frag_list. On the last descriptor, lan743x_rx_trim_skb()
linearizes the head and frees the fragment skb metadata.
The checksum-success path then writes ip_summed through the local skb
pointer, which still points to the final fragment. This causes a
use-after-free write when a packet spans more than one receive buffer.
Set ip_summed on the surviving head skb instead. Multi-buffer receive
can occur after a live MTU increase because existing ring entries keep
their old buffer size until they are replenished.
A KUnit test invoking lan743x_rx_process_buffer() with a two-buffer
packet produced a one-byte KASAN use-after-free write before this change.
The same test passed after the change. The driver object also builds
with W=1. This was not tested on physical LAN743x hardware. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: fix handling of NFSEXP_PNFS in the netlink codepath
The rework of how block layouts were checked moved the check for
NFSEXP_PNFS out of nfsd4_setup_layout_type() and into the callers. That
patch didn't account for the new call in nfsd4_setup_layout_type(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: avoid reallocating confirmed conntrack labels
ovs_ct_get_conn_labels() adds the labels extension when a conntrack
entry does not have one. Confirmed conntracks can be read locklessly,
so adding an extension may reallocate and free the extension block
while another CPU accesses it.
Only add the extension for unconfirmed conntracks. A confirmed
conntrack without labels now fails the caller's label operation instead
of reallocating its extension storage. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: libahci: clear PxCLBU and PxFBU for AHCI_HFLAG_32BIT_ONLY
A user reported that commit 105c42566a55 ("ata: ahci: force 32-bit DMA for
JMicron JMB582/JMB585") made the JMicron JMB585 unusable on his board.
The failure is seen as soon as the ahci driver is probed, and booting with
iommu=off does not solve the problem.
Looking at the AHCI specification, PxCLBU and PxFBU are both read only '0'
for HBAs that do not support 64-bit addressing.
For HBAs that do support 64-bit addressing, the registers are read write,
with a reset value that is Implementation Specific.
When using the AHCI_HFLAG_32BIT_ONLY flag, the HBA does support 64-bit
addressing, and a 32-bit DMA mask is set by simply clearing HOST_CAP_64.
Thus, in this case, we need to explicitly clear the registers to 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: cortina: Ack RX overrun interrupt correctly
The RX overrun interrupt is reported in interrupt status register 4, but
gmac_irq() acknowledges it using the RX descriptor error bit from status
register 0. For GMAC0 this writes the GMAC1 overrun bit, while for GMAC1
the shift leaves no bit in the 32-bit register.
Acknowledge the same per-port RX overrun bit that was detected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: ring the doorbell if a burst ends in a drop
fbnic_tx_map() skips the doorbell write, and the completion request,
for every packet handed to it with xmit_more set, counting on the
packet which ends the burst to publish them all. When that packet is
dropped instead - skb_put_padto(), skb_cow_head() or a DMA mapping
failure - nothing rings. The descriptors of the preceding packets stay
invisible to the HW until the next transmit on that queue, which for a
burst-then-idle workload may never come.
Remember the meta descriptor of the last packet left without a doorbell
and flush it from the error paths. The completion request has to be set
on that descriptor rather than simply writing the tail, otherwise the HW
would transmit the packets but never report a head, and the ring would
fill up and stall for good.
This is very similar to Joe's recent series of fixes for bnxt.
Not seen in real life, reproduced under QEMU with failure injection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: check IP header size in cfg80211_classify8021d()
A frame that looks like IP can be transmitted, but be too short, so
the DS field is read incorrectly:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027
cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027
ieee80211_select_queue+0x37a/0x9e0 net/mac80211/wme.c:180
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x60f/0x1d90 net/mac80211/tx.c:4304
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xa8/0x6d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:4538
...
packet_sendmsg+0x9173/0xa2a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
Use skb_header_pointer() like the MPLS case. |
| In is_pd_allowed of gem_msg.c, there is a possible permission bypass due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| Missing authorization in Permissions in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to spoof UI elements via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Race condition in WebAudio in Google Chrome prior to 155.0.8059.39 allowed a remote attacker to potentially leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions. |
| Unsigned integer underflow in wstrncat() in src/port.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH from v1.4.11 through v1.5.0 on non-Windows platforms allows an authenticated remote attacker to write one out-of-bounds null byte past the end of a stack buffer by sending a crafted SFTP path. wolfSSH_RealPath() in src/ssh.c appends each path component with a remaining-size bound (outSz - curSz) rather than the full destination size, so once the accumulated path reaches half the output buffer the size_t computation n - strlen(s1) - 1 wraps to near SIZE_MAX. The strncat() call is then effectively unbounded and copies the whole component; when that component exactly fills the remainder of the buffer, its terminating null is written one byte past the end. The caller's own length check keeps the copied data inside the buffer, so the overflow is limited to that single null byte, which may corrupt an adjacent stack value and crash the process. Applications that call the public wolfSSH_RealPath() with an output buffer smaller than the input path are additionally exposed to an unbounded copy, because the word32 expression outSz - segSz in that length check also wraps. |
| src/internal.c in wolfSSL wolfSSH through 1.5.0 admits the server-to-client Diffie-Hellman group exchange messages SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP (31) and SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY (33) when a server receives them from an unauthenticated client. IsMessageAllowedServer() applies no direction check to the key exchange message range: when the peer is keying and no particular message is expected, which is the state a server is in for the whole window after it processes the client's KEXINIT because nothing sets handshake->expectMsgId there, the function falls out of its expectation branch without a verdict and reaches a numeric bound that admits every message id from 30 through 34. A client that negotiates diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 and then sends message 31 makes the server run the client-side handler DoKexDhGexGroup(), which validates the attacker-supplied group with two 8-round Miller-Rabin primality tests, one on p and one on (p-1)/2, on a value of up to 8192 bits. The handler then returns success: the server stores the attacker's prime and generator, generates a Diffie-Hellman key pair in the attacker's group, and sends the client-role message SSH_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT (32) back to the attacker. Published RFC 3526 safe primes are the worst-case input and cost the attacker nothing to obtain. The primality validation was added in 1.5.0; versions from 1.2.0 through 1.4.22 admit the same message and enter the same client-role path without the primality cost. Message 33 is admitted as well, but on a server it is rejected before any cryptography because no public key check callback is registered, so it carries no comparable cost. Builds that define WOLFSSH_NO_DH_GEX_SHA256, which is implied by WOLFSSH_NO_DH or NO_SHA256, are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlegacy: fix broadcast stations deallocation
On the error path of __il4965_up(), il_dealloc_bcast_stations() clears
only IL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE, leaving IL_STA_BCAST set. This causes the
same broadcast stations to be deallocated again by __il4965_down().
This can occur when RF_KILL is toggled during driver startup.
To fix clear the entire 'used' field, since we will not do any
other operations on the station. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: hsq: Fix use-after-free in retry work
mmc_hsq_pump_requests() queues retry_work when request_atomic() returns
-EBUSY; today sdhci-sprd is the only consumer that implements
request_atomic(). The work is embedded in a devm-allocated mmc_hsq, but
is never cancelled during driver removal. Work still pending at unbind
can therefore run after the devm allocation has been released and
dereference hsq->mmc and hsq->mrq.
Use devm_work_autocancel() to cancel and drain retry_work before the devm
allocation is released. By the time devres cleanup begins,
mmc_remove_host() has already stopped the host, so no new requests can
arm the work.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: filemap: retain mapped dropbehind folios
Fault-around can map ready dropbehind folios without going through the
normal page-cache lookup that clears dropbehind. A mapping represents a
competing cached user, so retain the folio instead of forcibly unmapping
it when writeback completes.
For a mapped folio, folio_unmap_invalidate() can call
unmap_mapping_folio(), which takes i_mmap_rwsem and may sleep. Retaining
mapped folios avoids this path when folio_end_dropbehind() runs in
non-preemptible task context.
Tal was able to trigger a sleeping-in-atomic warning due to this [1].
Unmapped dropbehind folios continue through the existing invalidation path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick: ms_block: destroy io_queue workqueue on removal
msb_init_disk() creates the per-card ordered workqueue msb->io_queue with
alloc_ordered_workqueue(). It is torn down with destroy_workqueue() only
on the init error path; msb_remove() never destroys it. msb_stop() merely
flushes the queue, and neither msb_data_clear() nor put_disk() free it. As
a result every card insert/remove cycle leaks the workqueue and its
kworker, exhausting kernel memory over repeated cycles.
Destroy the workqueue in msb_remove() after the disk has been removed and
the queue drained. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
9p: Fix v9fs_issue_write() to update i_size and remote_i_size
Fix v9fs_issue_write() to update i_size and remote_i_size to the new size
of the server file if we made it larger, using the start fpos and the count
returned by p9_client_write() to calculate the new minimum file size.
This assumes that if the 9P server makes a short write (say it hits
ENOSPC), a reduced count is returned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: check ras and obj before dereference
nbio_v7_9_handle_ras_controller_intr_no_bifring() dereferences ras and obj
without checking either for NULL. Both amdgpu_ras_get_context() and
amdgpu_ras_find_obj() can return NULL, e.g. during the window between
adev->nbio.ras being set (early in amdgpu_ras_init(), by design, to
enable the fatal-error interrupt as soon as possible) and the PCIE_BIF
ras object actually being created in RAS late_init. Any interrupt in that
window crashes in hard-IRQ context.
This is analogous to commit d190b459b2a4 ("drm/amdgpu: the warning
dereferencing obj for nbio_v7_4"), which fixed the same issue in the
nbio_v7_4 handler.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
(cherry picked from commit c7071767a50a32ed727cf800ac84372429e3b4b3) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: psp: avoid conflicts with skb->decrypted and sk_validate_xmit_skb()
PSP conflicts with TLS ULP in its usage of both skb->decrypted and
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb().
Make PSP mutually exclusive with TLS ULP, the only other user of either
of these. As other users of skb->decrypted come along, they can be added
to sk_has_decrypt_user(). It would make sense to also assert that
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb() is also NULL in both of these setup paths for
similar future proofing, but the PSP listener/sk_clone() path is still
broken and it could be seen as a regression to not allow rx assoc to run
on a child of a listener socket with PSP tx assoc state.
Include all TCP ULPs in the sk_has_decrypt_user() check, even though TLS
is the only one that conflicts with PSP via the decrypted bit. This is
intentional because PSP was not designed to be used with ULPs. It is
best to close off surface area that may make bugs reachable, until
someone wishes to design and test an actual user of PSP with ULPs. |
