| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: ipmb: validate write message length
ipmb_write() read message fields before validating the length byte.
A zero or short write can read uninitialized stack bytes.
A length smaller than the SMBus header underflows the block write length.
Require a non-empty buffer and the minimum IPMB request length.
Also require the length byte plus payload before parsing the message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Cap MSI-X vectors to the device MSI-X table size
mana_gd_query_max_resources() sizes gc->num_msix_usable from resp.max_msix
and the CPU count, but never from the device MSI-X table. On a 1792 vCPU
M-series VM that yields 1793 while the table has 1024 entries, and
mana_gd_setup_remaining_irqs() then walks indices 1..1792, running off the
end of the region mapped by msix_map_region():
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff8e347f8b99800c
RIP: 0010:msix_prepare_msi_desc+0x7a/0x90
RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ff4330cb164ea780 RCX: ff8e347f8b998000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__msi_domain_alloc_irqs+0x13a/0x440
msi_domain_alloc_irq_at+0x149/0x1b0
mana_gd_setup+0x351/0x890
mana_gd_probe+0x274/0x390
</TASK>
RAX is index 1024 * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE, one entry past the table.
msi_insert_desc() does range check the index, but only against the MSI
domain hwsize, which matches the table only for devices on an MSI parent
domain. With a global PCI/MSI domain hwsize is MSI_XA_DOMAIN_SIZE, so
nothing bounds the request.
Cap num_msix_usable with pci_msix_vec_count(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/pm/powerplay: bounds-check voltage index in Vega10 lookup
vddInd, vddciInd and mvddInd from VBIOS-parsed tables index into vddc,
vddci and vddmem lookup tables without bounds checks across nine sites.
Return -EINVAL when any index is out of range. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: prevent out-of-bounds read in super root block parsing
super-root inode metadata size is trusted before nilfs_read_inode_common().
Reject super-root inode sizes whose computed on-disk footprint exceeds the
filesystem block size. This prevents malformed filesystem images from
making nilfs_read_inode_common() read past the end of the super-root block.
[ryusuke: clarify the commit title] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: arm_pmuv3: Zero initialize hw_id branch stack field
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HW_INDEX is supported by BRBE so hw_id is passed to
userspace, but it's never set by the BRBE driver. Zero initialize it as
it should be according to the docs:
* For the architectures whose raw branch records are
* already stored in age order, the hw_idx should be 0.
It's probably too risky to remove PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HW_INDEX from BRBE
now in case anyone is setting it and reading the value, but zero
initializing the whole struct also protects against the same issue with
new fields that are added in the future. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen
nfc_llcp_getsockopt() casts optval to (u32 __user *) for put_user(), so
the kernel always stores 4 bytes regardless of the caller-supplied
optlen. The existing min_t(u32, len, sizeof(u32)) only clamps the length
reported back to userspace; it does not constrain the store. A call with
optlen < 4 therefore writes past the user buffer, violating the
getsockopt(2) contract for all five supported optnames.
Reject any call with optlen < sizeof(u32) up front. 'len' is int, so a
plain size comparison would promote a negative optlen to size_t and slip
past the check; an explicit 'len < 0' test is added first to catch
negative values before the size compare. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: fix out-of-bounds link array access in mt7996_tx()
When mac80211 leaves the link unspecified, mt7996_tx() substitutes the
primary link id of the station or vif. That value is
IEEE80211_LINK_UNSPECIFIED (0xf) until the first link has been added,
and it is then used unchecked to index vif->link_conf[],
mvif->mt76.link[] and sta->link[], all of which hold
IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS (15) entries.
Clamp the primary link id to the default link before using it, and use
the clamped value for the link_sta fallback as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Zero queue and stack outputs on lock failure
Queue and stack pop/peek helpers accept an uninitialized output buffer
because the verifier expects the helper to initialize it. The empty-map
error path clears the buffer, but a failed lock acquisition returns
-EBUSY without writing it.
Clear the output before returning -EBUSY so BPF programs cannot observe
uninitialized stack contents after a failed helper call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: fix counter type in iwl_fwrt_dump_error_logs
The loop counter 'count' was declared as u8 while num_pc is u32.
If firmware advertises more than 255 PC entries the counter wraps
back to zero and the loop never terminates potentially causing an
infinite loop or reading past the allocated pc_data array.
Change the declaration to u32 to match num_pc. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: haptic: don't write an uninitialized value to unhandled usages
fill_effect_buf() initializes value only for the four haptic usages
handled by its switch, but writes it to field->value[] for every usage.
An unhandled usage can therefore receive either an uninitialized value
or one left over from the previous usage. hid_output_report() then
serializes that value into the effect's report buffer.
Skip unhandled usages instead. This also matches switch_mode(), which
only updates fields it recognizes.
Found with Clang's -Wconditional-uninitialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix max_qid race between configfs and controller allocation
The function nvmet_subsys_attr_qid_max_store() can race against
nvmet_alloc_ctrl() when a subsystem's max_qid limit is modified.
Suppose max_qid is currently 64. If nvmet_alloc_ctrl() executes:
ctrl->sqs = kzalloc_objs(struct nvmet_sq *, subsys->max_qid + 1);
and at this exact point, a userspace process changes max_qid to 128,
nvmet_subsys_attr_qid_max_store() will set the new max_qid value. It
attempts to delete active controllers to force a reconnect, but the
new controller won't be deleted because it hasn't been added to the
subsys->ctrls list yet.
nvmet_alloc_ctrl() then proceeds and adds the new controller to the
subsys->ctrls list. Later, when nvmet_install_queue() is called, it
will see max_qid set to 128, but the memory allocated for sqs is only
sized for 64 entries. This results in a KASAN out-of-bounds warning
and potential memory corruptions.
Fix this by protecting the queue allocations and list insertion in
nvmet_alloc_ctrl() with down_read(&nvmet_config_sem). Because
nvmet_subsys_attr_qid_max_store() acquires down_write(&nvmet_config_sem)
to modify the attribute, this safely prevents the configfs writer from
modifying max_qid during controller creation.
Copy the max_qid from the subsystem to the controller's structure
during the allocation; ctrl->max_qid never changes as long as the
controller remains in LIVE state, so this will prevent similar race
conditions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload
iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose
DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is '>' and
login->req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding
bytes, where
padding = ((-payload_length) & 3);
any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte
buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL
terminator.
The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path
chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls
strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a
length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL
to ';', so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value
records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the
object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated
initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is
not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and
the CHAP path is never entered.
Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to
it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes, so the buffer is always terminated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nci: fix uninit-value in the RF discover/activated NTF handlers
nci_rf_discover_ntf_packet() and nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet() each
parse a notification into an on-stack struct (nci_rf_discover_ntf /
nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf) that is not initialised. The RF
technology-specific parameters are only extracted when
rf_tech_specific_params_len is non-zero, so a notification that reports a
zero length leaves the rf_tech_specific_params union uninitialised - and
both handlers then pass it to nci_add_new_protocol(), which reads it:
- discover: nci_add_new_target() -> nci_add_new_protocol();
- activated: nci_target_auto_activated() -> nci_add_new_protocol().
nci_add_new_protocol() uses nfca_poll->nfcid1_len as both a branch
condition and a memcpy() length and copies nfcid1/sens_res/sel_res into
ndev->targets, which is later exposed to user space via NFC_CMD_GET_TARGET.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0
nci_add_new_protocol+0x624/0x6c0
nci_ntf_packet+0x25b2/0x3c30
nci_rx_work+0x318/0x5d0
process_scheduled_works+0x84b/0x17a0
worker_thread+0xc10/0x11b0
kthread+0x376/0x500
Local variable ntf.i created at:
nci_ntf_packet+0xbc2/0x3c30
Zero-initialise both on-stack notifications so the union reads back as
zero when no technology-specific parameters are present. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: xilinx-trng - Remove crypto_rng interface
Implementing the crypto_rng interface has no purpose, as it isn't used
in practice. It's being removed from other drivers too. Just remove
it. This leaves hwrng, which is actually used.
Tagging with 'Cc stable' due to the bugs that this removes:
- xtrng_trng_generate() sometimes returned success even when it didn't
fill in all the bytes.
- It was possible for xtrng_trng_generate() and
xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() to run concurrently and interfere with each
other, as the locking code in xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() was broken. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: dts: renesas: ironhide: Describe inline ECC carveouts
The DBSC5 DRAM controller protects DRAM content using inline ECC.
The inline ECC utilizes areas of DRAM for its operation, which are
in the DRAM address range, but must not be accessed or modified.
Describe the inline ECC carveout areas used by the DBSC5 controller
on this hardware as reserved-memory, which must not be accessed.
Include DRAM areas which are unprotected by ECC as well, those are
parts of the DRAM which directly precede the ECC carveout.
In case of high DRAM utilization, unless the inline ECC carveouts
are properly reserved, Linux may use and corrupt the memory used
by the DBSC5 DRAM controller for inline ECC, which would lead to
the system becoming unstable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag()
Found with syzkaller and a local syzbot instance running on top of a
netdevsim TLS offload emulation; tls_device.c is otherwise only reachable
on a machine with a NIC that implements the offload.
tls_push_data() only checks whether the open record still has room for
another frag at the bottom of its loop, and the MSG_MORE early break
skips that check. The record survives to the next syscall with the frag
count it already had, and tls_append_frag() does not check either, so
with TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO every splice(SPLICE_F_MORE) of a byte or two adds
a non-coalescing pipe page and num_frags walks off the end of
tls_record_info.frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]. Once the record is pushed,
tls_push_record() runs the same index over sg_tx_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS] and
the sg_set_page() writes land on the destruct_work that follows it, which
the workqueue then calls.
The byte limit is fine because copy drops to 0 and the loop falls through
to the same check; the frag count has no such feedback.
Push the record rather than keep a full one open, which is what a plain
TCP socket does - tcp_sendmsg_locked() uses tcp_mark_push() and
new_segment in both the copy and the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES paths, and tls_sw
already sets full_record when the sk_msg ring fills up, MSG_MORE or not.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tls_append_frag ( net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881104d1530 by task tls_oob/450
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 450 Comm: tls_oob Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7+ #329 PREEMPT
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
tls_append_frag (net/tls/tls_device.c:269)
tls_push_data (net/tls/tls_device.c:518)
tls_device_sendmsg (net/tls/tls_device.c:583)
inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:865)
sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:775 net/socket.c:790 net/socket.c:813)
splice_to_socket (fs/splice.c:884)
do_splice (fs/splice.c:936 fs/splice.c:1349)
__do_splice (fs/splice.c:1431)
__x64_sys_splice (fs/splice.c:1634 fs/splice.c:1616)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
</TASK>
and, once the record is pushed:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:300:24
index 18 is out of range for type 'skb_frag_t [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:301:41
index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:302:39
index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:307:38
index 26 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]'
kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea000411a680
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation
Oops: Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Workqueue: ktls_device_destruct 0xffffea000411a680
RIP: 0010:0xffffea000411a680
Call Trace:
<TASK>
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3405 kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: zero the sockaddr before returning it in getname
iso_sock_getname() fills a struct sockaddr_iso in place and returns its
size without clearing it first, so bytes it does not write are copied to
user space from the kernel stack. The getsockname(2) and getpeername(2)
paths both run through do_getsockname(), which hands getname() an
uninitialized sockaddr_storage on the stack and copies back up to the
number of bytes getname() returns, so the driver has to initialize every
byte it accounts for.
Two ranges are left uninitialized:
- struct sockaddr_iso is 10 bytes but only 9 are written (family,
iso_bdaddr, iso_bdaddr_type), leaking the trailing pad byte on every
call.
- for a broadcast peer (BIS_LINK or PA_LINK) the returned length grows
by sizeof(struct sockaddr_iso_bc), but only bc_sid, bc_num_bis and
bc_bis are filled; bc_bdaddr and bc_bdaddr_type, the first 7 bytes of
that structure, are never written.
An unprivileged process can open a BTPROTO_ISO socket and reach the pad
leak with getsockname(); the broadcast leak needs an established BIS/PA
connection. l2cap and rfcomm already memset their sockaddr in getname
for the same reason; do the same here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: lzo: reject compressed segment that overflows the compressed input
lzo_decompress_bio() validates each on-disk segment length seg_len only
against the workspace cbuf size, not against the compressed input size
(compressed_len, the total folio bytes of the bio). A crafted extent can
carry a segment whose seg_len passes the cbuf check but runs past the end
of the bio, so copy_compressed_segment() walks off the last folio:
get_current_folio() then returns the NULL folio from bio_next_folio(), and
with CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT disabled (default) folio_size(NULL) faults.
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in lzo_decompress_bio (fs/btrfs/lzo.c:383)
Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000000 by task kworker/u8:1/29
Workqueue: btrfs-endio simple_end_io_work
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:590)
lzo_decompress_bio (fs/btrfs/lzo.c:383)
end_bbio_compressed_read (fs/btrfs/compression.c:1065)
btrfs_bio_end_io (fs/btrfs/bio.c:135)
btrfs_check_read_bio (fs/btrfs/bio.c:180 fs/btrfs/bio.c:285)
simple_end_io_work
process_one_work
worker_thread
Reject any segment whose payload would extend beyond compressed_len before
copying it, treating it as corruption like the other on-disk validation
failures in this function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/openvswitch: check Ethernet header length in key_extract()
When a packet arrives on an ARPHRD_NONE device (e.g. TUN),
ovs_flow_key_extract() trusts the user-provided skb->protocol field: if
it is ETH_P_TEB, the packet is classified as MAC_PROTO_ETHERNET and
key_extract() is called without ensuring the skb has ETH_HLEN (14) bytes
of linear data. key_extract() unconditionally pulls 2 * ETH_ALEN bytes
for MAC addresses and parse_ethertype() pulls 2 more, either of which
triggers a kernel BUG in __skb_pull() when the linear area is too small.
kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2848!
RIP: 0010:key_extract+0xa7e/0xd90 net/openvswitch/flow.c:933
ovs_flow_key_extract+0x419/0xa70
ovs_vport_receive+0x222/0x390
netdev_frame_hook+0x3e0/0x630
tun_get_user+0x2d0c/0x38e0
Fixed by calling check_header() in key_extract() before accessing the
Ethernet header. |
