| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/intel: Fix kernel address leakages in LBR stack
Before Arch LBR gained CPL filtering support, a user-only branch stack
could still contain kernel addresses. As a result, kernel branch records
may be exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is
requested.
For example, on Intel Tiger Lake, the following command can still report
SYSRET/ERET entries with kernel-space from addresses:
$ ./perf record -e cycles:p -o - --branch-filter any,save_type,u -- \
./perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
./perf script -i - --fields brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \
grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}'
Total time: 0.000 [sec]
0.219000 usecs/op
4,566,210 ops/sec
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.551 MB - ]
0xffffffff93c001c8/0x7f12a2b1d647/P/-/-/16959/SYSRET/-
0xffffffff93c001c8/0x7f12a2b1d5c2/P/-/-/17535/SYSRET/-
0xffffffff93c01928/0x7f12a2861000/P/-/-/6719/ERET/-
0xffffffff93c01928/0x7f12a297a000/P/-/-/8575/ERET/-
The problem is that intel_pmu_lbr_filter() does not fully validate the
privilege level of sampled entries. It filters some mismatches based on
the branch type and the to address, but it does not reject entries whose
from address violates the requested branch privilege filter.
Fix this by extending software filtering to validate both from and to
addresses against br_sel. Any LBR entry contains kernel address does not
match the requested user filter is dropped. This prevents kernel
addresses from appearing in user-only branch stacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xhci: fix lost bounce buffers on TDs spanning several ring segments
When a TD reaches a link TRB with data that is not aligned to the
endpoint's wMaxPacketSize, xhci_align_td() stages the unalignable tail
through the bounce buffer of the ring segment holding that link TRB.
xhci_unmap_td_bounce_buffer() later unmaps it and, for IN transfers,
copies the data back into the URB's buffer.
The enqueue path records the segment that was bounced in td->bounce_seg,
under the assumption that a TD never spans more than two ring segments.
That assumption does not hold: a TD large enough to span three or more
segments crosses several link TRBs and can be bounced at each of them.
Only the last one survives in td->bounce_seg, so every earlier bounce
buffer is neither copied back nor DMA unmapped.
The URB still completes with actual_length equal to the requested length
and no error, so the transfer looks successful while a wMaxPacketSize
sized hole in the destination buffer silently keeps its previous
contents. It also leaks a DMA mapping per dropped bounce.
Any sufficiently large and fragmented bulk transfer can hit this. It was
found with a USB mass storage device behind xHCI backing a dm-verity
target with 512 byte hash blocks, where the stale data is detected rather
than silently consumed. The device enumerates as SuperSpeed, so
wMaxPacketSize is 1024, while dm-bufio issues one 512 byte bio per hash
block. verity_prefetch_io() makes the block layer merge hundreds of them
into a single request of up to 512 scatterlist entries of 512 bytes each.
At 256 TRBs per ring segment such a TD spans three segments, and every
segment boundary falls on an odd multiple of 512, i.e. unaligned to
wMaxPacketSize. dm-bufio then caches a hash block holding stale data and
dm-verity declares the metadata block corrupted:
device-mapper: verity: 8:2: metadata block 10850 is corrupted
A reproducer running this under qemu is available at
https://github.com/baloo/xhci-verity
The bounce state (bounce_buf, bounce_dma, bounce_len, bounce_offs)
already lives on the ring segment, so there is nothing extra to track.
Keep recording the last bounced segment in td->bounce_seg and, on
completion, walk the segments from td->start_seg up to it, unmapping
every segment that still has a pending bounce.
Stopping at td->bounce_seg rather than td->end_seg matters: a bounce
implies the TD continues past that segment's link TRB, so bounce_seg is
always strictly before end_seg, and a later TD may already have started
in end_seg and been bounced there. Walking that far would copy a foreign
bounce buffer into this URB and unmap it twice. It also keeps the walk
correct if a TD ever wraps the whole ring so that end_seg == start_seg.
[mn: Add ring->num_segs check to prevent unlikely infinite for loop.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload
iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose
DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is '>' and
login->req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding
bytes, where
padding = ((-payload_length) & 3);
any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte
buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL
terminator.
The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path
chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls
strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a
length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL
to ';', so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value
records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the
object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated
initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is
not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and
the CHAP path is never entered.
Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to
it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes, so the buffer is always terminated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: image: mdc800: change kmalloc() to kzalloc()
Change the kmalloc() calls in usb_mdc800_init() for irq_urb_buffer and
download_urb_buffer to kzalloc(), avoiding potential stack leaks if a
shorter message is received in mdc800_usb_irq() and
mdc800_usb_download_notify() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-fabrics: fix DHCHAP secret leak on parse failure
nvmf_parse_options() duplicates dhchap_secret and dhchap_ctrl_secret
with match_strdup() before validating the DHHC-1: representation.
If validation fails, the parser returns -EINVAL before the temporary
string in p is assigned to opts->dhchap_secret or
opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret. nvmf_create_ctrl() subsequently frees opts,
but nvmf_free_options() cannot release the unassigned temporary string.
Each rejected option therefore leaks one allocation.
This is easy to miss because valid secrets transfer ownership to opts
and are freed normally, while the malformed-secret path still returns
the expected -EINVAL to userspace.
With CONFIG_NVME_HOST_AUTH enabled, the leak is reachable before the
required-option checks and transport lookup. No NVMe-oF target or
working transport connection is required; for example, repeatedly
writing
dhchap_secret=BAD
or
dhchap_ctrl_secret=BAD
to /dev/nvme-fabrics deterministically takes the leaking parse path.
Free the temporary string before leaving both validation error paths.
Use kfree_sensitive() because the copied option may contain secret
material even when its representation is rejected, matching the
sensitive cleanup used for stored DHCHAP secrets. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: Free guest debug data on vcpu destroy
kvm_s390_clear_bp_data() is only called from
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(), i.e. when user space changes or
disables debugging. A vCPU that is destroyed while hardware breakpoints
are still armed - the normal case when the VMM just exits or crashes -
leaks hw_bp_info, hw_wp_info and all old_data buffers, since generic KVM
frees the vCPU right after kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy().
That is bounded by MAX_BP_COUNT entries, so roughly 8 KiB per vCPU, but
it is unbounded over VM lifetimes. The allocations are
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, so the charge also outlives the exiting process and
pins dying memcgs.
Fix by clearing the debug data on vCPU destruction. Calling it
unconditionally is fine: struct kvm_vcpu is zero allocated, so for a vCPU
that never enabled debugging the counters are 0 and the pointers NULL. |
| The LearnPress WordPress plugin before 4.4.7 does not restrict the correctness flags it returns when a quiz answer is checked, allowing unauthenticated attackers to obtain the correct answer to every option of a question, along with the instructor's explanation, on courses configured to be taken without enrolling. |
| Tanium addressed an information disclosure vulnerability in Discover. |
| OpenTelemetry-Go is the Go implementation of OpenTelemetry. From version 1.5.0 to 1.44.0, sdk/trace.NewTracerProvider emits a TracerProvider created internal Info-level diagnostic event whose MarshalLog implementations recursively include span processor, exporter, and client configuration. Applications that call otel.SetLogger to enable OpenTelemetry internal Info logging can therefore record OTLP gRPC and HTTP collector endpoints, the OTLP HTTP Insecure flag, and complete Zipkin collector URLs. A person or system with access to those logs can learn internal collector topology and can recover credentials or tokens embedded in Zipkin URL user information or query strings. The default OpenTelemetry logger does not emit the event, and this path does not log OTLP authentication headers, TLS key material, or span payloads. This issue is fixed in version 1.45.0. |
| vm2 before 3.11.7 exposes Node's shared Buffer pool to sandboxed code, allowing disclosure of host memory used by Buffer.from, Buffer.concat, and related allocations. Sandboxed code can read and write to host-realm buffers by acquiring ArrayBuffers from small allocations, leading to sensitive data exposure and potential denial-of-service. |
| vm2 before 3.11.6 fails to restrict access to os and dns builtins under the builtin: ['*'] configuration, allowing sandbox code to read host process identity and network topology. Attackers can invoke dns.setServers() to hijack the host process DNS resolver globally, redirecting all subsequent host DNS queries through an attacker-controlled resolver. |
| Vendure is an open-source headless commerce platform. Prior to 3.6.5, the public Shop API products, collections, and facets queries combine mandatory visibility guards with caller-supplied filters using the caller-controlled filterOperator. When filterOperator is OR, a predicate matching a hidden entity can bypass the Product.enabled, Collection.isPrivate, or Facet.isPrivate guard. An unauthenticated caller can therefore retrieve disabled products and private collections or facets. This issue is fixed in version 3.6.5. |
| Dell OpenManage Server Administrator, versions prior to 11.1.0.3, contains an Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Information exposure. |
| Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, the Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint /actuator/httpexchanges endpoint passes recorded request URIs through MaskedUri, which masks URI user information but does not inspect query strings. When Management:Endpoints:HttpExchanges:IncludeQueryString is enabled, the HttpExchangeRequest response can disclose OAuth tokens, password-reset tokens, signed-URL signatures, API keys, and other query-string secrets from prior traffic to a caller that can reach the explicitly exposed endpoint. The Steeltoe.Management.Endpoint.Actuators.HttpExchanges DEBUG logger also records these URIs, creating a second disclosure channel for users with log access. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0. |
| Cyberdrop-DL is a bulk asynchronous downloader for multiple file hosts. From 8.5.0 until 9.14.0, the Pixeldrain crawler uses substring host matching instead of requiring the input host to be an exact member of SUPPORTED_DOMAINS, and then reuses that input host for API requests. When a Pixeldrain API key is configured, processing a crafted URL from an attacker-controlled lookalike host causes cyberdrop_dl/crawlers/pixeldrain.py to send the Authorization header to that host. The URL may be introduced through a third-party site that can cause downloads for other sites, and the attacker receives the user's Pixeldrain API key. This issue is fixed in version 9.14.0. |
| GeoLens is a self-hosted geospatial data catalog with semantic search, OGC and STAC APIs, and a map builder. Prior to 1.2.3, multiple read and link endpoints authorize only the resource named in the request URL and fail to re-authorize a second caller-influenced dataset reached through a relationship, map layer, VRT source, externalId lookup, or request body. When a public map references a private dataset, anonymous callers can use GET /maps/{id} and GET /maps/{id}/style.json to obtain the private layer's metadata, sampled values, or vector tiles. The style response can expose a replayable HMAC tile URL that is bound to neither a user nor a map. When a public source dataset has a relationship to a private target dataset, anonymous callers can use the dataset relationship APIs to enumerate the relationship and read rows from the private target's backing table. Anonymous callers can also use GET /collections/datasets/items with an externalId dataset UUID to obtain metadata for any private, restricted, or unpublished dataset because that lookup performs no visibility check. Authenticated users with the default editor role can mosaic another user's private raster into an owned VRT and read its pixels, and POST /ai/metadata/{summary,keywords,lineage,quality-statement} accepts a body-controlled dataset_id without a visibility check and returns private metadata and sample values. Pre-existing vrt_source_links also expose unauthorized member metadata and health unless each member is filtered at read time. These paths can disclose vector geometries and attributes, raster pixels, table rows, table names, column schemas, feature counts, extents, source URLs and filenames, contacts, and sampled row values. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.3. |
| mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.2.0, the web_url_read URL policy in src/url-reader.ts can be bypassed while MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is enabled and MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS is not enabled because redirect targets are not revalidated, 0.0.0.0 is not classified as an internal address, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 literals canonicalized to hexadecimal form are not recognized. These inputs allow an attacker-influenced tool call to make the MCP server fetch loopback or internal HTTP resources and return content from local services, private APIs, service-mesh endpoints, or cloud metadata endpoints. The separate hostname-to-private-address case addressed by the earlier partial fix is not part of these residual bypasses. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.0. |
| A vulnerability in HPE Networking EdgeConnect SD-WAN Gateways could allow an unauthenticated adjacent attacker to obtain limited information from memory and disrupt the normal operation of the affected service. Successful exploitation could result in a denial of service (system crash) or the disclosure of uninitialized stack memory. |
| A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of HPE Networking EdgeConnect SD-WAN Gateways could allow a remote attacker authenticated with low privileges to access sensitive information. A successful exploit allows an attacker to retrieve information which could be used to potentially gain further access to network services supported by HPE Networking EdgeConnect SD-WAN Gateways. |
| A vulnerability in the API endpoint of HPE Networking EdgeConnect SD-WAN Orchestrator could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to obtain sensitive information. Successful exploitation could result in the disclosure of security-relevant configuration details and security feature status, which could be used to facilitate further attacks. |
