| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: quiesce input in hid_hw_stop() to prevent use-after-free
A driver's probe calls hid_device_io_start() to enable input delivery,
then fails at a later initialization step and unwinds via hid_hw_stop().
The unwind frees struct hidraw via hidraw_disconnect() while in-flight
HID reports may still be running on another CPU, dereferencing the
freed object through hidraw_report_event(). syzbot reports the
resulting use-after-free for the corsair-psu HID driver.
Edward Adam Davis posted a per-driver fix for corsair-psu that adds
an explicit hid_device_io_stop() before hid_hw_stop() in the probe
error path ("hwmon: prevent packets from going to driver for probe",
2026-04-28). Auditing the tree shows 15 drivers call
hid_device_io_start(); 7 also call hid_device_io_stop() and 8 do not:
drivers calling hid_device_io_start() without a matching
hid_device_io_stop() before hid_hw_stop():
drivers/hwmon/corsair-psu.c (fix posted by Edward)
drivers/hwmon/corsair-cpro.c
drivers/hwmon/nzxt-kraken3.c
drivers/hwmon/nzxt-smart2.c
drivers/hwmon/gigabyte_waterforce.c
drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c
drivers/hid/hid-nintendo.c
drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c
Roughly half of all callers of the API are exposed. Centralize the
quiesce in hid_hw_stop() so callers do not have to remember the
matching stop: if a driver has left hdev->io_started true on entry,
call hid_device_io_stop() before hid_disconnect().
For the 7 drivers that already call hid_device_io_stop() correctly,
hdev->io_started is false on entry, the guard short-circuits, and
behavior is unchanged.
No Fixes: tag because the affected drivers gained their
hid_device_io_start() calls independently over years; the bug is a
class-wide API misuse rather than a regression from one commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cuse: wait for pending RCU callbacks on module exit
Since commit 053fc4f755ad ("fuse: fix UAF in rcu pathwalks"),
fuse_conn_put() frees the fuse_conn through call_rcu() rather than
synchronously. For cuse, fc->release is cuse_fc_release(), which
lives in the cuse module. If the module is removed before the RCU
grace period ends, the callback jumps into freed module memory:
userspace / module unload | RCU softirq
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
close(/dev/cuse) |
cuse_channel_release() |
fuse_dev_release() |
fuse_conn_put(fch->conn) |
call_rcu(delayed_release) ------+---> callback queued
|
rmmod cuse |
cuse_exit() |
cuse_channel_destroy() |
... |
return |
|
<module text freed> |
| rcu_do_batch()
| delayed_release()
| fc->release()
| -> cuse_fc_release()
| ^^^ freed text!
The freed module text is unmapped by vfree(), so the jump into the
stale callback triggers a page-fault Oops. If the virtual address
is subsequently reused, the callback could execute unrelated code
(undefined behaviour).
Fix this by calling rcu_barrier() in cuse_exit() so that any pending
fuse_conn release callback completes before the module is removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat
The use of change_hat when in complain mode can cause a deadlock
when the hat doesn't exist and a new learning profile is created
for the missing profile. This is because change_hat() has taken
the lock to search the hat list and creating the new learning
profile needs to take the lock to add it to the list.
From the bug report:
Originally found in 7.0.0 in LTS ubuntu 26.04 with pam_apparmor + su
in complain mode set to change hats. Then verified in newest
available vanilla kernel I've compiled to see if still present:
7.2-rc7 vanilla -> affected
checked also some other kernels:
6.18.44 vanilla -> affected
6.12.95 with debian patches -> unaffected
On systems without bug (for example 6.12.95 debian) it just prints:
aa_change_hat rc=0
On systems with bug, the executable always hangs, prints nothing and
becomes unkillable. (And once stuck this way, it will cause any
further hat changes to also cause the changing process to get stuck)
Then in syslog you can find hint about cause:
kernel: INFO: task hat:3409 blocked for more than 483 seconds.
kernel: Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7 #1
kernel: "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
kernel: task:hat state:D stack:0 pid:3409 tgid:3409 ppid:2605 task_flags:0x400000 flags:0x00080800
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: <TASK>
kernel: __schedule+0x48f/0xfe0
kernel: schedule+0x27/0xa0
kernel: schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30
kernel: __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x569/0xa10
kernel: aa_new_learning_profile+0x15f/0x210
kernel: build_change_hat+0x19f/0x3b0
kernel: change_hat.isra.0+0x5dd/0xd60
kernel: aa_change_hat+0x2f3/0x710
kernel: aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x121/0x1f0
kernel: do_setattr+0x28c/0x340
kernel: apparmor_setselfattr+0x20/0x50
kernel: security_setselfattr+0xf6/0x110
kernel: __x64_sys_lsm_set_self_attr+0x53/0x90
kernel: do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x5e0
kernel: ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0xfd/0x260
kernel: ? lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x8d/0xd0
kernel: ? __folio_mod_stat+0x2d/0x90
kernel: ? map_anon_folio_pte_nopf+0xd1/0x1f0
kernel: ? do_anonymous_page+0x184/0xa10
kernel: ? __handle_mm_fault+0x805/0x870
kernel: ? count_memcg_events+0xef/0x230
kernel: ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x2f0
kernel: ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2bb/0x7b0
kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x94/0x5e0
kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x75/0x160
kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f815e134c8d
kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6df94ea8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001cc
kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000556d8c81d040 RCX: 00007f815e134c8d
kernel: RDX: 0000000000000046 RSI: 0000556d8c81d040 RDI: 0000000000000064
kernel: RBP: 00007fff6df94ef0 R08: 00007f815e212ac8 R09: 000000000000000c
kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000556d8c81d010
kernel: R13: 0000000000000026 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000064
kernel: </TASK>
kernel: INFO: task hat:3409 is blocked on a mutex likely owned by task hat:3409.
To fix the issue, lift the locking out of the core of
aa_new_learning_profile(), introduce a wrapper function that takes the
lock where needed, and have build_change_hat() call the core function
that no longer takes the lock.
In addition fix 4 other issues introduced by commit
32e92764d6f8d ("apparmor: grab ns lock and refresh when looking up changehat child profiles")
- aa_get_profile_rcu() was replaced-by: aa_get_profile without the
accompanying rcu_dereference_protected()
- an extra aa_get_label(label) was introduced at the start of
change_hat() without an accompanying aa_put_label() causing a
reference count leak.
- a reference count leak was introduced in the label_is_stale(label)
case, where the newest profile would be leaked instead of the
label passed to the function.
- a potential UAF when the lookup walks up the tree with new_ns != ns
the new label refere
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Flush context cache with correct SID when tearing down aliases
domain_context_clear_one() and device_pasid_table_teardown() are both
invoked once per DMA alias of a device. Each function locates the context
entry using the bus/devfn pair provided by the pci_for_each_dma_alias()
callback, then calls intel_context_flush_no_pasid(), which constructs a
device-selective context-cache invalidation from info->bus and
info->devfn (that is, always the requester ID of the device itself).
As a result, for every alias other than the device’s own RID, the context
entry that was just cleared in memory is never invalidated in the context
cache. Hardware may continue using that stale cached entry. In the
scalable-mode teardown path, intel_pasid_free_table() can then free the
PASID directory still referenced by that stale entry, allowing the IOMMU
to walk freed memory.
Fix this by passing the source ID of the entry being torn down to
intel_context_flush_no_pasid(), instead of deriving it from @info. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: use proto_lock for l2cap_data to fix l2cap_disconn_ind
hci_conn::l2cap_data is accessed without locks in l2cap_disconn_ind via
hci_conn_timeout (disc_work) -> hci_proto_disconn_ind ->
l2cap_disconn_ind. This is UAF if the l2cap_conn is deleted
concurrently.
disc_work is disabled sync in hci_conn_del(), so we cannot take
hci_dev_lock in disc_work.
Fix by using proto_lock to guard l2cap_data, in addition to hdev->lock
which is held in other access paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6mr: do not clone dst in ip6mr_cache_report()
IPv6 input attaches a non-refcounted (NOREF) dst to skbs under RCU.
When an ingress multicast packet misses MFC lookup,
ip6mr_cache_unresolved() places the skb onto the unresolved queue,
escaping the receive-side RCU grace period.
If the underlying route is deleted and freed, and the MFC queue is later
resolved with a wrong parent interface, ip6_mr_forward() invokes
ip6mr_cache_report(..., MRT6MSG_WRONGMIF), which executes
dst_clone(skb_dst(pkt)) on the freed dst entry, triggering a slab
use-after-free.
Report packets queued to mroute6_sk (a raw socket) and netlink
notifications do not require an attached dst entry.
Fix this by:
1. Removing dst_clone() in ip6mr_cache_report() and ensuring report skbs
do not hold a dst.
2. Dropping skb_dst before queuing unresolved skbs in
ip6mr_cache_unresolved(), matching the fact that multicast
forwarding resolves outgoing routes anew via ip6_route_output(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irqchip/gic-v5: Clear per-CPU IRS data on teardown
IRS affinity setup publishes an IRS pointer and IAFFID state in the
per-CPU data before the remaining IRS initialization can fail. The
error path then frees the IRS data without clearing that published
state, leaving CPUs associated with freed memory.
On initialization failure and normal IRS teardown, clear the per-CPU
IRS association by removing the stale pointer to irs_data. Also
invalidate the per-CPU IAFFID state for any CPUs that were tied to the
IRS before it was freed. |
| Suricata before 8.0.7 has an Http2ThreadMultiBuf use-after-free when a transaction is inspected by rules that use http.response_header with and without a transform. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-apple: Destroy the admin queue on removal
The admin queue is allocated with blk_mq_alloc_queue() but never
destroyed. nvme_free_ctrl() only drops the last reference and
blk_mq_exit_queue() and blk_sync_queue() never run: the hctx is never
moved to q->unused_hctx_list and the timeout timer and work stay armed on
a queue that is about to be freed which will eventually oops inside
blk_mq_timeout_work().
This can only be triggered when the controller fails to come up and is
then immediately torn down again which is why no one ever ran into this
before.
Let's just copy what the pcie driver does: unquiesce and destroy the admin
queue before nvme_uninit_ctrl().
With this the following WARN followed by a panic no longer happens:
WARNING: block/blk-mq.c:4390 at blk_mq_release+0x194/0x238, CPU#4: kworker/u34:4/119
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: kworker/u34:4 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc1-dirty #248 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Apple Mac mini (M1, 2020) (DT)
Workqueue: nvme-wq apple_nvme_remove_dead_ctrl_work
pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : blk_mq_release+0x194/0x238
lr : blk_mq_release+0x58/0x238
sp : ffffc000833a3b50
x29: ffffc000833a3b50 x28: ffff80001d0450f8 x27: ffff800020c95200
x26: 0000000000000088 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff800020f36805
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffc00081a86878 x21: ffff800020be9c60
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800022501698 x18: 000000000000000a
x17: 7365757165722066 x16: 666f7265776f7020 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000028 x13: 0000000000004def x12: 0000000000000003
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffc000805b4fc8
x8 : ffffc00081915820 x7 : ffffc00081c4f3c8 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : 0000000000000004 x4 : ffff800022498d80 x3 : ffffc000833a3b14
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff800022501698
Call trace:
blk_mq_release+0x194/0x238 (P)
blk_put_queue+0x8c/0xf0
nvme_free_ctrl+0x4c/0x260
device_release+0x44/0x128
kobject_put+0xa0/0x120
put_device+0x1c/0x40
nvme_uninit_ctrl+0x48/0x60
apple_nvme_remove+0x54/0xb0
platform_remove+0x28/0x40
device_remove+0x54/0x98
device_release_driver_internal+
device_release_driver+0x20/0x38
apple_nvme_remove_dead_ctrl_wor
process_one_work+0x1f4/0x770
worker_thread+0x1b8/0x360
kthread+0x140/0x160
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
irq event stamp: 448
hardirqs last enabled at (447):in_unlock_irqrestore+0x74/0x80
hardirqs last disabled at (448): [<ffffc000811cf5c0>] el1_brk64+0x20/0x60
softirqs last enabled at (0): [ess+0xb28/0x2698
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
---[ end trace 0000000000000000
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000005
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL),
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagA
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[0000000000000000] user address
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kwor 7.2.0-rc1-dirty #248PREEMPT
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Apple Mac mini (M1, 2020) (DT)
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeou
pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : percpu_ref_tryget_many.cons
lr : percpu_ref_tryget_many.constprop.0+0xc0/0x168
sp : ffffc000829cbce0
x29: ffffc000829cbce0 x28: ffff800020be9f48 x27: ffff800013e503c0
x26: 0000000000000108 x25: 000009c05
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffc000819f5000 x21: ffff800020be9f48
x20: ffff8001deda4808 x19: ffff8000a
x17: 00000000580e1fac x16: ffffc00082bbbb7c x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000028 x13: 000000001
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffc000829cbc20
x8 :
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix the SCO setup context lifetime
hci_setup_sync() queues a conn_handle_t with a NULL destroy callback, so
the context is only freed if hci_enhanced_setup_sync() actually runs. An
entry that is cancelled instead is leaked, as
_hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry() does not release entry->data when there is
no destroy callback, and hci_cmd_sync_clear() cancels every pending entry
when the controller is unregistered.
The context also stores a bare hci_conn pointer, so the connection can be
freed while the work is queued. The dequeue in hci_conn_del() does not
cover it either, as it matches on entry->data == conn and entry->data is
the wrapper here. Same problem as commit 2f5d635ad590 ("Bluetooth:
hci_sync: hold conn in hci_connect_acl/le_sync() callbacks").
Hold the connection and release both from a destroy callback. The
submission failure path drops both, since hci_cmd_sync_submit() does not
call the destroy callback when it fails to queue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSv4: remove callback IDR entry on client allocation failure
nfs4_alloc_client() allocates an NFSv4.0 callback identifier before it
finishes setting up the client. If any later initialization step fails,
the error path frees the nfs_client directly with nfs_free_client(). That
bypasses nfs_put_client(), which is where the callback IDR entry is
removed during normal teardown.
A failed allocation can therefore leave cb_ident_idr pointing at a freed
nfs_client. A later NFSv4.0 callback lookup by cb_ident would find the
stale pointer and take a reference to it.
Make the callback IDR removal helper callable by the allocation failure
path, and remove the callback identifier before freeing the client.
This was found by a local static-analysis checker for publish-before-free
lifetime bugs and confirmed by manual inspection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: mtip32xx: synchronize ioctls with device removal
The ioctl handlers only test REMOVE_PENDING before entering
mtip_hw_ioctl(). Removal can set that bit immediately afterwards and free
dd->port in mtip_hw_exit() while an ioctl still dereferences it. An already
open block device can reach the handlers while del_gendisk() is in
progress.
Serialize both native and compat ioctls with removal. Set REMOVE_PENDING
before taking the mutex so new callers fail after an in-flight ioctl has
drained, and hold the mutex until the port has been torn down. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
null_blk: register configfs subsystem after creating default devices
In null_init(), configfs_register_subsystem() currently runs before
register_blkdev(), so when null_blk is built as a module, a racing mkdir()
+ poweron from userspace can reach null_add_dev() while null_major is still
0. __add_disk() then hits WARN_ON(disk->minors) (major=0 with minors!=0)
and fails:
[root@fedora ~]# [ 2366.521436] WARNING: block/genhd.c:476 at __add_disk+0x8a7/0xde0,
[ 2366.523552] Modules linked in: null_blk(+) nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib
[ 2366.529081] CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 1600 Comm: sh Not tainted 7.2.0-rc1+ #66 PREEMPT(full)
......
[ 2366.547251] Call Trace:
[ 2366.547575] <TASK>
[ 2366.547831] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x84/0xe0
[ 2366.548260] add_disk_fwnode+0x114/0x560
[ 2366.548739] null_add_dev+0x102d/0x1b80 [null_blk]
[ 2366.549310] ? __pfx_null_add_dev+0x10/0x10 [null_blk]
[ 2366.549906] ? mutex_lock+0xde/0x1c0
[ 2366.550361] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
[ 2366.550827] nullb_device_power_store+0x1e7/0x280 [null_blk]
[ 2366.551499] ? __pfx_nullb_device_power_store+0x10/0x10 [null_blk]
[ 2366.552177] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1f5/0x470
[ 2366.552748] ? configfs_write_iter+0x35c/0x4e0
[ 2366.553242] configfs_write_iter+0x286/0x4e0
[ 2366.553787] vfs_write+0x52d/0xd00
[ 2366.554169] ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
[ 2366.554679] ? __pfx___css_rstat_updated+0x10/0x10
[ 2366.555196] ? fdget_pos+0x1cf/0x4c0
[ 2366.555649] ksys_write+0xfc/0x1d0
......
Additionally, the err_dev path destroys all devices on nullb_list while
configfs is still registered. If a racing mkdir() + poweron puts a user
device on the list, null_destroy_dev()->null_free_dev() kfrees the user
device's nullb_device but /sys/kernel/config/nullb/<name> is still
reachable. Any userspace access to the item will trigger a UAF.
For simplicity, move configfs_register_subsystem() to the end to solve
the problems above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: detach blocked lock requests before freeing
A file_lock retained by ksmbd for byte-range lock bookkeeping can still
be part of the VFS blocked-request graph. In particular, the VFS can
chain a new waiter below an already blocked request through
flc_blocked_requests. The ksmbd_file reference count does not cover that
graph.
Both __ksmbd_close_fd() and the cross-request unlock path free these
retained file_lock objects directly. If a dependent waiter is still
attached, locks_release_private() hits
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&flc->flc_blocked_requests)). The same lifetime
mismatch can leave a freed ksmbd_lock reachable through its request-local
llist.
Detach the file_lock from the blocked-request graph before freeing it in
the close, cross-request unlock, and rollback paths. locks_delete_block()
also wakes requests chained below the object. Remove llist when a
completed lock is published so a globally visible ksmbd_lock no longer
points into the submitting worker's stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: defer publishing granted locks to prevent UAF/double-free race
In smb2_lock(), mid-batch granted locks are published to connection-wide
(conn->lock_list) and file-wide (fp->lock_list) lists immediately upon
vfs_lock_file() success, while also remaining tracked on the stack-local
rollback_list.
If a subsequent element in the same SMB2_LOCK request array fails
validation or execution, the thread jumps to out: and walks
rollback_list to undo previously granted locks. However, because the
granted lock was already published to conn->lock_list, a concurrent
UNLOCK request on the same connection can find the lock object and
kfree() it before the rollback loop executes.
When the granting thread subsequently walks rollback_list, it
dereferences and frees the already-freed ksmbd_lock structure, resulting
in a Use-After-Free and Double-Free (on both ksmbd_lock and struct
file_lock).
Fix this by deferring the publication of granted locks to
conn->lock_list and fp->lock_list until after the entire array of lock
elements has been processed without error. Mid-batch grants remain
tracked exclusively on the request-local rollback_list until the whole
batch succeeds, eliminating the race window. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: smbdirect: destroy QP before mem pools on accept failure
On the rdma_accept_failed error path of
smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), the receive io posted just above is
owned by the QP (recv_io is set to NULL after a successful post). The
error path fell through to smbdirect_connection_destroy_mem_pools()
before smbdirect_connection_destroy_qp(), so the mem pools and the
recv_io slab cache were destroyed while that recv_io was still
outstanding on the QP.
The drain in smbdirect_connection_destroy_qp() (ib_drain_qp()) is what
runs the recv completion that returns the recv_io to the free list, so
destroying the pools first leaves the object outstanding at
kmem_cache_destroy() time ("Slab cache still has objects") and later
frees it into an already-destroyed mempool (mempool_free_bulk
NULL-pointer dereference).
Give rdma_accept_failed its own teardown that drains the QP first, then
destroys the mem pools, and returns. The remaining labels
(post_recv_io_failed onward) run before the recv_io was ever posted, so
they keep the mem-pools-then-qp order.
The outstanding recv_io at kmem_cache_destroy() time:
[ 3487.344647] =============================================================================
[ 3487.349942] BUG smbdirect_recv_io_cache_ffff88811ba99000 (Not tainted): Objects remaining on __kmem_cache_shutdown()
[ 3487.356078] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 3487.356078]
[ 3487.356738] Object 0xffff8881511c3440 @offset=13376
[ 3487.358464] Allocated in mempool_alloc_noprof+0x18c/0x290 age=1194 cpu=6 pid=22254
[ 3487.361197] mempool_alloc_noprof+0x18c/0x290
[ 3487.361542] smbdirect_connection_create_mem_pools+0x405/0x780
[ 3487.361972] smbdirect_accept_connect_request+0x5a8/0x1b80
[ 3487.362359] smbdirect_listen_rdma_event_handler+0x1579/0x1b90
[ 3487.362779] cma_cm_event_handler+0x9c/0x230
[ 3487.363096] cma_ib_req_handler+0x2682/0x45d0
[ 3487.363414] cm_process_work+0x56/0x3d0
[ 3487.363676] cm_work_handler+0x8a0e/0xd000
[ 3487.367496] process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x13a0
[ 3487.367859] worker_thread+0x7c9/0xc80
[ 3487.368148] kthread+0x341/0x430
[ 3487.368407] ret_from_fork+0x3a8/0x7a0
[ 3487.368704] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 3487.370307] Slab 0xffffea0005447000 objects=19 used=1 fp=0xffff8881511c0040 flags=0x100000000000240(workingset|head|node=0|zone=2)
[ 3487.372840] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 3487.373195] WARNING: mm/slub.c:1244 at __slab_err+0x1a/0x30, CPU#6: kworker/6:84/22254
[ 3487.373759] Modules linked in:
[ 3487.373993] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 22254 Comm: kworker/6:84 Tainted: G B 7.1.0-next-20260623+ #88 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 3487.374778] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
[ 3487.377830] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 3487.378515] Workqueue: ib_cm cm_work_handler
[ 3487.378820] RIP: 0010:__slab_err+0x1a/0x30
[ 3487.379129] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 e8 36 00 00 00 bf 05 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 e8 f7 75 45 00 90 <0f> 0b 90 c3 cc cc cc cc cc 66 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00
[ 3487.383255] RSP: 0018:ffff888220fc7050 EFLAGS: 00010093
[ 3487.383643] RAX: ffffffff8168e60a RBX: ffff88810955e640 RCX: ffff88821c381d80
[ 3487.384158] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff870fa080
[ 3487.384662] RBP: ffff888220fc7068 R08: ffffffff870fa087 R09: 1ffffffff0e1f410
[ 3487.385192] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff0e1f411 R12: ffffea0005447210
[ 3487.385674] R13: ffffea0005447000 R14: ffff888220fc7068 R15: ffff88812a8ab300
[ 3487.388932] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888427e76000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3487.389529] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3487.389934] CR2: 00007ffcf2d84fd8 CR3: 0000000111d64006 CR4: 0000000000f72ef0
[ 3487.390440] PKRU: 55555554
[ 3487.390641] Call Trace:
[ 3487.390826] <TASK>
[ 3
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
swiotlb: Preserve allocation virtual address for dynamic pools
swiotlb_alloc_tlb() can allocate from the DMA atomic pool when a decrypted
pool is needed from atomic context. With CONFIG_DMA_DIRECT_REMAP, the
atomic pool is backed by remapped virtual addresses, which are not the same
as the direct-map addresses returned by phys_to_virt().
swiotlb_init_io_tlb_pool() currently reconstructs the pool virtual address
from the physical start address. For atomic-pool backed allocations this
stores the wrong address in pool->vaddr. Later, swiotlb_free_tlb() passes
that address to dma_free_from_pool(), which will fail to recognize the
chunk
Pass the virtual address returned by the allocation path into
swiotlb_init_io_tlb_pool(), and store that address in pool->vaddr. This
keeps the pool free path using the same virtual address as the allocator. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uio: Fix stale info pointer in failed registration path
After device_add(), the UIO device is visible to userspace and /dev/uioX
can be opened. If a later setup step fails, __uio_register_device()
unwinds the device but leaves idev->info pointing at the caller-owned
struct uio_info.
That is unsafe when an opener races with the failed registration path.
The open file keeps a reference to the uio_device, while the caller sees
registration failure and may free its struct uio_info. Later file
operations can then follow idev->info and dereference freed memory.
Handle post-device_add() failures like unregister: remove UIO attributes
while the info pointer is still valid, then clear idev->info under
info_lock and wake existing waiters/async users before removing the
device and minor. This makes already-open file descriptors observe the
same "device gone" state as normal uio_unregister_device(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: xilinx: formatter_pcm: fix stream_data leak on open error
In xlnx_formatter_pcm_open(), stream_data is allocated and
adata->play_stream or adata->capture_stream is assigned early. If a
later step, such as snd_pcm_hw_constraint_step() or
snd_pcm_hw_constraint_integer(), fails, the function returns the error
immediately. ALSA does not call the close callback when open fails, so
stream_data is leaked and the stream pointer is left dangling, pointing
to a substream that ALSA frees. A later interrupt would then call
snd_pcm_period_elapsed() on the freed substream.
Free stream_data and clear the stream pointer on the error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix potential UAF when reading bpf link info
In bpf_link_show_fdinfo and bpf_link_get_info_by_fd, link->prog is
accessed without holding any locks. If the prog is concurrently replaced
via bpf_link_update, the old prog can be freed, leading to a potential
UAF issue.
Fix this by accessing link->prog under RCU protection to safely fetch
the pointer and guarantee its lifetime while reading its fields. |
