| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| HTTP::Body versions before 1.23_01 for Perl lose track of chunk boundaries in chunked request bodies when a read ends inside a chunk.
In chunked mode, used when no content length is given, add() treats a chunk as complete once the buffer is as long as the chunk's declared size, but the buffer still holds the chunk-size line. When a read ends in the last bytes of a chunk, add() takes the chunk short and parses the leftover data as the next chunk-size line.
A remote attacker can make a chunked body never complete, hanging a server that reads until the body is done, and may make it complete early, leaving the remaining bytes to be read as the next request. |
| A vulnerability was found in GnuTLS. The response times to malformed ciphertexts in RSA-PSK ClientKeyExchange differ from the response times of ciphertexts with correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. This issue may allow a remote attacker to perform a timing side-channel attack in the RSA-PSK key exchange, potentially leading to the leakage of sensitive data. CVE-2024-0553 is designated as an incomplete resolution for CVE-2023-5981. |
| A vulnerability was found that the response times to malformed ciphertexts in RSA-PSK ClientKeyExchange differ from response times of ciphertexts with correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. |
| tcpflow through 1.6.1 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read process memory by sending packets with forged IP payload lengths. Attackers can inject crafted IPv4 or IPv6 TCP packets into captured traffic or pcap files to leak adjacent memory into reconstructed flow files or crash tcpflow. |
| A heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the DTLS handshake fragment reassembly logic of GnuTLS. The issue arises in merge_handshake_packet() where incoming handshake fragments are matched and merged based solely on handshake type, without validating that the message_length field remains consistent across all fragments of the same logical message. An attacker can exploit this by sending crafted DTLS fragments with conflicting message_length values, causing the implementation to allocate a buffer based on a smaller initial fragment and subsequently write beyond its bounds using larger, inconsistent fragments. Because the merge operation does not enforce proper bounds checking against the allocated buffer size, this results in an out-of-bounds write on the heap. The vulnerability is remotely exploitable without authentication via the DTLS handshake path and can lead to application crashes or potential memory corruption. |
| In EPICS Base release 7.0.10 and prior, an insufficient validation of element or length values in a network message can cause the application to read beyond the bounds of an allocated buffer. This may lead to denial of service and could expose adjacent memory contents. |
| In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, the SNMP agent's OID parser uses a multi-byte BER length from the request without checking it against the bytes present, and reads past the end of the packet buffer. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted SNMP request that makes the agent read adjacent memory into its OID state, faulting the agent on targets with memory protection. |
| MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, decoders for OK packet session-state blocks, column definition packets, text row data, or binary row data used server-declared lengths without confirming that the requested bytes remained in the receive buffer. The decoders could position reads, create sub-buffers, or decode strings beyond the packet boundary. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could trigger unchecked ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException or IllegalArgumentException failures inside JDBC calls and terminate connection handling. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11. |
| MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.10, the ReadableByteBuf.readLength() and ReadableByteBuf.readIntLengthEncodedNotNull() methods narrowed the protocol's unsigned 8-byte length-encoded integer to a Java int without checking that the value fit a non-negative integer. Values above Integer.MAX_VALUE could wrap to a negative or unrelated length that downstream allocation and read paths used. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could trigger NegativeArraySizeException, out-of-bounds failures, or oversized allocation behavior in client connection handling. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.10. |
| Seroval facilitates JavaScript value stringification, including complex structures beyond JSON.stringify capabilities. From 1.4.1 until 1.6.8, fromJSON and fromCrossJSON do not require an array node's element list to be an actual array. A small crafted payload can supply an attacker-controlled length that determines memory allocation and decoder iterations independently of payload size, allowing an unauthenticated request to exhaust the process or block its thread. This issue is a residual bypass of the remediation for CVE-2026-23957. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.8. |
| A data-validation flaw exists in the BSON handling and binary serialization path of the MongoDB C# Driver. When an application constructs a raw or lazy BSON document object from externally supplied binary data, the driver does not verify that the size quantity declared inside that data matches the amount of data actually provided, and it copies the data onto the wire unchanged. An unauthenticated party who can supply binary content to such an application can thereby cause additional elements to be inserted into, or existing elements to be removed from, the database command the application issues, without needing any database credentials of their own. This can result in unauthorized modification of stored data and disclosure of data outside the intended scope of the application's request, bounded by the database privileges the application itself holds. |
| PEAK-System PCAN contains a vulnerable operation involving a variable-length receive-record copy. The driver uses a requested or queued record count without sufficiently capping the copy to the actual caller-supplied output length. |
| MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, the MariaDbPoolConnection.recover() and MariaDbPoolPinnedConnection.recover() implementations trusted the gtrid_length and bqual_length columns returned by XA RECOVER. The methods allocated and split Xid byte arrays without validating the lengths against Xid.MAXGTRIDSIZE, Xid.MAXBQUALSIZE, or the actual data payload. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could cause large allocations, NegativeArraySizeException, or ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException during XA recovery. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11. |
| MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, when CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK was negotiated, the OkPacket.parse() and OkPacket.parseWithInfo() paths allocated byte arrays using server-declared lengths for the OK packet info field and session-state variable names and values before confirming that the bytes remained in the packet. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could send a small OK packet declaring a much larger length and repeatedly force attacker-controlled heap allocations before the subsequent copy failed. This could create garbage-collection pressure or an OutOfMemoryError in the client application. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11. |
| MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7 and 3.4.5, during caching_sha2_password authentication, the authentication-more-data response was treated as a length-encoded byte array, memory was allocated from the server-declared length, and authResult[0] was accessed without ensuring a byte existed. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could declare a very large length or send an empty response before any password was transmitted. The malformed packet could cause excessive allocation or an unchecked ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException escaping from DriverManager.getConnection(). This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7 and 3.4.5. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm/tcpci_maxim: validate header NDO against RX_BYTE_CNT
A broken/malicious port can transmit a CRC-valid frame whose header
advertises up to seven data objects but whose body carries fewer than
that. Check for this, and rightfully reject the message, instead of
reading from uninitialized stack memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: reject a read that transferred too few bytes
nvme_tcp_recv_data() completes a request once the current C2HData PDU
has been consumed. Nothing compares the total bytes received against
the length the command asked for: struct nvme_tcp_request has no
receive-side counter, queue->data_remaining is per queue, and
blk_mq_end_request() completes for blk_rq_bytes(rq) unconditionally
with no residual concept anywhere above.
A controller can therefore answer a 4096-byte read with 512 bytes and
have it reported as a complete read; user space then gets 4096 bytes of
which 3584 are whatever was already in the page. I reproduced that with
a test target.
Count the bytes received and refuse to complete a successful read whose
count does not match, at the two NVME_TCP_F_DATA_SUCCESS paths and in
nvme_tcp_process_nvme_cqe(). The success test shifts req->status right
by one, because the driver keeps the wire value there and shifts it on
completion, so the check must see what the completion path will see.
Only REQ_OP_READ is checked, because there the length comes from the
sectors the request covers; a passthrough command is built by its
submitter, which picks both command and buffer, so the kernel has
nothing to compare against. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ieee80211: validate MLE common info length
ieee80211_mle_common_size() uses the first common-info octet as the
common information length for all known MLE types. However,
ieee80211_mle_size_ok() only validates that octet for Basic, Probe
Request, and TDLS MLEs.
Reconfiguration MLEs also skipped the length octet when calculating the
minimum common size, and Priority Access MLEs skipped validation of the
advertised common information length.
Account for the Reconfiguration common-info length octet and validate
the advertised common information length for all known MLE types. Keep
unknown-type handling unchanged.
[remove now misleading comment] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Ignore Port I/O requests of length '0'
Explicitly ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' (or count '0'), so that
setting up the software scratch area (and other code) doesn't have to
worry about underflowing the length, and to allow for WARNing on trying
to configure the scratch area with len==0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dlm: validate length in dlm_search_rsb_tree
The len parameter in dlm_dump_rsb_name() is not validated and comes
from network messages. When it exceeds DLM_RESNAME_MAXLEN, it can
cause out-of-bounds write in dlm_search_rsb_tree().
Add length validation to prevent potential buffer overflow. |
